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ABSTRACT 
THE ETHJCS OF HUMAN GENETIC ENHANCEMENT EXTENDING THE PUBLIC 
POLICY DEBATE 
By John J. Baumann, Ph.D  
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University Virginia Commonwealth 
University, 1999. 
Major Director David R Hiley, Ph D ,  Vice Provost for Academic Affairs 
Mammalian one-cell embryos can be genetically altered, implanted into the 
female's uterus, and subsequently develop into biologically mature organisms in the 
usual manner. If the resultant adult organisms reproduce, the genetic change may be 
passed on to future generations. In humans, the procedure is known alternatively as 
"human genetic engineering" or "human germline gene therapy." Bioethicists distinguish 
between genetic engineering intended for the prevention or treatment of disease 
("treatment germline gene therapy") and genetic engineering intended for non-medical 
enhancement of certain characteristics ("enhancement germline gene therapy"). Human 
genetic engineering has the potential to effectively replace deleterious genes such as the 
gene for cystic fibrosis or sickle cell disease - with a normal gene. Thus, not only is 
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disease avoided in the next generation, but all future generations are spared the effects of 
the disease-causing gene as well. 
The current public policy consensus is that human genetic engineering, whether 
intended for treatment or enhancement, is ethically impermissible. The primary reason is 
that present genetic engineering technology carries an unacceptable level of risk for use 
in humans. There is, however, good reason to believe that genetic engineering will 
become acceptably safe for use in humans, thereby eliminating the major ethical barrier 
to the technology. In fact, several policy statements already have suggested that, once 
safe, treatment genetic engineering ought to be permitted while enhancement genetic 
engineering ought not to be permitted. 
Part of the concern surrounding genetic enhancement is that bad consequences -
such as morally objectionable eugenics practices - might ensue. But another objection is 
that human genetic enhancement is intrinsically problematic. In other words, at least 
very radical genetic enhancements violate what it is that makes human beings 
intrinsically valuable Drawing on a Wittgensteinian view of human beings, the present 
work proposes a conception of ethically significant humanness - "human beingness" -
that is potentially threatened by certain kinds or degrees of human genetic enhancement 
The impact of human beingness on the future direction of human gene therapy policy, 
and in other policy areas, is discussed 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
That the growing power of molecular genetics confronts us with future prospects of being 
able to change the nature of our species is a fact that seldom appears to be addressed in 
depth.I 
Since the 1960s, when the prospect of technically feasible human genetic 
engineering (GE) first came into view, it has been met with a variety of ethical 
objections. At the forefront have been concerns that human GE would lead to unintended 
harms or other bad consequences. In particular, there has been the fear that things will go 
horribly awry and monstrous subhumans will be created (see also President's 
Commission, excerpted in Jonsen, Veatch, & Walters, 1998, p. 300; Rollin, 1995). 
In addition to fear of harm, there have been other objections. For example, some 
have argued that human GE for any purpose would put us on the slippery slope towards 
ethically objectionable eugenics - that is, towards efforts to improve the human race 
through genetic means. Such efforts in the past have been based on racial and other 
prejudices, and have involved such means as forced sterilization of certain 
"undesirables." Others have argued that human GE is morally wrong because it would 
involve the destruction of embryos along the way. Since current human GE technology 
involves the introduction of genes into one-cell embryos in a process that is not one 
hundred percent efficient, many one-cell embryos would be lost both in preliminary 
research and in clinical application. Still others have argued that human GE is wrong 
1 Editors of the journal Nature, March 7, 19% (quoted in Silver, 1997, p. IO). 
because it violates the rights of future generations to have a genetic inheritance that has 
not been tampered with. And still other objections have been made as well. 
We will be concerned with a different sort of objection, namely, that human GE 
has the potential to violate what is intrinsically valuable, or "sacred" (where that can be 
understood in a secular sense; see Chapter 4 on Dworkin), in human beings While not 
all alterations to the human genome are ethically objectionable, certain kinds or degrees 
of genetic alteration in humans are intrinsically morally regrettable - that is, regrettable 
regardless of whether the consequences are good or bad. 
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Investigating this ethical objection to human GE is important for two interrelated 
reasons - the first having to do with public policy, and the second with bioethics 
generally  With respect to public policy, it will be argued that the current ethical basis 
for restricting certain kinds of human GE is unstable. The ethical objections that 
collectively compose that basis are either time-bound, or not likely to carry sufficient 
weight to justify restricting human GE. Most important of these is the objection that 
human GE is morally impermissible because it is unsafe. This objection is at present not 
a matter of serious dispute, and is central to the justification for restricting even medically 
beneficial human GE. But there are good reasons for believing that human GE will 
become safe in the foreseeable future (see Chapter 2). Once safe, we will need to rely on 
other ethical objections to support the imposition of limits on the kinds of genetic 
alterations that may be made to human beings. The other possibilities, as just noted, are 
not particularly compelling. These arguments related to the tenuous foundation for our 
current ethical consensus on human GE will be taken up in Chapter 3. 
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With respect to bioethics generally, the question is whether the ethical issues are 
exhausted by the list of objections that we will be considering. Perhaps even after one 
accounts for the possibility of harmful consequences, and the moral status of embryos, 
and the possibility of eugenics-related abuses, and so on, there is at the heart of our moral 
intuitions about human GE, an ethical "remainder," so to speak. Put differently, even in 
an idealized case in which human GE could be done safely and the other ethical 
objections did not apply, many would intuitively feel that some limit on the genetic 
alteration of humans still ought to apply - that something of ethical significance remains 
that ought not be violated. (We already have used the terms "intrinsic human value" and 
"sacredness" to refer to this hypothesized ethical remainder. Others have spoken of 
"human dignity" or "humanity" or "human beingness", which seem in certain contexts to 
be related concepts. For the time being we will use the term humanness as a 
placeholder.) To the extent that there are rational underpinnings to our intuitions about 
humanness - intuitions that may be illuminated by considering the case of human GE -
an understanding of those underpinnings will broaden the base of ethical concerns that 
can legitimately be raised in bioethics. 
Thus, the present inquiry addresses the following central questions: 
I) What is the current ethical basis for public policy restrictions on certain kinds of 
human GE, and is that basis stable? 
2) Can a rational basis be found to support the intuition that certain kinds or degrees 
of non-harmful human genetic enhancement violate what is intrinsically valuable 
in human beings? 
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The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the nature of this motivating 
intuition. Novel genetic and biomedical technologies are often accused of violating "who 
we are." But some technologies seem to evoke stronger reactions of this sort than others. 
We will focus on these more troubling cases and ask what it is that seems to be 
jeopardized in these cases in contrast to the others. Having narrowed the scope in this 
way, two senses of"who we are" will emerge. Of these two senses of"who we are" only 
one will appear to be threatened by certain kinds or degrees of human genetic 
enhancement - namely, what we are provisionally calling "humanness " But is 
"humanness" merely biological humanness, i e., membership in the species Homo 
sapiens? If so, how can this be of ethical significance? If "humanness" is something 
other than species membership, then what is it? Finally, a thought experiment is 
introduced to assist in our consideration of these questions in subsequent chapters. 
The scientific background to human GE will be introduced in Chapter 2 Aside 
from serving as an introduction to GE technology, Chapter 2 also gives reasons in 
support of the claim that GE is likely to become technically feasible and acceptably safe 
for use in humans, thus eliminating the main ethical objection to human GE. Chapter 3 
introduces the current "orthodox" position on human GE, and argues that - once GE 
becomes acceptably safe for use in humans the other ethical objections to human GE 
are not likely to justify a restrictive policy Chapter 4 considers the view that, given the 
arguments of Chapters 2 and 3, restrictions on human GE are not justifiable. That is, if 
human GE becomes acceptably safe and other common objections are not compelling, 
perhaps we are not justified in our intuition that altering humankind is ethically 
regrettable. Chapter 5 offers a conception of humanness that, arguably, could serve as a 
basis for restricting at least certain kinds or degrees of (non-harmful) human genetic 
enhancements. Finally, Chapter 6 considers some of the implications of this conception 
of humanness not only for human GE policy, but for other policy areas as well 
The Essence of Humanness 
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The idea that human beings have an essence or distinctive nature has been a 
prominent part of our Western philosophical heritage. Aristotle held that all things in the 
world have a function, or te/os, that is peculiar to them. The good life, or eudaimonia, is 
achieved through the successful performance of that function But only things which 
possess the relevant arete (usually translated as "virtue" or "excellence") will be capable 
of successfully performing their peculiar function (Rowe, 1991, p. 124). Thus, for 
example, only good acorns (those possessing the relevant arete) will successfully fulfill 
their peculiar function, namely, becoming a strong, well shaped oak tree (Magill, 1990) 
The function of human beings, according to Aristotle, is "an active life of that which 
possesses reason" (quoted in Rowe, 1991, p  124) The successful performance of this 
function requires the relevant aretai, the most important of which is "the intellect 
functioning in isolation," although the practical or "moral" virtues (such as justice, 
courage and wittiness) have a role to play as well (ibid , p. 124). St Thomas Aquinas 
drew on Aristotle's work, which had recently become available in the Christian West 
On Aquinas' view, 
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right action is conduct that either tends to promote or actually realizes human 
flourishing. On this view there is a distinctive and essential human nature, and 
associated with it a set of values constituting excellence in the conduct of life. 
Hence, virtues are those habits of action which are conducive to the fulfillment of 
an agent's rational nature. (Haldane, 1991, p. 141) 
Kant rejects both the conception of a human nature that transcends our 
experience, and the accounts of the virtues held by his predecessors. Kant does, however, 
tie the moral worth of human beings to their possession of the faculty ofreason It is 
reason that permits the development of a good will, for "only a rational being has the 
power of acting according to the idea of a law, i e , by Will" (Russell, 1945, p. 710). The 
good will, in turn, is a sort of moral fountainhead from which all properly motivated 
moral actions spring. Kant claims that "Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even 
beyond the world - can possibly be conceived which could be called good without 
qualification except a goodwilf' (quoted in Magill, 1990, p. 336) The intellectual and 
"moral" virtues of Aristotle and Aquinas are not good in themselves. Intelligence, 
courage, moderation, and so on, can be put to ill purposes as well as good From this 
notion of the rational man's good will, Kant derives an ethics centered on moral duty. 
The repudiation of transcendental understandings of human nature seen in Kant is 
sympathetically received in an increasingly scientific world. The tools of science have 
allowed us to probe "human nature" in ways that Aristotle could not have imagined, and 
the descriptions of this nature are in the language of biology and chemistry, not 
metaphysics. We don't see souls or essences; we see organs, cells and chromosomes. As 
the Nobel Prize-winning geneticist Joshua Lederberg once noted, "Humanistic culture 
rests on a definition of man which we already know to be biologically vulnerable" (1966, 
p  530) 
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Nevertheless, "human nature" need not imply the existence of mysterious 
metaphysical entities In our everyday world there is no problem in distinguishing human 
beings from other things. Although it may not be easy to identify with certainty the one 
or more defining characteristics of human beings, the sense that there are such 
characteristics is not easily abandoned. As we have seen, the conception of human 
beings as essentially rational creatures has been prominent in our thought about 
ourselves. But whether our humanness inheres just in rationality or in something else (or 
something more), we tend to think that the notion of human nature, or essential 
humanness, is meaningful And we think not only that it is meaningful semantically, but 
that it is meaningful morally as well 
To say that a particular philosophical view - essentialism - has been prominent in 
Western thought is merely to make an historical point. It remains to be seen whether 
some notion of ethically significant humanness is defensible (see Chapters 4 and 5). Let 
us turn first to our intuitive moral aversion to certain genetic and other biomedical 
technologies. What is the nature of this aversion? Which technologies seem most 
problematic? And what exactly appears to be threatened by these technologies? 
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Moral Aversion to Biological Novelties 
With many biotechnological breakthroughs - certainly those directly involving 
humans - there have been public outcries of alarm and dismay of variable duration and 
vociferousness. The offending technologies are typically accused of being "unnatural," 
or of threatening "who we are," our "identity" Joseph Fletcher, writing almost three 
decades ago, captured this sense of alarm at a time when organ transplantation and 
kidney dialysis machines were new technologies, the use of psychotropic medicines had 
become common, and molecular genetics was just getting under way (Fletcher, 1970, pp  
122-123) 
Take the notion of' identity,' a notion so prominent in the current rhetoric of 
psychology.. Given the present and future trends in cyborg medicine, one may 
well ask Who is it that functions physiologically with borrowed or artificial veins 
and arteries ( whether synthetic or plastic), bone structures, prosthetic devices, 
cardiac implants - including even donated aortas or whole hearts - audio and 
visual aids, manipulators and pedipulators, donated kidneys, or artificial dialysis 
for kidney function, artificial kidneys and hearts powered by isotopic energy, and 
many other technological devices, logically ending in a sort of ultima ratio with 
transplanted brains? Who is the child born as a result of predetermined sex, 
germinal selection, genetic control, and artificial mutations - and after birth 
modified not only by cyborg technology but by chemical and electronic means, 
for example, by effective appetite controls and weight controls, electric brain 
stimulation by electrodes and surgical subcuts, endocrine alterations, and the like? 
For just as we once reached the point at which diabetics could regulate the sugar 
in their blood systems, so we will have autocontrol of mood and intelligence. 
Who, then, is who? How will we think of it when theoretical brain transplants 
become operational? As they say, today's 'science fiction' is tomorrow's science 
Who is the recipient patient - is he the preoperative person or the donor? This 
kind of basic conceptual question, like the one about when and what is death, will 
inevitably change not only the language but also the mental constructs with which 
we think about moral values, ethical responsibility, and even the very notion of 
the moral agent himself 
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Fletcher covers the gamut of biological novelties of the time, citing bodily 
alterations ( e.g., transplantation, prosthetics, dialysis), psychological alterations ( e.g., 
psychotropic medications, brain surgery), and genetic or reproductive alterations. Similar 
reactions have also been seen, to greater or lesser extents, in response to in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), somatic cell gene therapy, and human cloning. (Somatic cell gene 
therapy involves the correction of a genetic defect in the non-reproductive cells of a 
patient - e g, the introduction of normally functioning genes into the lung cells of 
persons with cystic fibrosis These genetic corrections cannot be passed on to offspring 
See Chapter 2.) 
But it is relatively easy to chip away at this sort of sweeping objection. Certainly 
no one regards the recipient of a transplanted heart, liver or kidney as a person whose 
identity has become indefinite as a result of that transplant If it was Aunt Mary who 
entered the operating room, it is the same Aunt Mary who comes out Whatever it is that 
is essential to Aunt Mary is not changed by having exchanged a diseased kidney for a 
healthy one  Similarly, in the case ofIVF, how can the fact that fertilization is 
extrauterine make any moral difference? The same child would have resulted from a 
given union of sperm and egg if that union had occurred in the Fallopian tube of the 
prospective mother rather than in a laboratory dish. In the case of somatic cell gene 
therapy, if we can restore normal lung cell function in a patient suffering from cystic 
fibrosis, what does it matter that this is accomplished through the introduction to lung 
cells of "normal" genes that won't be passed on to that patient's offspring? Somatic cell 
gene therapy seems to raise no new ethical issues over and above those that attend non­
genetic therapies - expected beneft-to-risk ratio, informed consent, and so on. 
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Although the popular verdict is still out on human cloning, some see it as no more 
morally troublesome than IVF or somatic cell gene therapy (see Kluger, 1997, p. 70). An 
objection that some have made is that, by creating a genetic duplicate, the "identity" (in 
the sense of self-image or self-conception) of that clone would be compromised. As 
Annas ( 1998, p. 123) says, "The danger is that through human cloning we will lose 
something vital to our humanity, the uniqueness (and therefore the value and dignity) of 
every human " The underlying premise seems to be that genetic uniqueness is necessary 
for an uncompromised "identity" of this sort. But clones are essentially later-born 
identical twins - that is, the cloned offspring is identical to the "original" (the donor of 
the cell nucleus used to create the embryo) in the same way that identical twins are 
identical. And the latter we do not typically view as lacking in uniqueness as individual 
persons, nor as victims of morally regrettable reproductive circumstances 
These brief comments on cloning, somatic cell gene therapy, IVF, and 
transplantation are not intended to substitute for a full ethical debate. They are 
mentioned here merely to point out what they have in common. In each of these cases, 
the result is either a normal human offspring, or a medically improved (closer to normal) 
patient. When the result of biomedical intervention is a relatively healthy, normal human 
being who has not undergone a significant transformation of the personality or "self," the 
initial sense of revulsion about the intervention seems not to have much staying power. 
The charge of"changing who we are" seems implausible 
II 
For many controversial biotechnologies, perhaps there is nothing more to be said. 
Upon reflection, we may agree that the novel technique in question does not change "who 
we are." Our initial reaction, we may conclude, was nothing more than a "revulsion 
against anomalies," as Glover puts it ( 1984, p. 40), or maybe a concern about the 
potential for harm or abuse, or a bit of both 
Threats to "Identity" 
Yet there are other technologies that cannot be so easily dismissed, that do seem 
to have the potential to threaten who we are, in some sense of that phrase. Let's briefly 
consider three that Fletcher alluded to - "cosmetic psychopharmacology" (Kramer, 1993, 
p xvi), brain surgery, and genetic engineering. In doing so, we will gain a better 
purchase on what might be meant by the phrase "who we are." That is, we will see which 
kinds of identity are potentially placed in jeopardy by human GE, and which kinds are 
not Since we wish to consider the ethical ramifications of potential threats to identity in 
isolation from other ethical issues, we will concern ourselves only with non-harmful 
interventions, i e., with enhancements 
Cosmetic Psychopharmacofogy 
Psychiatrist Peter Kramer, in his book Listening to Prozac (1993) describes 
several patients who were treated with Prozac at a time when that drug was new on the 
market Prozac was used in patients who were having difficulties that could, in a very 
broad sense of the term, be classified as compulsions  In one case, a patient's 
compulsions had to do with remaining committed to close personal relationships. In the 
past, these compulsions had had favorable effects The patient managed at a young age 
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to fill a parental role in her family after her parents failed to do so, seeing to it that her 
siblings completed their education and generally turned out well. She herself managed 
against all odds to succeed professionally  Later, however, her compulsive tendencies led 
her to remain committed to a relationship with an abusive man, and then emotionally 
attached to him after the relationship ended. 
On Prozac, this patient was able to shed her emotional ties to her former 
boyfriend. In addition, on the job she was able to handle difficult and very stressful labor 
negotiations with an improved degree of conf dence and skill Her social life picked up. 
She began dating much more frequently, and enjoying these occasions 
This transformation of the self was typical of Kramer's patients on Prozac 
Kramer noted with some alarm that patients tended to characterize themselves as being 
"better than well" when on the drug Some, when taken off Prozac, reverted to that set of 
behaviors and dispositions that had been typical of their life prior to medication, at which 
they would lament that they no longer felt themselves. This complaint caused Kramer to 
wonder, naturally, who they had been all those years before Prozac if not themselves? 
One patient was so taken with the drug that she ebulliently announced that she now 
referred to herself as "Ms  Prozac" - an appellation that had never in the author's 
experience been constructed using the name of any other drug. 
In the case of Prozac, we might be inclined to say that the effect is more on the 
order of "enhancement of mood" rather than "transformation of self" But then it is not 
difficult to imagine another drug - a "Super Prozac" - the effects of which are even more 
pronounced, though still considered enhancements, at least from the perspective of the 
patient. With Super Prozac, whatever we have gained in the form of the enhanced 
person, we are tempted to say that there has been a loss in the form of the pre-treatment 
person. 
Brain Surgery 
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The second technology that has been viewed as a potential threat to identity is 
brain surgery. In brain surgery, a distinction is made between surgery intended to correct 
or alleviate psychiatric disorders and surgery intended to correct or alleviate non­
psychiatric disorders. The former was until recently known as psychosurge,y, and is now 
commonly known as psychiatric surge,y (The term "psychosurgery" fell into disfavor 
owing to the crude nature of early psychosurgical techniques - most notoriously the 
frontal lobotomy - which eventually drew vehement protest (see, e g ,  Valenstein, 1986)) 
The latter category is known simply as brain surgery 
Kleinig (1985, p. 73) speaks of a "rigid moral dichotomisation of brain surgery 
and psychosurgery." Brain surgery tends to be seen as morally unobjectionable because 
the intent is to restore brain function, often by removing damaged or diseased tissue. 
Psychiatric surgery, on the other hand, usually involves the destruction of histologically 
normal brain tissue and is, by definition, intended to alter personality. 
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A morally troubling feature of psychiatric surgery is the potential for a substantial 
transformation rather than moderate alteration - of the personality  The concern is that 
"[ t ]he patient enters the [ operating] theatre as one person and emerges as another" (ibid , 
p. 77). The procedure is justified, of course, by viewing the transformation as restorative, 
rather than destructive, of the self 
An example of (non-psychiatric) brain surgery is the use of grafts of neural tissue 
for the treatment of Parkinson's disease, a relatively common neurodegenerative disorder 
named for the physician who first described it as the "shaking palsy" (Youdim & 
Riederer, 1997, p 52) Northoff ( 1996) reviews the standard arguments for and against 
the claim that brain tissue transplantation alters personal identity over time Opponents 
tend to rely on"' strict identity' between brain and person so that even inserting a small 
number of new cells within the brain necessarily affects personal identity" (ibid , p 175; 
emphasis added) Some argue that alterations to the brain necessarily affect the mind as 
well (ibid , p  177) Some argue that the distinction between motor functions and 
psychological functions is blurry, and that tissue transplantations designed to restore the 
former necessarily affect the latter (ibid., p  166) Proponents, on the other hand, say that 
when relatively small amounts of tissue are transplanted, the effect is one of restoring 
normal function, not altering personal identity (ibid , p. 174). Brain function - its 
restoration, loss, or alteration - is emphasized by proponents as being critical to personal 
identity. There has been no evidence that tissue transplantation (i.e., small amounts) 
alters the psychological functions or phenomenal experiences of Parkinsonic patients 
(ibid , pp  176 177)  Thus far, these brain tissue grafts have not provoked much in the 
way of controversy because the amounts of tissue have been small, the goal has been the 
restoration of normal brain function, and evidently the strict identity arguments of 
opponents have not been persuasive. 2 
For our purposes, it is not necessary to resolve the dispute over whether 
transplantation of small amounts of brain tissue jeopardizes personal identity. The 
underlying philosophical views on personal identity over time are complicated, and are 
somewhat tangential to our main concerns. Instead we can work from the common 
ground between the camps. Both proponents and opponents of tissue transplantation 
agree that the transplantation of a substantial amount of brain tissue (e.g., whole lobes) 
would threaten personal identity. Of course, one is not at liberty to test this hypothesis in 
humans, but an example in birds makes the point. A recent experiment showed that, by 
transplanting portions of the brain of a Japanese quail into chickens, one can transfer to 
chickens the crowing and associated head movements typical of the quail (Balaban, 
1997) 
At the extreme end of the spectrum, whole brain transplants, if surgically 
successful, would presumably result in a radical change in (or relocation ofi) the self -
the transfer of one (psychological) person to another body The prospect of human brain 
transplants might seem annoyingly fantastic and so far out of moral bounds as not to 
warrant serious discussion. While the subject of brain transplants will not be pursued 
herein, a few brief observations may suffice to show that the possibility of human brain 
transplants is not as far-fetched as one might suspect, either as a technical or a moral 
2 What controversy there is has to do wid1 die source of the graft tissue aboned fetuses (Hoffer & 
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matter. Whole-brain transplants have been done in monkeys (White et al, 1996), 
suggesting that they could well be technically feasible in humans. Although in monkeys, 
the post-operative animal was paralyzed from the neck down, it is not difficult to imagine 
at least one scenario in which we might want -indeed, be ethically compelled -to 
exercise this option. Let us imagine that A suffers from disease Z that leaves him 
paralyzed from the neck down and is characterized further by a progressive, inevitably 
fatal, deterioration of the body excluding the brain (The plight of world-renowned 
physicist Stephen Hawking comes to mind here.) B is an accident victim who, as a result 
of his head injuries, is declared "brain dead," but who retains normal function in all other 
organs including the brain stem. Assuming B's loved ones give permission, etc , it is by 
no means obvious why the transplantation of A's brain into B's body should be deemed 
morally impermissible. The outcome for B is no worse B is dead in either case. The 
outcome for A is better-while still paralyzed from the neck down, B's body is free from 
disease Z which, it will be recalled, is fatal By proceeding with the transplant, we will 
have saved A's life. Obviously, we have for simplicity just ignored a long list of social 
and philosophical complications, the pursuit of which is beyond the scope of the present 
inquiry. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that, at the very least, a justification for 
denying A the operation is called for. 
The main point for our purposes is simply that certain kinds of brain surgery may 
compromise our identity even though they otherwise relieve certain diseases or 
disabilities and are generally beneficial 
Olson, 1991). 
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Genetic Engineering 
The third biotechnology that has the potential to threaten our "identity" is genetic 
engineering. GE involves the introduction of exogenous genes into the chromosomes of 
either the recently fertilized egg, or the sperm or egg prior to fertilization. When 
successful, this procedure results in offspring that possess, in addition to their own genes, 
the artificially introduced genes as well. Since genes are made of the same chemical stuff 
in all organisms, genes from human or non-human sources may be used The technical 
details of human GE will be presented in Chapter 2. For now, it is sufficient to note that 
the prospect of crossing species boundaries has elicited expressions of moral dismay from 
various quarters, and is generally viewed as morally impermissible, at least where the 
human species is involved. Recently, for example, President Clinton reacted to news that 
a human cell had been fused with a cow egg cell, reportedly giving rise to an embryonic 
stem cell, i e , a cell that has the capacity to develop into a fully formed organism. 
Writing to the Chair of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, the President 
expressed the nature of his ethical misgivings concisely (Clinton, 1998) 
This week's report of the creation ofan embryonic stem cell that is part human 
and part cow raises the most serious of ethical, medical, and legal concerns. I am 
deeply troubled by this news of experiments involving the mingling of human and 
non-human species. 
We will have more to say on the subject of crossing species boundaries shortly. Now, 
however, it will be useful to contrast the threat to our "identity" posed by human genetic 
engineering with that posed by psychopharmacology or brain surgery. 
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Human GE Does Not Threaten Particular Personhood (Personal Identity over Time) 
In genetically altering recently fertilized eggs, one might conceivably alter 
general personhood or humanness - i.e., one's very status as a person or a human - but 
not particular personhood or humanness  That is, assuming that the recently fertilized 
egg (a.k.a, the one-cell embryo, or zygote) is not a person or human being, genetically 
altering it might give rise to an organism that is not a person or not a human being 
However, such an alteration will not result in a loss of ( or threat to) personal identity over 
time, as was illustrated in the cases of brain surgery and (arguably) cosmetic 
psychopharmacology What is threatened in those latter cases is the continued existence 
of a particular, essentially psychological, person Where there was, prior to treatment 
with Prozac (or a "Super Prozac"), Jane, there is now some other individual who is not 
(or is only partially) Jane. And intentionally bringing about the loss of part or all of this 
unique individual person is ethically regrettable. The same might be said of certain types 
of brain surgery that similarly result in significant differences and psychological 
discontinuities between the pre-operative and post-operative patient The relevant 
examples considered above were the transplantation of whole lobes or whole brains  
But particular personhood - or personal identity over time - cannot be what is 
lost in the case of human GE because the thing that is altered (the zygote) is not a person  
There is no Jane that exists in the first place, and thus no particular person who could be 
lost through some radical pharmaceutical, surgical or other alteration. It has just been 
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asserted without argument that the zygote, or one cell embryo, is not a person. Those 
who find this assertion implausible might insist that some justification -some account of 
personhood -is required here  While a justification could well be articulated, we can 
instead concede the point and make an alternative claim. Even if we allow that the 
zygote is a person -and thus that personal identity over time is potentially threatened by 
genetic alterations of the zygote -we can stipulate instead that the gamete (i.e., the sperm 
or egg) is the object of genetic manipulation (see Chapter 2 for technical details). It is 
difficult to imagine an account of personhood on which gametes qualify as persons At a 
minimum, we may say that the burden has now shifted to those who would make such a 
claim 
Isolating the Ethical Variable of Interest - Humanness 
We have been searching for what we intuitively feel is potentially intrinsically 
wrong with human GE. This search is important, we have said, for two interconnected 
reasons. First, our policy statements reflect the popular sentiment that, while some 
medically beneficial human GE ought to be permitted, there are some moral lines that 
should not be crossed with the technology. Thus far a restrictive policy has been able to 
rely on the risk of harm and other common ethical objections as the basis for the ethical 
consensus against human GE. However, there is reason to believe that the technology 
will become safe, and other common objections, we will argue, are not likely to stop the 
momentum that favors a permissive policy on human GE  
Second, as an ethical issue, the current debate over human GE seems incomplete. 
The concerns about harm, the moral status of the embryo, eugenics, and so on, do not 
capture the deeper ethical misgivings - the sense that at least certain kinds or degrees of 
genetic intervention threaten "who we are>' We have noted that this intuitive sense that 
human GE threatens our sense of identity or "who we are" cannot be understood to mean 
particular personhood (personal identity over time) However, GE can, in principle, 
threaten general personhood or humanness  That is, assuming that it became technically 
feasible, substantial alterations of the human genome could give rise to a novel organism 
that would not be recognizably human. The hypothesis, then, is that it is the potential of 
human GE to threaten our humanness that is at the heart of our intuitive moral aversion. 
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At this juncture, a point should be made regarding the selection of human genetic 
enhancement from among several controversial biotechnologies that have evoked similar 
moral reactions  This selection was made not only because human genetic enhancement 
is an important and timely public policy issue in its own right. There was a strategic 
reason as well. As might already be obvious, the motivation had to do with isolating the 
ethical variable of interest. By focusing on enhancement, as opposed to genetic 
engineering generally, we are by definition ruling out moral objections based on bad 
consequences. By choosing germ line genetic alterations, we eliminate moral objections 
having to do with a loss of personal identity over time. (Per above, we are starting with a 
one-cell embryo or gamete - a non-person and so loss of personal identity is 
impossible.) Thus, in attempting to make sense of the intuitive moral aversion to GE, it 
is being suggested that even when human GE leads to good consequences and does not 
threaten personal identity over time, something (the isolated ethical variable -
humanness) of ethical significance remains 
We will have more to say about the notion of humanness shortly. For now we 
will continue to rely on a common-sense understanding of what it means to be human. 
What sort of human genetic enhancement might threaten humanness? 
Silver's Futuristic Scenario: The GenRich 
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Silver, in Remaking Eden ( 1997, pp  240-249), describes a scenario that will serve 
us well in our ethical thought-experiments In Silver's future world, genetic engineering 
technology has become routine by the year 2350 and is used for purposes of 
enhancement What H  G. Wells had predicted at the end of the nineteenth century- the 
splitting of the human species -is gradually coming to pass But Wells was speaking of 
the natural course of evolution and a time scale of 800,000 years  Scientists now are 
predicting species divergence via GE-accelerated evolution by the year 3000. Early on, 
enhancements were largely related to physical and mental health Before long, however, 
non-health related traits - such as cognitive and athletic abilities - were fair game. 
"Genetic enhancement clinics" are widespread and privately financed, owing to a long­
standing ban on funding research on human embryos. Immense profits are at stake in the 
industry, and consumer demand is strong, making a belated attempt at regulation 
politically improbable. Aside from all this, all wielders of political and corporate power 
are themselves genetically enriched. Although not yet a distinct species, this "GenRich" 
class has an extra pair of chromosomes - 48 instead of the 46 in the unenhanced, or 
"Natural" class - designed to hold additional "gene packs" as necessary. 
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By the 26th century, Homo sapiens has evolved into four species. One is the 
unenhanced Naturals. The other three are GenRich species made distinct from each other 
as a consequence of corporate competition: The three mega-corporations that dominate 
the industry use mutually incompatible gene-pack "platforms." Massive overpopulation 
has made Earth inhospitable, hence the GenRich have been modified to live in extreme 
conditions, such as in the polar regions and even on Mars where "lung-modified thick­
skinned dark green human descendants" live quite comfortably "within enormous bubble­
enclosed biospheres" (ibid., p. 247) By the 2ih century, there are at least a dozen 
human-derived species each with 46 to 54 chromosomes. One gene-pack - called 
AGEBUSTER - has opened up new possibilities for distant space travel by dramatically 
slowing the aging process 
For present purposes, these few details will suffice The purpose of the thought­
experiment is to provide an extreme case so that what (if anything) is ethically 
objectionable about a loss of humanness through radical genetic enhancement will be 
more apparent. By the term radical genetic enhancement of humans we have in mind, 
roughly, a genetic change that is generally beneficial but which produces an organism 
that is no longer recognizably human and can no longer interbreed with unenhanced 
humans. 
Now it seems clear that many aspects of our present-day humanness (at least, 
biological humanness) would be altered in our GenRich descendants But for the sake of 
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starting the discussion, let us first consider the charge that Silver's scenario is morally 
objectionable because we have crossed the biological line that separates one species from 
another 
Crossing Species Boundaries 
Several challenges have been made to the claim that crossing species boundaries 
has special ethical significance 3 First of all, it cannot be the transfer of"foreign" DNA 
in transgenics (GE) that is morally problematic, for such transfer happens in nature 
without human intervention. Second, the claim that the creation of tangelos or mules -
bred from tangerines and grapefruits, and horses and donkeys, respectively - is morally 
wrong seems highly implausible Third, if the concern is that GE can be used to create 
non-sterile hybrids (unlike mules), then it seems that the fear has to do with a "self­
perpetuating mistake," rather than crossing species boundaries per se. Fourth, the 
concern may be about human-animal hybrids - specifically, that some horrible 
Frankenstein-like outcome will result. But if this is the "rational kernel" of the objection, 
then the rightness or wrongness of creating such a hybrid depends on the consequences  
That is, once again, the objection is not against crossing species boundaries in itself, but 
about some anticipated harm. (It has been consequentialist concerns that have dominated 
in the debate over the ethics of xenotransplantation - transplantation of organs from one 
species to another The only significant ethical hurdle has centered on the probability 
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that xenotransplants will contain latent viruses harmful to humans (Le Tissier, Stoye, 
Takeuchi, Patience, & Weiss, 1997; Vogel, 1998).) 
Fifth, one might claim, instead, that the creation of human-animal hybrids is 
intrinsically wrong. In response, two questions are posed by the President's Commission 
in Splicing Life (ibid , p. 59)  
First, what characteristics are uniquely human, setting humanity apart from all 
other species? And second, does the wrong lie in bestowing some but not all of 
these characteristics on the new creation or does it stem from depriving the being 
that might otherwise have arisen from the human genetic material of the 
opportunity to have a totally human makeup? 
Surprisingly, the report makes no attempt to answer these questions, instead stating that 
"the information available to the Commission [in 1982] suggests that the ability to create 
interspecific hybrids of the sort that would present intrinsic moral and religious concerns 
will not be available in the foreseeable future" (ibid , p. 59). What is expected, according 
to the report, is the use of single human genes, or research that does not result in mature 
organisms (ibid , pp 59-60) 
Splicing Life was one of the frst statements of the "orthodox view" of the ethics 
of gene therapy The orthodox view can be summarized as follows: 
1  Alterations to the genes of somatic cells (any cell except the sperm or egg or 
their precursors) for the purpose of medical treatment is morally permissible 
2. Genetic alterations in the germline (e.g., in sperm, egg, or zygote) are morally 
impermissible, even if intended for medical treatment - at least as long as the 
technology carries an unacceptable level of risk 
3. Genetic alterations for the purpose of (non-medical) enhancement are morally 
impermissible, whether carried out in somatic or germline cells. 
3 The following discussion is based on the report Splicing Life (U.S. President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, pp. 56-58). 
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More will be said about the development and current status of the orthodox view in a 
later chapter For now we can make the following observations about the moral 
prohibitions against germline or enhancement GE. While some have argued that 
germline GE is intrinsically wrong, the primary reason for this prohibition seems to be a 
prudential concern about risk of unintended harm With respect to the impermissibility of 
enhancement, again some have attempted to argue that enhancement, genetic or 
otherwise, is intrinsically wrong As we shall see, these arguments are implausible given 
the fact that we enhance ourselves in many other ways - e.g., through exercise, 
education, plastic surgery, and ingestion of caffeine Others argue that enhancement 
amounts to eugenics, and we should learn from having been on the slippery slope of 
eugenics before (more on this later) 
A lot has happened in the fifteen years between the publication of Splicing Life 
and the publication of Silver's book Silver and others argue that, owing to unexpectedly 
rapid technological progress, we can no longer rest on the assumption that the kind of 
genetic interventions generally taken to be morally troubling will "not be available in the 
foreseeable future " The orthodox view may have been sufficient justification for a 
restrictive public policy when human GE was not safe and technically feasible But, 
there is good reason to believe that the technology will become safe and available This 
forces us back to the very questions that Splicing Life considered moot What is it about 
human beings that distinguishes us from non-humans? And what exactly is ethically 
objectionable about creating human-derived, genetically engineered non-human 
organisms? 
CHAPTER TWO: THE SCIENCE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 
The following four assertions have already been made with respect to human 
genetic engineering: 
I) Human GE is or soon will become technically feasible 
2) Human GE is likely to become acceptably safe for use in humans. 
3) Human GE promises tremendous benefits 
4) Human GE has the potential to give rise to human-derived non-human 
creatures. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to give a brief introduction to the biomedical 
aspects of human GE, and thereby to lend support to each of the above-mentioned claims. 
Although human eugenics - or the genetic improvement of humankind - did not 
have its beginning with genetic engineering, the advent of human GE changed the nature 
of the ethical concerns. We will compare human eugenics in the pre- and post-GE era to 
see what new ethical issues arose in the latter Having placed human GE in the context of 
eugenics, an overview of the technology will be given. The aim here is to describe genes, 
chromosomes, embryonic development, and so on, in just enough detail so that a 
conceptual picture of the creation ofa genetically engineered organism emerges. The 
relevance of some topics - such as human cloning and embryonic stem cells - may be 
unclear initially. But the question of relevance should disappear near the end of the 
chapter when the various pieces of the puzzle are assembled into what may resemble a 
scientific recipe for human beings. 
The resemblance to a recipe may be what makes human GE seem so amazing on 
the one hand, yet disturbing on the other It is as if human beings had always been 
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dropped from the sky, like manna from heaven, wholly formed and immutable. And 
then, in one cataclysmic moment, the secrets of our creation were revealed to us, no 
longer shrouded in divine mystery, but exposed for all the mundane biochemistry that 
they are. However that may be, let us forge ahead in hopes that a better understanding of 
our biological nature will enlighten our subsequent discussion of what, if anything, is 
"sacred" about human beings, and how human GE might pose a threat to that sacredness 
Altering Evolution: From Improving Humankind to Improving On Humankind 
The eugenics movement, in two waves 
Altering the course of human evolution is not a new idea. Especially since the 
end of the 191h century, scientists and others have taken up the cause of genetic 
improvement of the human race. The heyday of eugenics in the United States and 
western Europe was from the 1880s through 1932 (Carlson, 1981; Kevles, 1992), 
although a eugenics revival of sorts occurred primarily in the years following World War 
II. Kevles (1992) refers to the earlier and later movements as "prejudicial eugenics" and 
"reform eugenics," respectively. 
The original Eugenics Movement was founded by Francis Gatton, a cousin of 
Charles Darwin Gatton promoted a plan of "human betterment" through controlled 
breeding. This entailed both positive eugenics (genetic improvement through promoting 
the propagation of desirable traits) and negative eugenics (genetic improvement through 
preventing the propagation of undesirable traits). Gatton himself was a respected 
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scientist in his day. His emphasis was on positive eugenics as much as negative 
eugenics. Others such as Charles Davenport of the Eugenics Record Office (US ) 
emphasized negative eugenics Under the influence of Davenport and his ilk, eugenics 
was popularized. Immigration policies of the day were informed by eugenicists, called as 
experts to testify on, for example, the relative "fitness" of immigrants from southeastern 
Europe as compared with those from northwestern Europe. State fairs awarded prizes to 
families judged the most eugenic, as opposed to "dysgenic." And the US Supreme 
Court, in Buck v. Bell ( 1927), upheld the forcible sterilization of the (allegedly) mentally 
ill, ruling that "three generations of imbeciles are enough" (Kevles & Hood, 1992, p. 10). 
Eugenicists of this era were increasingly being criticized for their simplistic 
treatment of human "traits" such as "pauperism," and "shiftlessness " By what criteria 
were these categories judged? And even putting aside the definitional problems, did 
these so-called traits follow Mendelian rules of inheritance? The criticism was increasing 
in direct proportion to the growing scientific understanding of the physical nature of the 
genetic material. For example, geneticists working with the fruit fly, Drosophila, 
established that chromosomes in the nucleus of biological cells were the sites of the (still 
mysterious) genes  Experimental work using X-irradiation of chromosomes showed that 
physically detectable changes in chromosomes were associated with the appearance or 
disappearance of genetic traits, such as eye color or wing morphology These causal 
links suggested that casting genetic change in the global language of behavior rather than 
the particular language of cellular biology and biochemistry was taking unjustifiable 
liberties with the available evidence. 
29 
The original Eugenics Movement was eventually discredited, and the motives of 
many of its adherents were exposed as prejudiced With the ascension of fascist regimes 
in Europe in the 1930s, the word "eugenics" became inextricably linked to the abuses 
committed in its name. As Kevles notes, "plant and animal geneticists were discouraged 
from having anything to do with human genetics because of its associations with racism, 
sterilizations, and scientific poppycock" ( 1992, p  11) For these reasons, serious 
discussion of the deliberate shaping of the human gene pool was frowned upon for a time 
The reform eugenicists, however, were motivated by a concern that mutations 
(changes in the nucleotide sequence of the genome) were accumulating in the human 
gene pool at a rate that could jeopardize humanity at some point in the future Mutations 
occur naturally at a low frequency But other modern developments, it was feared, would 
increase the frequency of mutations among the population. Chief among these were life 
saving medical advances and artificially generated radiation. Advances in medicine 
meant that persons with some genetic diseases were living long enough to reproduce and 
pass along their deleterious genes to their offspring, whereas in earlier times they had not 
The medical use of X-rays, and later radioactive fallout from bomb testings, was cause 
for alarm since radiation was known to be a highly effective mutagen. 
The overall picture, then, was that humanity was facing some distant "Genetic 
Apocalypse" (Ramsey, 1966, p. 132) that could only be circumvented by humankind's 
intervening in its own evolution. As one contemporary scientist noted, "[t]he three great 
problems created by the exponential explosion of man's power over nature are nuclear 
war, the population explosion, and genetic deterioration" (Shockley, 1966, p. 104) It 
was this gloomy outlook that permitted geneticists of the 1960s to publicly speak of 
eugenics at all in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust (Ramsey, 1966, pp 109-110). 
(Concerns about a high rate of accumulation of deleterious mutations have recently 
resurfaced, although not in "apocalyptic" terms (see Wade, 1999d).) 
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By what means were we to direct our own evolution and stave off genetic 
disaster? HJ. Muller, a Nobel laureate and leading reform eugenicist, proposed a system 
of"germinal choice." This essentially meant the voluntary selection of frozen sperm 
from desirable donors, with guidance from genetic counselors, for use with artificial 
insemination. But there was at the same time ( ca 1960s) no shortage of futuristic 
speculation about human cloning, in vitro fertilization (IVF), cross-species hybrids, and 
human genetic engineering At this time, partial success with cloning had been achieved 
in frogs; experimentation into human IVF was just beginning; cells from different species 
had been fused, and scientists were well on their way to discovering the complete genetic 
code. This futuristic speculation was set centuries or even millennia in the future, which 
no doubt tempered some of the alarm that might otherwise have been expressed In 1963, 
for example, the British biologist JBS Haldane gave a speech at a meeting of futurists 
titled "Biological Possibilities for the Human Species over the Next Ten Thousand 
Years." Haldane predicted that the cloning of humans would become possible, and 
would benefit humankind by simplifying the eugenic program of reproducing only the 
highest achievers, bettering humankind (1963, pp. 352-353) This frank 
acknowledgement of the eugenic purposes to which reproductive technology might some 
day usefully be put was typical of the speeches and debates at this meeting, which was 
attended by Lederberg, Crick, and other scientists of the highest distinction. 
Genetic engineering: a third wave of eugenics? 
Muller's germinal choice proposal was viewed by Lederberg as shortsighted. In 
Lederberg's view, the way to ensure human survival was not through what amounted to 
technologically assisted human husbandry Instead, the eugenic project would best be 
served by investing in the new techniques of molecular biology and genetic engineering  
ln doing so, Lederberg felt, humankind could "accomplish in one or two generations of 
eugenic practice what would now take ten or one hundred" (Lederberg, 1963, p. 265) 
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We are now able to go inside the nucleus of cells and change the genetic code. 
When the cells on which we perform this genetic surgery are the sperm, egg, or zygote, 
then the genetic change is carried in each nucleus-containing cell of the adult organism -
a complete genetic transformation 
Thus, human GE makes possible a eugenics program that is fundamentally 
different from those of the 1960s. ln the 1960s, the possible offspring of, say, Muller's 
germinal choice strategy were limited to those made possible by the joining of any human 
egg with any human sperm Today, with gene-splicing technology, there is no such 
clearly circumscribed limit Genes of non-human origin, or artificially synthesized genes, 
could without great difficulty be introduced to a developing human embryo Thus, in 
addition to fears about prejudicial abuses, eugenics-via-human GE is subject to a new 
ethical objection, namely, that something morally fundamental to human beings - our 
very "humanness" - could potentially be lost. 
32 
Other breakthroughs in reproductive biology are proving just as remarkable as our 
ability to alter the genetic code. We are evidently - although the confirmatory 
experiments are not permitted - now able to create human beings from "seeds" other than 
the combination of sperm and egg. The seeds we are speaking of are the nuclei of our 
body cells, which would be used in human cloning, and human embryonic stem (ES) 
cells But first, let us turn our attention to the gene itself 
Genes, Chromosomes, and Human Seeds 
What is a gene ? 
Everyone has heard of genes, and many have heard of gene therapy. But I think it 
will help us ifwe give ourselves a clear picture at the outset of what genes are and how 
one might go about altering them 
Our body is composed of at least a trillion cells (Aldridge, 1996, p. 5), and in the 
center of almost all of them is a nucleus. The nucleus is surrounded by a membrane, just 
as the whole cell is, so it looks like a little cell within a cell. And the membranes - both 
cell and nuclear - provide a physical barrier that some things can cross and other things 
can't. Held within the nuclear membrane are the chromosomes Most human cells have 
chromosomes, and in those that do there are 46 (two sets of23), except for the sperm and 
egg cells which have just one set of23 chromosomes. Each chromosome is composed of 
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an enormously long double-strand of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) supported by proteins 
that serve as a sort of biologically active scaffolding The double-strand is in the shape of 
a helix, sort of like a spiral staircase. The chromosomes would be over six feet in length 
if one could manage to get hold of the ends, stretch them like rubber bands, and lay all 46 
of them end to end (Thus stretched, all the DNA from one human body would reach to 
the moon and back 8,000 times (Weatherall, quoted in Harris, 1992).) But inside the 
nucleus of the cell, the total length of the chromosomes is only 0.3 millimeters (Aldridge, 
1996, p. 60). A reduction in length from six feet to O 3 millimeters is analogous to a cord 
stretching across the US being shortened until its length was only a few city blocks 
What accounts for this 20,000-fold reduction in chromosome length? The answer 
is that the DNA on its protein scaffold is "supercoiled," or subjected to higher-order 
coiling To illustrate higher-order coiling, think of a braided rope. First-order coiling 
consists in the braids winding around each other to make up the rope Second-order 
coiling would be present if one coiled the rope, as when sailors make a roughly 
cylindrical stack for easy access at sea. If one could imagine such a stack of rope that 
was very tall and somewhat rigid, then third-order coiling would be accomplished by 
coiling that tall cylinder around something else 
So that's a chromosome - what's a gene? A gene is any stretch of the 
chromosome that codes for a protein. In thinking conceptually about genes, we can for 
our purposes imagine just the DNA double helix and forget about the proteins and the 
supercoiling of the chromosomes on which the genes lie. What do we mean when we say 
"codes for a protein"? Let's start with the DNA code first. We said that DNA is a long 
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double helix. We can now say a bit more about it  Each strand of DNA is a long chain 
made up of individual links called nucleotides  Each nucleotide has a characteristic 
chemical structure, which we won't bother ourselves with. There are four nucleotides 
making up DNA: adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine, or A, T, G and C for short. So 
we can now picture two long nucleotide chains running side by side. For example, one 
strand might have the following partial sequence 
ATTGCGGAATCGTACCA 
If this were the nucleotide sequence on one strand, then its partner or complementary 
strand would have this sequence 
TAACGCCTTAGCATGGT 
So when you put both strands together they look like this 
ATTGCGGAATCGTACCA 
TAACGCCTTAGCATGGT 
You might have noticed that A always pairs with T and C with G ( called "base pairs"). If 
we think of our DNA double helix as a ladder, the AT and CG bonds between strands are 
analogous to the rungs  G and A can't pair because they're both big; the rung would be 
too long. C and T can't pair because they're both small; the rung would be too short. 
(Also, A and T each have two binding sites, while C and G each have three.) 
Protein is not made directly from DNA An intermediary molecule, called 
messenger RNA (mRNA), is "transcribed" from one of the two DNA strands. RNA is 
chemically very similar to DNA It also is a chain (single-strand) made up of 
nucleotides. These are the same nucleotides as with DNA, except that U (uracil) takes 
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the place ofT The messenger RNA is in effect a copy of the DNA code. Each mRNA is 
a tiny fraction of the length of a chromosome, and is not all bound up in the chromosome 
superstructure. This means that it is free to foat off into the nuclear space and make its 
way across the nuclear membrane to the cytoplasm (the space between the nuclear and 
cell membranes) where proteins are assembled. 
We won't concern ourselves with the fine details of protein synthesis. We will 
say only a few things First, the genetic code, as delivered in the form of mRNA, is 
translated into the amino acid sequence of a protein Like DNA and mRNA, proteins are 
chains, too. They are single-stranded and made up of amino acids instead of nucleotides. 
One amino acid is drawn to a particular triplet of nucleotides at one of the cell's 
ribosomes While the mRNA chain ratchets its way through one side of the ribosome 
(the image of ticker tape comes to mind), an amino acid chain is formed on the adjoining 
side, with the sequence being determined by the three-by-three sequence of the mRNA 
So what's so great about a protein? Proteins are the workhorses, chemically 
speaking, of biological lif e The immunoglobulins (antibodies) and certain hormones are 
proteins Proteins are important structurally. (Chromosome structure is but one example ) 
Transmission of nerve impulses relies on proteins Enzymes are perhaps the most 
important class of proteins. Without enzymes all of our biochemical machinery would 
come to a halt including, as just one example, the breakdown of our food into 
biochemical building blocks and the reassembly of those building blocks into 
macromolecules, cells, organs, and ultimately us. 
We said earlier that a gene is any stretch of DNA that codes for a protein 
Humans have about 50,000 to 100,000 genes and a gene of average length comprises 
roughly 1,500 base pairs. But there are about three billion base pairs of DNA making up 
the chromosomes. This means that only about 2% of the genome appears to "code" for 
protein, thus there is a lot of non-coding (so-called "junk") DNA (Aldridge, 1996, p. 57). 
The Human Genome Project has undertaken to sequence the human genome (i.e., the 
complete sequence of chromosomal DNA) The long-range goals are to distinguish the 
coding regions (genes) from the non-coding regions, and to fgure out what proteins each 
gene codes for and what those proteins do in the cell Since many genes/proteins are 
involved in multiple cellular processes, the full interconnected understanding of 
biological life is certain to be incredibly complicated 
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Some genetic phenomena, however, appear to be relatively straightforward 
There are some diseases that result from a defect in a single gene. Sickle cell anemia and 
cystic fibrosis are two common examples In sickle cell anemia, a mistake in the DNA 
code at just one nucleotide results in a change in the amino acid sequence of the protein 
and that single amino acid mistake causes the protein to malfunction. Other single-gene 
disorders are cystic fibrosis (CF), Tay-Sachs disease, and Huntington's disease (HD) 
Single-gene disorders lend themselves to gene therapy because a modification would be 
needed at only a single locus in order to correct the genetic defect More will be said 
about these diseases below 
Before considering the potential medical benefits of gene therapy, however, it will 
be helpful to outline what is involved in gene therapy, technically speaking In turn a 
brief introduction to the stages of embryological development and certain reproductive 
technologies will make the subsequent explanation of gene therapy easier to follow 
Some parts of this introduction also bear on later arguments related to the moral status of 
the embryo. 
Embryonic and fetal development 
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Fertilization takes place in several steps. First, one or several sperm stick to the 
outer protective covering - the zona pellucida - of the egg, which is making its way 
through the Fallopian tube on its journey from the ovary to the uterus. The sperm has a 
roundish head and a whip-like tail which propels it along The sperm, upon contacting 
the zona pellucida, releases enzymes that dissolve the zona. In this way, the sperm gains 
access to the space between the zona and the next barrier, the cell membrane of the egg. 
The second step, then, is fusion with the egg cell membrane. Initially the sperm 
tail and the membrane surrounding the sperm head are intact, but these dissolve after a 
few minutes, leaving the bare nucleus, or pronuc/eus Thus there are now two pronuclei 
inside the egg cell membrane - one from the egg and one from the sperm The third step 
involves the erection of chemical barriers to prevent the entry of other sperm (If a 
second sperm cell penetrates the egg before these barriers are in place, the fused sperm­
egg dies because of the excess genetic material i.e., three sets of chromosomes 
[triploidy] instead of the required two [diploidyl) The zona becomes harder, and a 
repellant electrical "screen" is established at the egg cell membrane 
In the fourth step, the maternal (or egg) DNA is reduced by half. That is, the 
process ofreducing the chromosome number to 23 (one copy of each, or "IN") from 46 
(two copies, "2N") is completed after penetration by the sperm. It is a popular 
misconception that the egg has a IN chromosome number prior to fusion with the sperm. 
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The fifth and final step is fusion of the pronucleus of the sperm with that of the 
egg. Here we encounter a second popular misconception: The two pronuclei do not fuse 
with one another to form one nucleus at the one-cell embryo (or zygote) stage. Instead 
each of the two pronuclei is duplicated, then the zygote divides. At this point there are 
two cells, each containing one sperm-derived pronucleus and one egg-derived 
pronucleus. It is at this two-cell stage that the pronuclei in each daughter cell commingle, 
giving rise to a 2N (i e ,  46-chromosome) state  Fertilization is now - at the two-cell 
stage - complete (Silver, 1997, pp  37-38) 
Between days two and six there is further cell division and differentiation  A cell 
differentiates when it progresses from a cell type that has the potential to give rise to any 
(or many different) cell type in the body to one of those final cell types, such as skin, 
brain, blood or liver cells. Taking the example ofan oak tree, the acorn is the 
undifferentiated precursor cell that has within it the potential to develop into all of the 
many cell types of the mature tree. The acorn is an example of a totipotential cell In the 
embryo, all cells are totipotent until the eight-cell stage. Thus, if one took an eight-cell 
embryo, split it into its eight component cells, and coated each in an artificial zona 
pellucida, one would have eight genetically identical embryos (or embryo-equivalents) 
where before there had been just one. Each, if successfully implanted in a uterus, could 
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give rise to a fetus and the supporting placental tissue  (This human embryo "splitting" 
was in fact done in 1993 - converting 17 human embryos into 48 - by researchers at 
George Washington University and, not surprisingly, was met with vehement public 
opposition (McCormick, 1994; National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction, 
1994; Robertson, 1994) The term "cloning" was used in reference to the procedure, 
further fanning the flames of controversy, although embryo splitting is distinct from the 
nuclear transfer cloning used to produce Dolly the sheep in 1997 (Cohen & Tomkin, 
1994; Wilmut, Schnieke, Mc Whir, Kind, & Campbell, 1997)) Of greater practical 
importance, using IVF one can remove one of the cells of the eight-cell embryo and test it 
for genetic defects. Only those embryos that pass the genetic screening are then 
implanted into the uterus. This technique is known as preimplantation (genetic) 
diagnosis, or PID. 
After the fourth division (at the 16-cell stage) the outer cells of the embryo are no 
longer totipotent  These outer cells are destined to form the placenta The inner cells are 
still totipotent (Silver, 1997, p. 49). At day five, the embryo, still encased in the zona 
pellucida, enters the uterus (ibid , p 51 ). At about day 7 or 8, the embryo "hatches," i e , 
it slithers through a break in the zona wall and implants in the uterus, prompting the 
establishment of blood vessel connections At this point the inner cells of the embryo 
are still totipotent, meaning that the formation of twins (triplets, etc.) is still possible 
(ibid., p. 52) 
On day 14 or 15, the inner cells of the embryo at last begin to differentiate That 
is, they are destined to be progenitors offetal cells, rather than placental cells. Thus, as 
embryologist CR. Austin notes, "The whole egg certainly becomes the embryo, and the 
whole fetus becomes the child, but the whole embryo does not become the fetus only a 
small fraction of the embryo is thus involved, the rest of it continuing as the placenta and 
other auxiliary structures" (quoted in ibid , p. 53)  (This fact has been used to argue that 
it makes no sense to say that the embryo is a human individual prior to the beginning of 
the third week of development) On day 15, the primitive streak, or "precursor to the 
spinal cord and backbone" appears, and twinning is no longer possible (ibid , p. 53). 
In week four, the internal organs appear. By the end of that week there is a 
heartbeat and circulation, and the earliest stages of brain development have occurred 
The embryo is less than one-quarter inch in length. Between weeks six and eight, 
external human-like features appear, prompting a change in terminology from "embryo" 
to "fetus " By week twelve, all major internal organs have appeared, but neither these 
nor the central nervous system is yet functional (ibid , pp. 53-54). 
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Between weeks 24 and 26, the lungs become functional and, therefore, the fetus 
becomes viable. By "sheer coincidence" at this same time the cerebral cortex also has 
become functional, meaning that the potential for consciousness exists at this stage (ibid , 
pp. 55-57) 
Now that we have been introduced to human embryonic development and the 
related notions of embryonic potency and differentiation, we may introduce embryonic 
stem cells. Embryonic stem (ES) cells could play a key role in human GE technology, as 
we will explain below, relying on Silver (ibid ) Since the publication of Silver's book 
(in 1997), two teams of researchers have discovered human ES cells, bringing us one 
major step closer to technically feasible human GE. 
Embryonic stem cells 
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In 1993, scientists removed certain cells from a mouse embryo, wrapped them in 
other genetically disabled cells meant to resemble a placenta, implanted them in the 
uterus of a mouse, and produced adult mice (Kolata, 1999) These cells are called 
embryonic stem cells. Since then, human ES cells have been discovered (Gearhart, 1998; 
Thomson et al, 1998) The general presumption is that what can be done with ES cells in 
mice can be done in humans. That is, human ES cells, if properly handled, would give 
rise to adult human beings 
Human ES cells have been a sort of Holy Grail for biologists for reasons unrelated 
to the potential to produce entire human beings. Human ES cells have been called "the 
raw material for human tissue engineering" (Marshall, 1998, p. 1014). Since ES cells 
are primordial cells for all the organs and tissues of the body (i.e , they are totipotential), 
the hope is that scientists will be able to figure out the molecular signals that direct ES 
cells and their close descendants down the path that ends in, say, pancreatic cells "that 
could squirt out insulin for a person with diabetes or a fresh layer of skin for a burn 
patient" (Kolata, 1999) The creation of transplantable ES-derived human tissue has been 
called the "home run" of ES technology by private-sector financial backers. Genetically 
engineering ES cells prior to tissue engineering would provide a means to alter the 
transplantable tissue so that it cannot be rejected by the immune system of the host 
patient (Marshall, 1998, p. 1015) Human ES cells will also benefit the research and 
development of new pharmaceuticals. Instead of having to screen potentially useful 
drugs using non-human or abnormal (i.e , cancerous) human cells in culture, the hope is 
that normal human tissue of any type ( e.g , liver, brain) can be produced from ES cells 
and then used to screen drug candidates (Marshall, 1998, p. 1015). 
At present, the molecular signals that direct human ES cells down particular 
developmental pathways are unknown. Thus, ironically, while it is technically 
impossible at present to produce isolated human organs or tissues from ES cells, the 
prevailing scientific opinion seems to be that creating a complete human organism from 
ES cells, though illegal, is possible (Kolata, 1999)  
Cloning 
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The significance of cloning, many feel, has little to do with reproducing "carbon 
copies" of existing persons, and much to do with genetic engineering As Lee Silver 
notes, "For the f rst time, germ-line gene therapy becomes realistic" (Mirsky & Rennie, 
1997, p  122) And Theodore Friedmann, director of the gene therapy program at the 
University of California at San Diego and an early advocate of the technology, echoes 
this view saying, "The need for enlightened public debate over the merits and risks of 
germ-line therapy has, however, been made more urgent by the recent cloning of an adult 
sheep" (1997, p. 96). We shall see why this is so shortly. First, however, we need to 
explain briefly what cloning is. 
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The term "human cloning," as commonly used, refers to the creation of a human 
offspring not from sperm and egg, but from the combination of a modified egg and the 
nucleus of a body ("somatic") cell, such as a blood, skin, or muscle cell. Recall that the 
embryo, to be viable, must have 46 chromosomes, two sets of twenty-three. We called 
this the 2N chromosome number Normally, the 2N chromosome number is achieved in 
the fertilized egg (zygote) by the contribution of one set of23 chromosomes by the egg 
and one set of 23 by the sperm. There may be a great number of reasons why not just any 
of the body's cells can fulfill the role of one of the gametes (the egg and sperm). But 
primary among these is the fact that only the egg and sperm and their immediate 
precursors have a 1 N chromosome number, and thus in combination can add up to the 
required 46 chromosomes 
What if one were to take the 46 chromosomes from one of the run-of-the-mill 
somatic cells and place those chromosomes in an egg from which all chromosomes had 
been removed? The answer, we now know, is that apparently normal mammalian 
offspring are produced This is the procedure that led to the birth of Dolly the sheep, the 
first mammal cloned from adult cells (Wilmut et al., 1997). 
Now, the procedure was not as simple as it has just been made to seem. The 
major breakthrough in the creation of Dolly was not cloning per se. After all, other 
animals had been cloned using the donated nuclei (containing the 46 chromosomes) from 
embryonic cells. But repeated failures to clone adults - i.e., using donated nuclei from 
adult cells - led scientists to believe that the latter was not possible. This was the 
accepted belief virtually up to the moment that Dolly's birth was announced to the world. 
The explanation was that nuclei in adult cells were fully differentiated, whereas 
embryonic cell nuclei were totipotent, or at least potent enough that they could be made 
totipotent once placed in the biochemically accommodating environment of the 
( enucleated) embryo. As we described it above, the process of differentiation - of going 
from totipotential embryo to the terminally differentiated skin cell - seemed to be a one­
way street. One can go from the acorn to the leaf cell, but not from the leaf cell to the 
acorn. 
The major breakthrough in cloning Dolly, then, was that, in some way, the 
process of differentiation was reversed. The mammary gland cell nucleus that was used 
to "fertilize" the enucleated egg was somehow made to regain the potential of an early 
embryo nucleus. 
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How this process of"de-differentiation" is stimulated in the laboratory, while of 
great scientific interest, is not central to our discussion. What is significant about cloning 
as it concerns human genetic engineering is that it helps make possible the strategy of 
gene replacement, which has been called the needed technological breakthrough for safe 
germline gene therapy (i e , human GE). 
Let us turn now to a brief overview of gene therapy. First, we will discuss the 
common classifications of gene therapy. This will be followed by a brief summary of the 
potential medical benefts of gene therapy. And finally, we will discuss how exactly 
genetic alterations are made - at which point we will re-visit cloning, ES cells, and some 
earlier points of discussion. 
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What is Gene Therapy? 
Gene therapy refers to making biological improvements in an organism through 
direct biochemical modification of genes There are two important distinctions that are 
now commonplace in the bioethics literature on gene therapy The first distinction is 
between germ line and somatic cell gene therapy  In germline gene therapy (GGT), the 
genetic modification is made in the chromosomes of the just-fertilized egg (a k.a., zygote, 
or one-cell embryo) (In principle, the change could be made in the sperm or egg prior to 
fertilization.) Once the chromosomal DNA is modified in the one-cell embryo, that 
modification is carried to each of the cells that result from the multiple cell divisions that 
are part of embryonic and fetal development - first two cells, then four, eight, sixteen, 
and so on  The modified genome, then, is present in all of the cells of the adult organism  
This includes, significantly, the gametes (sperm or eggs) of the adult, meaning that the 
genetic modification will be passed on to future generations should the adult reproduce. 
In somatic cell gene therapy (SGT), the genetic modification is made to the 
chromosomes of somatic cells of the (fetus or) adult, i.e., any cells except the sperm or 
eggs or their precursor cells This of course means that the genetic modification cannot 
be passed on to future generations. Should there be some unanticipated ill effect from 
SGT, the harm comes only to the treated patient The case of cystic fbrosis provides a 
good example. Researchers are trying to figure out a way to deliver the normal cystic 
fibrosis gene (which is really the non-cystic fibrosis gene) to the lung cells of affected 
patients If they can succeed in delivering the normal genes, the hope is that those genes 
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will take up residence at suitable sites on the chromosomes of the affected lung cells and 
begin to produce normal protein The normal protein, in this case, is called CFTR, which 
stands for cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator. It situates itself in the 
cell membrane, sort of like a gate in a wall, and regulates the flow of water and ions into 
and out of the cell The abnormal protein, coded for by the (abnormal) cystic fibrosis 
gene, also situates itself in the cell membrane. But it fails to properly regulate the flow, 
resulting in viscous deposits in the lungs that promote infections and interfere with 
respiration CF is the most common single-gene disorder, affecting one in 2,000 persons 
(Aldridge, 1996, pp 141-143). 
The second distinction is between treatment (and prevention) gene therapy and 
enhancement gene therapy. Treatment gene therapy, as one might suspect, is gene 
therapy intended to treat (or prevent) a medical condition Enhancement gene therapy is 
intended to improve or enhance biological functioning over normal functioning There is 
some difficulty in distinguishing between these two types of gene therapy, owing to the 
difficulty in distinguishing disease from a merely undesired or unpreferred biological 
state  (We will return to this point in a later chapter.) These two distinctions leave us 
with four types of gene therapy 
1) Treatment somatic cell gene therapy 
2) Enhancement somatic cell gene therapy 
3) Treatment germline gene therapy 
4) Enhancement germline gene therapy 
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Terminology 
We have used the terms gene therapy and genetic engineering. Genetic 
engineering (GE) as used herein is synonymous with germline gene therapy, but not 
somatic cell gene therapy. The term (germline) gene therapy is perhaps more commonly 
used, especially in public policy circles. Because of that convention, we will continue to 
use the term in this paper, especially in those sections that make frequent reference to 
policy statements and the bioethics literature. However, the word "therapy" 
(notwithstanding the antecedent qualifiers "treatment" or "enhancement") implies that the 
genetic alteration has a medical purpose. Since our discussion of genetic engineering will 
encompass both therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes - and will emphasize non­
therapeutic purposes especially in the latter sections - avoiding the word "therapy" is 
preferable and we will make use of genetic engineering  
One final term is sometimes taken to be synonymous with genetic engineering or 
germline gene therapy and that is tran.sgenics. Velander's usage, however, is more 
typical. According to Velander (Velander, Lubon, & Drohan, 1997, p. 70) "transgenics" 
is GE in which the non-human recipient embryo is supplied with a gene from another 
species whose proper expression in the adult (non-human) organism is in some way 
useful. Following this convention, we will use for the term transgenics only when 
referring to GE in non-human animals. 
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What are the potential benefits of human genetic engineering (germ line gene therapy)? 
It is the promise of medical benefits that proponents of germline gene therapy 
(GGT) point to when pleading their case Diseases such as Tay-Sachs, Lesch-Nyhan 
syndrome, sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, and Huntington's disease, all of which are 
associated with horrible suffering and premature death, can not only be prevented in the 
genetically-altered "patient" (as with somatic cell gene therapy), they can also be 
eliminated from the gene pool entirely. The prospect of the total eradication of certain 
genetic diseases provides much of the momentum behind the pro-GGT arguments 
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 76). It is worth digressing at this point to briefly describe 
some of these diseases, for only if we have a full appreciation for the benefits of human 
GE will we be able to responsibly assess, in the light of the ethical objections to be stated 
below, what we ought to do. 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is a disease in boys that causes mental retardation, a 
chronic, gout-like pain, and an irresistible urge to self-mutilate Typically, this self-
mutilation consists of gnawing at the lips and finger tips to the point that those tissues are 
raw and bleeding (Kitcher, 1996, pp. 82-83) 
Tay-Sachs disease results in neural degeneration in the first year and death 
invariably by the age of four. This recessive genetic disease is most common in 
Ashkenazi Jews (Kitcher, 1996, pp. 25, 351) 4 Sickle-cell disease is another recessive 
4In humans, there are 23 pairs of chromosomes. Each gene is present in two copies, one on each of a 
chromosome pair. Recessive traits are traits that only appear in the organism when both copies of the 
gene are defective. Dominant traits are traits that appear in the organism even when only one copy of the 
gene is defective. 
genetic disease and is caused by a mutation in the gene for a component of hemoglobin. 
Under anoxic conditions ( e.g , prolonged physical exertion) the red blood cells that carry 
hemoglobin collapse, taking on a characteristic sickle shape. Such crises can lead to 
premature death (ibid , pp. 106, 3 51) 
Cystic fibrosis (CF) was introduced above in molecular and cellular terms. In 
clinical terms, disease symptoms are caused by thick mucus from mucus-producing cells 
- a consequence of the inadequate water concentration in those cells. While several 
organs may be affected, the lungs usually are most affected, with the mucus acting as a 
trap for infectious microbes. Persons with CF have typically died in adolescence or 
young adulthood; 90% of CF deaths are from acute respiratory failure (Kitcher, 1996, p  
40; Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 29). 
49 
Huntington's disease is a dominant genetic disorder. The symptoms are a 
particularly cruel deterioration of neural tissue and, thus, mental functioning Since 
symptoms don't appear until later in life - usually between ages 30 and 50 - a parent may 
conceive children without knowing that a) he or she carries the gene; b) he or she will 
therefore suffer the disease later in life; and c) he or she has at least a 50-50 chance of 
passing along the gene and disease to his or her children (Kitcher, 1996, p  39) 
How are genes modified in genetic engineering (germline gene therapy)? 
There are three general approaches to GE. The currently used, less desirable 
approach is gene addition. The preferred approach, not yet technically feasible, is called 
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gene replacement. A third approach, no doubt in the even more distant future, would 
make use of artificial chromosomes. We will consider each of these in tum 
In gene addition, the added gene is introduced (e.g., microinjected) into a one-cell 
embryo (Walters & Palmer, 1997) When successful, this results in the added gene 
randomly incorporating into the chromosomal DNA We can imagine this as a small 
length of chain - the gene and important adjacent DNA- being "spliced" into the very 
much longer chromosomal DNA chain of one or more chromosomes. (Thus, the origin 
of the once-popular term "gene-splicing ") In fact, multiple copies of the exogenous gene 
are typically spliced into multiple genomic sites. As the embryo divides from one cell to 
billions in the mature animal, the added genes are faithfully passed along to each 
daughter cell, and if all works well at the chromosomal level, the genes are properly 
expressed and the therapeutic or other desired result is achieved. The gametes in this 
mature, genetically engineered animal also contain the transferred genes. This means that 
the genotypic and phenotypic changes arising from the GE will be expressed not only in 
the individual 5 receiving the treatment, but also in all of those of his or her descendants 
who are fortunate enough to inherit the correction. 
The strategy of gene addition has some significant disadvantages. First, owing to 
the randomness of the integration of vector DNA into the host-cell chromosomal DNA, 
the added genes may be located at sites that are not conducive to their expression - i.e., 
transcription into mRNA and subsequent translation into protein. A second disadvantage, 
5 Note that "individualtt is used as a neutral tenn with respect to status as a human being or person. The 
individual actually receiving genes in this procedure is, as indicated, a single-cell gamete or fertilized 
egg. 
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also associated with the randomness of the site of chromosomal integration, is that the 
added gene might situate itself within or near an important or essential cellular gene, 
thereby disrupting that gene's expression with potentially deleterious consequences for 
the organism. (Such a disruption is called an insertional mutation (ibid., p. 67)) A third 
disadvantage is that the defective gene is still present in the host cell or cells, and the 
presence of the corrective gene may not be able to (completely) overcome the deleterious 
effects of the defective gene. A final disadvantage - which applies to germline gene 
therapy and is related to the desirability of gene replacement - is that the defective gene 
persists in the gene pool. In the ideal case, the defective cellular gene would be replaced 
with the corrective, or therapeutic gene, rather than having the latter merely added to the 
mix with the defective gene persisting in the genome. Because the defect is not replaced, 
the corrective gene and the defective cellular gene may segregate from one another 
during meiotic cell division (ibid, p. 68) so that the therapeutic effect of the added gene 
may not be conferred to some or all of the descendants. 
A strategy of gene replacement is, therefore, preferable to that of gene addition. 
Gene replacement, as the name implies, means removing the deleterious gene and - in the 
same physical site on the chromosome from which the deleterious gene was removed -
inserting the corrective gene. Gene replacement has been called the "needed technical 
breakthrough" that would likely make germline gene therapy (human GE) acceptably 
safe in humans (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 72) It is here that cloning and ES cells come 
into play. 
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Silver (1997, pp. 232-233) explains how gene replacement would work. First, an 
egg would be fertilized using standard in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques. The 
embryo is next grown in conditions in which cells continue to divide, but differentiation 
into the various cell types is blocked. The cells that result are called "embryonic stem 
cells>'6 The "stem cell" component of that term refers to the retained capacity ( or 
"potency") to develop into any kind of embryonic or fetal cell - lung, brain, heart, etc. 
Next, the ES cells in a laboratory culture dish are exposed to DNA containing the 
corrective replacement gene. Cells in a culture dish will internalize DNA under certain 
conditions. The procedure, known as tramfecfion, is commonly used. A precise 
replacement is exceedingly rare, occurring in about one cell per million. But the sheer 
number of transfected cells makes it likely that a replacement event will be detected. 
Herein lies the critical advantage of ES cells over one-cell embryos: In order to perform 
gene replacement, one needs to transfect millions of cells in order to find a cell in which 
the precise gene replacement has occurred There is no ready source of millions of 
human one-cell embryos. But human ES cells in culture can be grown to virtually 
unlimited numbers of cells. 
Once a cell containing the replacement gene has been identified, it is isolated and 
cultured, and then nuclei from these genetically identical cultured cells can be used to 
clone the desired genetically altered organism. The cloning technique is essentially that 
used by Wilmut et al ( 1997) to produce Dolly the sheep - nuclear transplantation, or 
6 As previously noted, human embryonic stem cells have been successfully isolated since Silver published 
his book. 
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nuclear transfer (see above). This entire gene replacement GE protocol has already been 
used successfully in mice (Silver, 1997, p  232 and citations therein). 
Artificial chromosomes are a relatively new item in the GE toolbox. These are 
artificially constructed chromosomes or chromosome segments that contain both genes of 
interest and sequences essential to the perpetuation of the artificial chromosome itself 
There are two main advantages that come with using artificial chromosomes: First, genes 
can be added without disrupting the host cell genes - that is, without the problem of 
insertional mutations, noted above. Second, many genes can be carried on one artificial 
chromosome. 
Artificial chromosomes may be used either as part of a gene addition strategy, or 
possibly as a part of gene replacement strategy  In gene addition, the desired transgene(s) 
is introduced to the recipient cell as part of the artificial chromosome. The critical 
advantage of gene addition-via-artificial chromosome is that the host cell chromosomes 
aren't physically disrupted leading to the potentially serious consequences mentioned 
above. 
With respect to a gene replacement strategy, Silver claims that artificial 
chromosomes could be used as part of a different sort of gene replacement - one 
involving the replacement of gene function rather than the physical substitution of the 
corrective gene in place of the defective. This gene-function replacement uses an 
approach called "anti-gene therapy" Although we will not delve into the technical 
details of anti-gene therapy, Silver's example conveys the general idea (1997, p. 233) 
Based on this approach, an anti-sickle-cell gene and a normal hemoglobin 
replacement gene could both be added together - as a gene-pack [i.e., on the same 
artificial chromosome] - into an embryo with a sickle cell disease genotype. The 
anti-gene would prevent the production of sickle cell protein while the normal 
transgene would make normal protein to take its place. The child that emerged 
from this embryo would be completely healthy even though he would still carry 
two defective sickle cell alleles (that are now silenced) 
Researchers have already constructed "the first wholly synthetic, self-replicating, 
human 'microchromosomes,' one-ffth to one-tenth the size of normal human 
chromosomes" (Harrington, Van Bokkelen, Mays, Gustashaw, & Willard, 1997; Roush, 
1997) Not only that, when human mini chromosomes were transferred into mouse ES 
cells, and those ES cells were added to mouse eight-cell embryos, the resultant chimeric 
54 
embryos gave rise to viable mouse offspring  Various tests showed that the human genes 
residing on the artificial chromosomes functioned normally in the mouse cells This 
study demonstrated that artificial chromosomes could be used in GE, and that the genetic 
changes thus introduced would be stably inherited from generation to generation (Rastan, 
1997; Tomizuka et al, 1997). 
This chapter has sought to accomplish several things. First, of course, was simply 
the goal of elucidating the nature of the biological alterations in question. Second, it is 
hoped that knowledge of some of the pertinent scientific details will help in evaluating a 
range of moral objections (see below), perhaps especially those having to do with the 
moral status of the embryo  Third, highlighting some of the medical benefits of human 
GE was intended to make clear what it is that will give human GE its momentum as a 
public policy issue. (The opponent to human GE might say instead that it is the promise 
of medical benefits that will put us on the slippery slope to human GE) Fourth and last, 
it is hoped that, the claim that safe human GE will likely become available in the 
foreseeable future now seems plausible 
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If human GE, as expected, becomes acceptably safe, then we will have dealt with 
one of the primary ethical objections to it But the potential for direct harm to genetically 
engineered offspring is not the only objection. The current policy prohibited germline 
genetic intervention in humans has a broad ethical base  The question remains, however 
- is that base secure? 
CHAPTER THREE: The Tenuous Consensus on Human Gene Therapy Policy 
The intuitive moral aversion that many feel to human genetic engineering persists, 
we have suggested, even when we account for many of the more obvious ethical 
objections. Two of these objections - threat to personal identity and risk of harm - have 
already been discussed (in Chapters I and 2, respectively). The sense that human GE 
threatens "who we are" persists even if it is conceded that, by the phrase "who we are" 
we cannot mean particular personhood (i.e., personal identity over time) Unlike surgical 
or drug-induced psychiatric interventions on already existing persons, GE alters single­
celled zygotes or gametes (sperm or eggs), not persons. (Other objections based on the 
moral status of embryos, rather than personal identity, are taken up below) And our 
moral aversion persists even ifwe stipulate that human GE will become acceptably safe -
a stipulation that is plausible, as discussed in the previous chapter However, we have not 
yet spoken to a number of other objections that have been made against human GE (i e , 
germline gene therapy). 
In the present chapter we will first trace the development ofU.S policy on human 
genetic engineering  Of interest here will be the early appearance and then later re­
appearance of concerns about the intrinsic wrongness of human GE. Second, the current 
"orthodox position" on the ethics of human gene therapy will be shown to be lacking 
long-term stability The ethical objections on which the orthodox position is based, it 
will be argued, are either time-bound or are probably not strong enough to undergird 
continued ethics-based restrictions on the technology Third, it will be shown how this 
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need for an alternative ethical foundation for a restrictive policy on human GE leads us 
again to Silver's futuristic scenario and the question, "ls (safe) radical human genetic 
enhancement intrinsically wrong?" 
The Development of U.S. Policy on Buman Genetic Engineering 
The Mondale and Kennedy Hearings (1968-1973) 
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In 1968, Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota introduced Senate Joint 
Resolution 145, which proposed the formation ofa President's Commission on Health 
Science and Society (Jansen, 1998, p. 90). Mondale's proposal came at a time when 
medical advances seemed to be racing ahead, leaving unresolved in their wake some 
troubling ethical questions. Organ transplantation raised questions of fair allocation of 
the scarce organs. Research involving human experimentation led to calls for an elevated 
regard for patient autonomy, and to demands that informed consent be taken seriously 
Advances in life-sustaining technologies, combined with the first successful heart 
transplants, called for a revised conception of death from a biological state defined by 
cardiopulmonary criteria to one defined by neurological criteria. And the world's leading 
scientists spoke futuristically of lending a technological hand to the creation of human 
beings through such novel means as cloning and genetic engineering. 
In light of this exciting yet morally disquieting surge of biomedical activity, the 
involvement of Congress should have come as no surprise. Mondale, citing popular 
support, recommended that the Commission study "organ transplantation, genetic 
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engineering, behavior control, experimentation on humans, and the financing of research" 
(Jansen, 1998, p. 91 ). 
Mondale's resolution faced surprisingly vehement opposition from physicians and 
scientists, who had been used to having the final word on research and patient care and 
were fearful of an uninformed regulation by laypersons. Christiaan Barnard, the 
renowned South African physician responsible for the first human heart transplant, was 
especially critical of the proposal (Jansen, 1998, p. 91 ). Under this pressure, the 
resolution failed 
Mondale returned, however, in 1971, spurred in part by news of a scandal. From 
1970 to 1973, Stanfield Rogers, an American physician and researcher, assisted a 
German colleague in the treatment of three German girls with hyperargininemia -
elevated blood levels of the amino acid arginine. Rogers treated with a virus called 
Shope papilloma virus (SPY). Laboratory workers who handled SPY were observed to 
have relatively low levels of arginine, thus it was hoped that a similar effect could be 
brought about in the girls by SPY treatment. Much of the ensuing controversy had to do 
with the ethical treatment of human research subjects generally. Nonetheless, given that 
the intent was to correct the abnormal expression of certain genes through SPY 
treatment, an element of the debate had to do with the ethics of the genetic alteration of 
humans (Fletcher, 1990, pp. 58-59) 
In 1971, prompted by news reports of the Rogers case, Senator Walter Mondale 
again called for the formation of a national commission to investigate the "legal, social, 
and ethical implications of medical research, including the aims of geneticists. 
Mondale's testimony referred to the dangers of genetic manipulation" (ibid., p. 59). 
It was not until 1973 that a version of Mondale's original proposal was given 
Congressional approval Once again, political controversy provided legislative incentive. 
This time the controversy was over a recommendation from an NIH advisory panel to 
keep late-term aborted fetuses alive for the purposes of research The recommendation 
had been reported in the Washington Post, and prompted not only a quick about-face by 
the NIH, but also and once again Congressional hearings. Senator Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts presided During the course of the hearings, other scandals became 
prominent. Of particular note were the use of prisoners as research subjects, and the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Report (Jansen, 1998, pp. 94-98). In the latter study, which 
became public in 1972, a cohort of African-American men infected with syphilis were 
left untreated for decades so that the clinical course of the disease could be studied 
(Kolata, 1998, pp. 77-78). 
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Finally, in July, 1974, the National Research Act was signed into law by President 
Nixon, and with that the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created (Jansen, 1998, p. 99) The National 
Commission ended its work in October, 1978, when its term expired. In just over four 
years, it produced a number of reports. Several had to do with the protection of research 
subjects from special populations, e g ,  children, prisoners, and the institutionalized 
mentally disabled  There were also reports on psychosurgery, health care delivery, and 
institutional review boards (Jansen, 1998, p. 104) In 1980, the National Commission 
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was succeeded by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The President's Commission also 
produced a number ofreports, extending the scope of study beyond the subject of 
protection ofresearch subjects Securing Access to Health Care was published in 1982. 
Defining Death and Deciding to Forego [sic] Life-Sustaining Treatment were published 
in 1981 and 1983, respectively. These reports were undertaken in large part as a result of 
the social upheaval caused by the Karen Ann Quinlan case. It was Quinlan that finally 
forced the issue of what to do with the irreversibly comatose who were being kept alive 
on respirators. The Quinlan case also solidified the standing of the new field of bioethics, 
as Rothman notes: "After Quinlan .. every national commission addressing medical 
issues would have among its members a bioethicist, and no media account of a medical 
breakthrough would be complete without a bioethicist commenting on its implications" 
(Rothman, 1991, p  241) 
Two reports - Screening and Counseling for Genetic Conditions and Splicing 
Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human 
Beings - had to do with human genetics. Both were released in 1982. Splicing Life was 
not originally on the agenda ofthe President's Commission. However, in 1980 President 
Jimmy Carter received a letter from concerned theologians asking for an ethical review of 
the new genetic technologies Thus prompted, Carter assigned the task to the 
Commission. We will have more to say about this letter and Splicing Life shortly  
The Recombinant DNA Debate 
At the same time that Mondale and Kennedy were advocating for the creation of 
the National Commission, a new biotechnology was being discovered and developed. 
This technology was known as recombinant DNA (rDNA), or gene splicing. The 
discovery of a few key bacterial and viral enzymes made rDNA possible, for these 
enzymes could cut, copy and paste specific segments of DNA as if they were typed 
sentences in a word processing program. 
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In 1972, DNA from two different species was spliced into one contiguous rDNA 
molecule One year later, rDNA molecules were successfully grown in bacteria in the 
laboratory (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1984, p. 3) The rDNA 
molecules were plasmids, or circular DNA molecules capable of replicating themselves 
independently of the much larger bacterial chromosome By growing large numbers of 
plasmid-containing bacteria, one has a virtually limitless source of plasmid DNA This 
accomplishment came to the attention of the broader scientific community at the Gordon 
Research Conference on Nucleic Acids, held in New Hampshire in June, 1973. The 
chairpersons of that conference, Maxine Singer of the US National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and Dieter Soll of Yale University, expressed the concerns ofa majority ofthe 
conferees over the propagation ofrDNA molecules in an innocuous strain (called Kl2) of 
the common intestinal bacterium E. coli. Some of the rDNA molecules of interest at that 
time were genes oftumorigenic viruses and genes coding for antibiotic resistance. Thus, 
the fear was that genetically engineered K 12 E. coli could cause cancers or be resistant to 
common antimicrobial agents. Singer and Soll communicated these concerns in a letter 
to the presidents of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Institute of 
Medicine, which also appeared in the journal Science (Singer & Soll, 1973). 
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In response, a committee of the NAS, chaired by Stanford's Paul Berg (in whose 
lab the first rDNA molecule was made), called for a moratorium on rDNA experiments 
that posed theoretical risks of carcinogenesis or antibiotic resistance. The Berg, or 
Moratorium, letter was published both in Science and its British counterpart Nature in 
mid-1974 (Berg et al, 1974). The letter also called for an international conference to 
discuss the issue of potential biohazards related to rDNA research and appropriate safety 
measures. That meeting was held at the Asilomar Conference Center south of San 
Francisco in February, 1975 The Conference report was issued several months later  It 
recommended a four-tiered categorization of risk and a corresponding four-tiered system 
of biological containment, and called for voluntary compliance among scientists 
internationally until their respective governments could formalize their own guidelines or 
recommendations (Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin, & Singer, 1975)  
Throughout the 1970s, especially from the conference at Asilomar on, the public 
policy focus was on "inadvertent biohazard." NIH had formed, prior to Asilomar, the 
Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee (a k.a RAC), and it was this 
body that was charged with developing U S guidelines for rDNA research. These were 
finally published in June, 1976, and were more stringent than the Asilomar 
recommendations which scientists had been following voluntarily (Watson & Tooze, 
1981, pp  63-66)  A final revision followed in December, 1978, and reflected in them 
was the sentiment expressed by NIH Director Donald Frederickson, in the introduction to 
the revised guidelines, "that the burden of proof is shifting towards those who would 
restrict recombinant DNA research" (quoted in Watson & Tooze, 1981, p. 431). In the 
end, much of the oversight responsibility was delegated to local biosafety committees 
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 145)  
With inadvertent biohazard now moved to the back burner, scientists in the early 
1980s moved from genetic engineering in bacteria to genetic engineering in higher 
animals 
Transgenics: Genetic Engineering in Non-Human Animals 
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The biotechnological accomplishment with the strongest implications for human 
GE is the creation of genetically engineered - or transgenic - animals. Ruddle and 
Gordon ( 1980) first successfully transferred foreign genes to mice by microinjection into 
a one-cell embryo. Shortly thereafter, other researchers microinjected the rabbit 
hemoglobin gene into mouse zygotes and were able to produce a mouse that had 
incorporated the rabbit gene into its chromosomal DNA, and passed along the gene to its 
progeny. The gene functioned normally (Velander et al, 1997, p. 71 ). Since then, 
according to Silver (1997, p. 230) "hundreds of thousands of transgenic mice, pigs, cows, 
and sheep [have] been produced." What are the incentives to produce such a vast number 
of transgenic animals? 
Three applications of transgenics, in particular, have enormous potential to benefit 
humankind  Those three applications are xenotransplantation, molecular "pharming," 
and designing transgenic animals to be used in biomedical research. Xenotransplantation 
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is the transplantation of organs or tissues from members of one animal species into 
recipient animals of another species. The availability of transplantable organs for human 
patients from human donors has been, and is projected to be, insufficient to meet demand. 
In 1993, approximately 33,000 persons in the US. were waiting for an organ transplant, 
and there were only 7,600 donors Approximately 3,000 persons died that year while on 
the waiting list. And about half of those on the list will eventually die due to lack ofa 
suitable organ for transplant (Institute of Medicine, 1996, pp. I 0-11 ). The discovery and 
use of immunosuppressive drugs effectively increased the pool of possible donors for a 
given patient to include genetically unrelated donors (Lanza, Cooper, & Chick, 1997, pp. 
54-55). Yet the gap between supply and demand remains. The pool of non-human 
animals is, for all practical purposes, unlimited  Genetic engineering of donor animals is 
one of the leading strategies for circumventing the problem of hyperacute immune 
rejection The genetic modification involves the introduction into (e.g.) a pig zygote -
and thus into the transplantable organs of the adult pig - of a human gene that codes for a 
protein that inhibits the normal immune response (Institute of Medicine, 1996, pp. 30-
31 ). 
A technique for producing virtually limitless quantities of certain pharmaceuticals 
in transgenic (non-human) animals is on the very near horizon (Reed, 1998; Velander et 
al, 1997). The technique, dubbed "pharming," is being employed for the production of 
certain proteins that heretofore have had to be purified from large quantities of donated 
blood at great expense. One such protein is protein C, which controls clotting in persons 
with an inborn deficiency (ibid., p. 70). Also valuable as a clotting factor is factor VIII, 
used by hemophiliacs Tissue plasminogen activator is a blood protein that dissolves 
blood clots, and is typically used for heart attack and stroke patients. And alpha-1-
antitrypsin is used to ease breathing in emphysema patients. Not only is pharming 
expected to be much more cost-effective than current blood purification methods, but, 
according to Velander (ibid., p  71 ), it "circumvents the risk of contamination with 
infectious agents " 
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Using transgenic animals as bioreactors (i.e., pharming) or as organ sources in 
xenotransplantation are not the only ways in which these creatures are of potential benefit 
to humans In some cases, transgenics may be developed to serve as animal models for 
certain human diseases, such as Alzheimer's (Shuldiner, 1996), sickle cell anemia 
(Nagel, 1998), or multiple sclerosis  In the latter case, Leroy Hood and his colleagues, 
then at the California Institute of Technology, produced a genetically engineered mouse 
containing a transgene that appeared to eliminate symptoms of incessant shivering 
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp 60-61, and references therein). These "shiverer" mice had 
been found to lack myelin basic protein (MBP), a protein important in the conduction of 
electricity along nerves  The transgene contained a function MBP gene, and it was the 
expression of this transgene that was responsible for elimination of shivering symptoms. 
The shiverer phenotype and multiple sclerosis in humans are both characterized by 
dysmyelination, suggesting that germline gene therapy might offer a useful approach to 
curing the latter disease as well Reiss and Straughan (1996, p. 169) list as examples 
eleven human diseases for which there are transgenic mouse models, including cystic 
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fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, sickle cell anemia, atherosclerosis, 
and various cancers. 
Thus we see that remarkable progress has been made in the genetic engineering of 
non-human animals in less than two decades, and this using the less precise GE method 
of gene addition discussed in Chapter 2. Once the more precise (i.e., less risky) method 
of gene replacement becomes available, it seems entirely possible that safety will fade 
from its currently prominent place on the list of ethical concerns, just as it did in the 
recombinant DNA debates of the 1970s  
Revisiting Genetic Eng;,ieering in Humans 
The achievement of recombinant DNA in the early 1970s precipitated a swift 
change in the scope of the ethical debates. Whereas, just prior to that achievement, the 
debates often had to do with the prospect of the biotechnological manipulation of 
humans, once rDNA plasmids were constructed the issue of risks associated with 
ecologically devastating, cancer-causing, or otherwise pathogenic bacteria thrust itself to 
the top of the agenda  By the end of the decade, notwithstanding the increasingly 
entrenched position of environmental groups, there was sufficient political consensus that 
rDNA (at least in the Kl2 strain of E.coli being used) was not a significant hazard that 
the scope of the ethical debate with respect to GE could once again be broadened. 
Two events in 1980 re-focused attention on the ethics of GE in humans. First 
there was the unauthorized gene therapy treatment of two patients by Martin J. Cline, 
Chief of the Division of Hematology-Oncology at UCLA (Murray, 1990, p. 50) In 1980, 
Cline had attempted to treat two thalassemia patients, one in Italy and one in Israel, with 
genetically altered bone marrow cells  (Thalassemia is a hereditary blood disorder ) 
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Cline had originally submitted a treatment protocol to two committees at UCLA One 
committee was responsible for biosafety, and had oversight responsibilities because the 
protocol called for DNA to be introduced to the patient in a particular recombinant form 
that was viewed at the time as potentially hazardous. The other committee, UCLA's 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), had oversight over the human experimentation aspects 
of the proposal Meanwhile, in order to circumvent the requirement for review by the 
biosafety committee, Cline altered his experimental design so that the DNA to be used 
was a non-recombinant form This maneuver was made moot by the IRB's rejection of 
the proposal It was after, and because of, this administrative rejection that Cline 
arranged to do the treatments overseas. After Israeli authorities confirmed with Cline and 
with UCLA that Cline's protocol as revised did not involve rDNA, approval was given. 
Cline, however, after gaining clearance to proceed, reverted to the original protocol and 
injected the suspect rDNA form of the genes (Fletcher, 1990, pp  60-61; Walters & 
Palmer, 1997, pp. 145-146). 
Cline's deceptions were discovered, and various punitive actions were meted out 
by Nill and UCLA (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 146). As with Rogers, the ethics of 
human experimentation was the primary issue, with the ethics of the genetic manipulation 
of humans a secondary, though still important, issue What Cline and Rogers had both 
attempted to do, each in a different way, was to manipulate the expression of genes in the 
somatic cells of patients. Manipulation of the genes of somatic cells became known as 
somatic cell gene therapy, and of germ cells or very early embryos, germline gene 
therapy. 
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The second event came in the form of a letter from the general secretaries of 
representative Catholic, Protestant and Jewish national organizations to President Jimmy 
Carter expressing concern about genetic engineering The letter was prompted in part by 
the Supreme Court decision (Diamond v. Chakrabarty) allowing GE-microbes to be 
patented. The general secretaries felt that "fundamental ethical questions" were at stake -
questions that dealt with "the fundamental nature of human life and the dignity and worth 
of the individual human being" (U S President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, pp. 95-96). 
Therefore they called on the President to assemble a broadly representative task force to 
look at the need for governmental regulation and to address these issues [ibid.; Walters, 
1997 #115, p. 145]. 
The Report Splicing Life The Orthodox Position on Human Gene Therapy 
The President's Commission responded by initiating a study on the science and 
ethics of GE. This study culminated in 1982 with the report Splicing Life, which was 
made public in hearings chaired by then-Congressman Al Gore of Tennessee. Much of 
interest came before Gore's committee, including an appearance by Dr. Martin Cline. 
But the most salient points, for our purposes, address the distinctions with respect to gene 
therapy - somatic cell versus germline, and enhancement versus treatment. The 
Commission found germ line gene therapy to be ethically unacceptable given the state of 
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the technology at that time, although it recommended against banning the technology 
outright. The overriding consideration was the fact that, since genetic changes were 
heritable, mistakes once made could be perpetuated in future generations. Somatic cell 
gene therapy, in contrast, had no such complications, and was effectively cleared for 
further research and development 
The Commission found enhancement gene therapy morally problematic as well, 
on the grounds that it might lead to eugenic applications 
Interventions aimed at enhancing "normal" people, as opposed to remedying 
recognized genetic defects, are also problematic, especially since distinguishing 
"medical treatment" from "nonmedical enhancement" is a very subjective matter; 
the difficulty of drawing a line suggests the danger of drifting toward attempts to 
"perfect" human beings once the door of"enhancement" is opened. [U.S. 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982 #117, p. 3] 
The position of the Commission - that somatic cell gene therapy for pwposes of 
treatment was ethically acceptable, while germline or enhancement gene therapy were 
not became established as a widely shared consensus position internationally. In a 
more recent statement, the European Commission's Group of Advisers on the Ethical 
Implications of Gene Therapy stated that "[b ]ecause of the important controversial and 
unprecedented questions raised by germ-line gene therapy, and considering the actual 
state of the art, germ-line gene therapy on humans is not at the present time ethically 
acceptable"[, 1995 #151, p. 268; emphasis added] 7 Walters and Palmer (1997, pp  47
7This objection seems to imply (though not clearly) that there may be some ethical concerns ("important 
controversial and unprecedented questions") over and above concerns about safety (alluded to by 
reference to the "actual state of the art"). 
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49, 90-91) reviewed an international sample of28 government policy statements on gene 
therapy, dating from 1980 through 1993, and found that "most expressed grave 
reservations about germ-line techniques" Few addressed enhancement germline gene 
therapy directly - the presumption was that gene therapy implied treatment Those that 
did mention enhancement (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada) found it ethically unacceptable 
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 134) 
Splicing Life thus cleared the way in the U S for the submission of human 
somatic cell gene therapy research protocols. A committee at the National Institutes of 
Health prepared guidelines - called the "Points to Consider in the Design and Submission 
of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols" - for researchers considering such 
projects. These guidelines are still in use and are still consistent with the consensus, or 
"orthodox," position on human gene therapy. That is, only protocols for clinical research 
in somatic cells are considered, and only if the ultimate goal is medical treatment ( or 
prevention) Germline or enhancement gene therapy protocols are not considered for 
funding  
The Tenuous Consensus: A Critique of the Ethical Grounding for the Orthodox 
View on Human Gene Therapy 
A number of ethical objections have been raised against human genetic 
engineering, and it is to these that we now tum Following the distinctions emphasized in 
Splicing Life, we will consider first the objections to germline genetic intervention, and 
second the objections to enhancement 
Objections to Germline Genetic Intervention 
Walters and Palmer (Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp  82-86) list eight common 
objections to germline gene therapy (GGT), and respond to each of the eight Unless 
otherwise specified in the language of the objection, it will be assumed that we are 
referring to gene therapy for treatment, not enhancement. 
Objection # 1 • Irreversible harm 
The first argument is that GGT carries with it a significant risk of harm to future 
generations Because of our limited knowledge, and the subtle, sometimes delayed 
effects of alterations to the genome, irreversible mistakes are likely to be made that will 
put our descendants in harm's way. (Harm to embryos will be considered below. See 
Objection #5 ) 
71 
As argued in the previous chapter, the response to this objection is that technology 
is likely to advance to a point where germline interventions are acceptably safe It is 
worth briefly reviewing some of the relevant scientific reasons for making this claim  
First, genetic engineering has been done successfully in non-human animals, although the 
strategy used - gene addition (see Chapter 2) - is not at an acceptable level of safety for 
use in humans. Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is good reason to 
believe that an acceptably safe GE technique - gene replacement - will become feasible 
in the foreseeable future. Third, initially human GE can be expected to target well
characterized, single-gene disorders such as cystic fibrosis. As expertise is gained in the 
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genetic treatment of these relatively straightforward genetic diseases, a broader 
knowledge of human genetics will become available as research into the human genome 
progresses. The Human Genome Project, as the collective effort is known, is expected to 
have identifed all 100,000 human genes by the year 2020, and all common versions (or 
alleles) of those genes by 2030 (Silver, 1997, p. 208). 
Fourth, an added measure of safety may become available for genetically­
engineered organisms, including humans Recent research has shown that genes that are 
altered or added (the transgenes) can be present in the cells in an "off' mode. That is, the 
gene is present in the cell, but its ability to become active (i e ,  produce the protein it 
encodes) can be placed under external control. Specifically, such a transgene will only 
turn on when the person carrying the gene takes a certain pill (Wade, 1999a; Ye et al., 
1999). 
Finally, one expects that the usual protections for human subjects that have 
become so prominent in clinical trials for novel drugs and medical procedures will be 
even more prominent in germline gene therapy trials. This has certainly proved to be the 
case so far with somatic cell gene therapy. 
Objection #2 Alternatives to GGT available 
The second argument is that there is no need to incur the risks of GGT when other 
options are available to those who wish to avoid having children with certain genetic 
diseases. One option is to use in vitro fertilization (IVF) in combination with 
preimplantation diagnosis (PID). The IVF-PID option involves removing a cell or cells 
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from the very early embryo and testing for genetic defects If no defects are present in 
the tested cells, then no defects will be present in the embryo from which the cells were 
removed, since all the descendant cells of the fertilized egg are genetically identical. (For 
our purposes, we may ignore differences in mitochondrial DNA) The embryo may then 
be implanted in the prospective mother's womb where, if all goes well, a normal 
pregnancy will follow The second option is prenatal diagnosis in combination with 
selective abortion Here cells of fetal origin are removed from the amniotic fluid and 
subjected to genetic testing. Parents may opt to abort the pregnancy if the test results are 
unfavorable 
Walters and Palmer argue that treatment GGT is more consistent with the ethical 
mission of medicine than are discarding unused or affected embryos or aborting affected 
fetuses In addition, a strategy of genetic treatment is more respectful of those members 
of society who are challenged by genetic diseases, or by disabilities generally To this 
counter-argument, one might add quite simply that it is mere speculation to assume that 
GGT will always be riskier (or more expensive) than the two options in question. IVF is 
expensive and often fails even after several attempts. Abortion is not without medical 
risk, and in any case is, for most women, an unpleasant or even traumatic experience. 
Finally, most disease-causing genes reside in the cells of heterozygote carriers, i e , 
persons who carry only one copy of a recessive gene when two copies are required to 
cause disease. These carriers are unaffected by disease, but could have children who are 
affected should they happen to conceive with another carrier Only germline GE will 
permanently remove the disease-causing genes from heterozygote carriers - that is, from 
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the gene pool at large Whether or not such a eugenic goal is morally defensible is a 
separate question (We will have more to say about eugenics below) But the eradication 
of certain well-characterized recessive genetic disorders such as cystic fibrosis from the 
human population seems on its face to be a worthy and humanitarian goal, akin to the 
eradication of smallpox or polio 
Objection #3 • High cost, limited availability 
A third objection to GGT assumes that it will be an expensive and therefore 
scarce commodity. As such, the wealthy will have access and the poor will not. The 
counter-argument is that it is, again, pure speculation to say that GGT, once available, 
will remain prohibitively expensive In any case, the costs of GGT must be compared 
with costs associated with genetic diseases not treated by GGT. Finally, GGT could be 
(more) equitably distributed if subsidized 
Society has many commodities medical and otherwise - that are scarce and in 
high demand And society finds solutions to the problem of how best to distribute those 
commodities. The solutions are rarely ideal, and often there is inequity between the 
wealthy and the poor. However, for better or worse, some level of inequity is generally 
tolerated. Rarely if ever is the commodity denied to all on the grounds that its 
distribution is inequitable  One would expect, then, that human germline gene therapy 
will be made available even if problems of inequity accompany it. 
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Thus, although the issue of equity in the distribution of scarce medical resources 
is an important one, it is not unique to human GE, nor is it likely to be seen as a sufficient 
ethical justification for prohibiting the technology 
Objection #4: Use for enhancement 
A fourth argument relies on the third - assuming that human GE will be 
preferentially available to the wealthy - and on the second - assuming that less expensive 
options for "treatment" (avoiding disease) will be available. In this scenario, no one will 
use human GE to avoid genetic disease. Instead, they will use human GE for 
enhancement Only the wealthy will pursue genetic enhancement, since the government 
is unlikely to subsidize enhancement as opposed to treatment, and the poor will be 
effectively denied access to genetic enhancement Over the course of time, society will 
be divided into two or more classes of genetically-enhanced "haves" and unenhanced 
"have-nots" Silver (1997) presents such a scenario in some detail, and sees this as being 
an important objection to human GE (see Chapter I). 
There seem to be three components of this objection. First, there is the basic 
inequity - the wealthy have access to a valuable resource while the poor do not This 
issue was addressed above (see Objection #3). Second, although it is not explicitly 
stated, one might take part of the objection to be against genetic enhancement per se. As 
has been noted above, this objection to enhancement is one of the two foci of the 
orthodox position on gene therapy. We will take up this issue in the next section. Third, 
the objection might be against the divergence into two genetic classes. Here the issue is 
not so much that one class is better off than the other. It is not that one class (the 
enhanced) is super-human while the other is merely human  The issue is that we have 
gone from one class of beings all of whom were equally human to two classes one 
(unenhanced) human and the other (enhanced) modified-human. 
Silver's (ibid ) GenRich v. Natural scenario introduced in Chapter 1 is just this 
kind of scenario a world filled with genetically-enhanced GenRich descended from the 
wealthy and unenhanced Naturals descended from the poor. Silver finds nothing 
inherently wrong with enhancement, even enhancement so radical as to result in species 
diverg�nce (Recall that in Silver's future world there were several GenRich species ) 
The issue for Silver is equity Glover ( 1984) views the problem similarly. 
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The suggestion that, once problems of equity are resolved, there is nothing 
ethically regrettable about a world in which, in a relatively short period of time, humanity 
has been fragmented into a number of non-human (or at least quasi-human) offshoots is a 
bit difficult to swallow As indicated in the introductory chapter, an alternative 
hypothesis is that our moral aversion to (radical) genetic enhancement is grounded in a 
belief that there is something intrinsically valuable in humanness 
This ethical concern is, of course, central to this inquiry and therefore will be 
taken up in later chapters. 
Objection #5 Moral status of human pre-embryos 
GGT is held to be morally objectionable because, both in the clinical research 
stages and as part of post-research treatment, human embryos will be discarded or 
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otherwise destroyed This harm to embryos is morally objectionable, it is argued, 
because a human embryo is the sort of thing that is due an elevated moral respect Let us 
recall from Chapter 2 that GGT (human GE) is performed on a single cell - typically the 
zygote, but possibly also the embryonic stem cell, or the as-yet-unfertilized egg. For the 
purpose of addressing this objection, let us assume that the target cell is the zygote (or 
one-cell embryo) The human embryo during its frst fourteen days of development is 
often referred to as a "pre-embryo," presumably because it is only after fourteen days that 
the early embryo is incapable of twinning Also, it is only after fourteen days that each 
of the cells of the early embryo have committed either to become placental cells or to 
become fetal cells. (Silver suggests that political motivations are at play also in the 
adoption of the new term "pre-embryo" (1997, p. 39)) 
According to the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, there are 
three principal views on the moral status of human pre-embryos (American Fertility 
Society, 1986, p. 3 59) The frst is that pre-embryos "are entitled to protection as human 
beings from the time of fertilization forward" Two scientific reasons are given in 
support of this claim. First, a new genotype - that is, a unique combination of genes - is 
created at the moment of fertilization And second, pre-embryos have the potential to 
develop into fetuses, children and adult human beings. 
The second view "denies that human pre-embryos have any moral status." 
Scientifc reasons are given in support of this view as well First of all, only about a third 
of all human pre-embryos conceived through sexual intercourse attach to the uterine wall, 
develop and are delivered as live infants. Since the "natural" fate of two-thirds of pre-
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embryos is a death that no one seems to find ethically regrettable, one is led to conclude 
that pre-embryos are not the sort of thing to which we have ethical duties or obligations. 
Secondly, as noted above, pre-embryos can divide into twins, triplets, etc. Not only that, 
in the IVF laboratory several pre-embryos - each the product of different sperm-egg pairs 
- can literally be stuck together to form one pre-embryo  Silver ( 1997, p. 46) asks us to 
imagine a scenario in which parents initially intend to have twins created using IVF and 
splitting the single pre-embryo into two prior to implantation After the split, however, 
they have a change of heart and request that the twin pre-embryos now be physically 
unified in the culture dish The physician complies with the request  Silver finds it 
implausible to say that such a series of actions is morally objectionable. We have, he 
notes, destroyed a potential life without killing anything  
The third view takes an intermediate position. While acknowledging that the 
potential to become an adult human being gives the pre-embryo a more elevated moral 
status than nonembryonic human tissues, it is held that other moral duties and obligations 
can outweigh our duties and obligations to the human pre-embryo 
There are problems with the first view (and that part of the third view that defers 
to the first view) over and above those already mentioned. The first problem has to do 
with the claim that the human pre-embryo has a unique genotype beginning at the 
moment of fertilization. As we learned in the previous chapter, fertilization is a multi­
step process that is not complete until the zygote has divided once, forming the two-cell 
pre-embryo. It is only at the two-cell stage that the genes from the sperm and those from 
the egg commingle and a new genotype is achieved If that is the moment at which the 
pre-embryo becomes morally important, then human GE is not touched by this objection 
since it must occur at the one-cell stage. Moreover, germline genetic interventions may 
be made in other cells - either gametes prior to fertilization [already done in cattle; see 
\Moffat, 1998 #195]; or human ES cells (Gearhart, 1998; Wilmut, 1998); or human 
somatic cell nuclei to be used for cloning (Wilmut, 1998). 
Technology is racing ahead of ethics on these questions. Since 1995 the US 
Congress has effectively banned embryo research in federally funded facilities The ban 
has been attached to the bills authorizing spending for the National Institutes of Health, 
which funds the vast majority of the nation's biomedical research. The use offederal 
funds is prohibited for "research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, 
discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for 
research on fetuses in utero" (quoted in Wade, 1999b) 
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The picture is clouded, however, since embryos evidently are no longer the only 
cells that can give rise to fully developed human beings. Human ES cells, discovered in 
late 1998 (Thomson et al, 1998), were recently ruled by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) to fall outside the Congressional ban. The distinction that 
DHHS and its general counsel made was that an ES cell, if implanted into a uterine wall, 
could not develop into a human being whereas an embryo could. In earlier experiments -
in which adult mice offspring came from ES cells - the ES cell needed to be surrounded 
by an "artificial placenta" in order to implant in the uterus (Kolata, 1999). The DHHS 
ruling means, according to Nm Director Harold Varmus, that it would be illegal for 
federally funded labs to derive human ES cells, since that would involve embryo 
research, but they could use ES cells produced in private labs (Wade, 1999b) 
The matter was immediately taken up by 70 members of the House of Representatives 
who, in February 1999, asked the Secretary of Health and Human Service to rescind the 
ruling (Wade, 1999c) 
Thus, those who would argue against human GE on the grounds that it violates 
the moral integrity of the embryo would have to stipulate a very broad definition of 
"embryo." Essentially they would need to protect all totipotential cells (Walters & 
Palmer, 1997, pp. 83-84) But what we are discovering is that "all totipotential cells" 
may include everything from human embryonic stem cells growing in culture, to somatic 
cells such as skin or blood cells (which can be used in cloning), to cells removed from an 
early embryo for genetic testing 
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While there is certainly much more that remains to be said regarding this 
objection, it appears unlikely that, in the long term, human GE will be prohibited because 
of a perceived violation of the moral status of the human embryo and other totipotential 
cells. It is not only the dubious scientific grounding for the arguments that prompts this 
conclusion. Current biomedical practices indicate a public willingness to allow 
manipulation of pre-embryos. IVF is common, and the disposal of unneeded embryos, 
while not without controversy, has not aroused the passions of the majority. Genetic 
screening, which involves the discarding of embryos, has been done in humans (see, e g , 
Mulkay, 1997, pp 139-140). Abortion, though controversial, remains legal Initially, the 
focus of human GE will be on treatment gene therapy, which as discussed in Chapter 2 
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- promises to alleviate much pain and suffering from genetic diseases Emphasizing this 
point, Walters and Palmer ( 1997, p  86) argue that "there is a presumption in favor of 
fostering continued development of human embryos and fetuses, but that presumption 
can in our view be overridden by other considerations like serious harm to the developing 
individual or others and the needs of preclinical research " Already there has been 
political movement on the part of advocates for persons with certain genetic diseases who 
would like to see less restrictive regulations on the use of human embryos in research 
And finally, there will be pressure from corporations that stand to profit from treatment 
GGT. 
Objection #6 Concentration of power 
A sixth objection is that making human GE commonplace would give to a 
relatively small number of people a tremendous amount of power over the direction of 
the course of human evolution Let us assume that those in power are well-intentioned, 
conscientious individuals (The "mad dictator" scenario is dealt with below.) Let us also 
assume that this objection does not have to do with the possibility that those in power 
will, through ignorance or accident, cause harm to future generations. (The issue of 
irreversible harm was addressed above.) The issue here is this: given that a huge number 
of possible evolutionary courses may be available to genetic engineers of the future, all 
generally beneficial, who should make the decisions that collectively determine the 
course? 
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The response is that it is unlikely that authority over human GE will be 
centralized (Glover, 1984; Silver, 1997). Human GE is unlike other technologies (e.g., 
nuclear) that require huge capital investments and therefore are not left to the unimpeded 
marketplace of individual consumers. The private market for reproductive and genetic 
technologies already exists, and that industry - at least in developed countries is 
flourishing. The course of human evolution, thus, will be set by many individuals acting 
independently in a free market The potential for harm (i e., consumers making genetic 
choices that would bring harm to fuure generations) can be minimized by a limited 
number of government restrictions - based on the best genetic science - on decisions that 
are legally permissible. Glover (ibid., p. 51) proposes just such a "mixed system," a 
system of parental initiative in making genetic choice in combination with a centralized 
veto power. 
Human GE will have its start with treatment germline gene therapy, not 
enhancement To deny to those suffering from horrible genetic diseases the medical 
benefits of treatment GGT cannot be justified on these grounds. 
Objection #7: Misuse by dictators 
The seventh objection reflects what some have in mind when they use the term 
"eugenics" in a pejorative sense. They imagine that a mad dictator, or someone with 
excessive political authority, will attempt to genetically engineer a class of humans with 
desired skills or characteristics. One imagines a super-race of persons exceptionally 
skilled at and amenable to, warfare. Or, on the other hand, the most useful product of the , 
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human GE apparatus might be a particularly docile and servile underclass, much like the 
epsilons of Huxley's Brave New World The counter-argument is that this scenario is 
both politically unlikely (Nazi Germany notwithstanding) and would be an inefficient and 
ineffective means of achieving the mad dictator's goal. It would be inefficient even 
assuming we had a vast and comprehensive understanding of the human genome 
because the fruits of one's GE labor take roughly twenty years to grow to useful 
adulthood. The program would be ineffective because, to put it simply, we are more than 
just our genes and so giving humans the desired genotype does not guarantee the desired 
person. 
Objection #8 Human rights and tampering 
The eighth objection is that we all possess a right to a genetic inheritance that has 
not been artificially tampered with. Here it is interesting to contrast the policy statements 
emanating from Europe with those of the United States. The American treatment of the 
ethics of genetic engineering thus far has had a consequentialist bent. That is, roughly 
speaking, the moral rightness or wrongness of GE hinges on whether the consequences 
were good or bad. The European treatment has had an additional component  
Recommendation 934: On Genetic Engineering was issued by the Council of Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly in January, 1982, just prior to Splicing Life Of particular 
significance in this policy statement is the assertion of a "right to inherit a genetic pattern 
which has not been artificially changed" (Council of Europe, in Jonsen et al., 1998) This 
right, it was claimed, is derived from the "rights to life and to human dignity protected by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (ibid , p. 297) In the 
formal recommendations, however, this right is importantly qualified. Recognition is 
asked for a "right to a genetic inheritance which has not been artificially interfered with, 
except in accordance with certain principles which are recognised as being fully 
compatible with respect for human rights (as, for example, in the field of therapeutic 
applications)" (ibid , p. 297) Thus the door is left open, it seems, for human GE for 
purposes of medical treatment. 
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Splicing Life, while also adopting the orthodox position on gene therapy, made no 
reference to a right to an unaltered inheritance, as had Recommendation 934 and other 
European statements. Instead it compared gene therapy with conventional medical 
treatments. The President's Commission could find no basis for the suggestion that 
human genetic engineering was intrinsically wrong. The ethical emphasis, it argued, 
should properly be placed on the potential uses, both beneficial and harmful, to which the 
technology might be put  
The motivation for this objection, according to Walters and Palmer (1997, pp. 84-
86), is that human GE should not be allowed because future generations are incapable of 
giving consent  The proper moral consideration of future persons is a complex matter  
With respect to making a decision about a genetic alteration of a one-cell embryo that 
will one day be one's child, it is enough to observe that we routinely make medical 
decisions for our children who are not competent to do so. The fact is, however, that 
multiple future generations may be affected by one's decision to proceed (or not proceed) 
with a genetic intervention. Does this mean that it is morally incumbent on us to preserve 
the genetic lineage in its "natural" state? As Walters and Palmer (ibid., p. 86) have 
argued, at least certain interventions are unlikely to be viewed, by future generations, as 
violations of rights 
Insofar as we can anticipate the needs and wants of future generations, we think 
that any reasonable future person would prefer health to serious disease and 
would therefore welcome a germ-line intervention in his or her family line that 
effectively prevented cystic fibrosis from being transmitted to him or her. In our 
view, such a person would not regard this intervention as tampering and would 
regard as odd the claim that his or her genetic patrimony has been artificially 
tampered with. Cystic fibrosis was not a part of his or her family's heritage that 
the future person was eager to receive or to claim 
In the end, it seems that a right to an unaltered inheritance is in need of further 
defense. The recognition that our actions today will affect many future persons, rather 
than one, ought to sharpen our desire to arrive at the best decision. That, however, says 
nothing about whether the best decision will be in favor of, or against, GE. 
Objection #9 "Playing God" 
The objection that human GE is morally objectionable because it amounts to 
"playing God" was not one of those listed by Walters and Palmer. This omission is very 
likely due to the ambiguity of the objection So many others, however, have made the 
charge that it is worth a brief inspection. 
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The faith-based version of the "playing God" objection relies on a literal belief in 
God. This objection, we may surmise, is just that the creation of life lies within God's 
domain, and by genetically engineering human (and perhaps other) organisms, we have 
infringed on God's domain But we already interfere in many ways with the creation of 
human life, for example, with birth control pills, or in vitro fertilization (IVF) Assuming 
that many of those who would raise this objection would not find the use of birth control 
pills or IVF morally offensive, we must look for an alternative interpretation of 
"interference." 
Perhaps the objection is that what falls within God's domain is not whether a 
child should be conceived, or even how it should be conceived, but rather, how it will 
biologically develop from a fertilized egg to a newborn  In other words, we ought not 
interfere with, or alter, the gene-directed embryological and fetal development of the 
(future) child If that were God's domain, then this might constitute a legitimate 
challenge to GE, for this is precisely what GE does. 
This view does not, however, appear to be shared by the majority of those 
theologians who have engaged in the public policy debate. Peters [, 1995 #228; 1997 
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# 123], for instance, argues from a religious perspective that we have no reason to believe 
that the creation of human life is the domain of God alone. He argues that it is not 
inconsistent with the faithful life to believe (as Peters himself does) that we are intended 
by God to be "created co-creators" A similar stand is taken by the World Council of 
Churches, which has declared, "[a]s Christians we believe that we are both creatures of 
God and co-creators with him in fulfilling the image He has given us" (Abrecht & Shinn, 
1980, p  49) 
The Catholic, Protestant and Jewish theologians contributing to the 
aforementioned report, Splicing Life, were of a like mind on this question (U  S 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, 1982, p  53) 
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In the view of the theologians, contemporary developments in molecular biology 
raise issues of responsibility rather than being matters to be prohibited because 
they usurp powers that human beings should not possess. The Biblical religions 
teach that human beings are, in some sense, co-creators with the Supreme Creator  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore theological doctrine on the question 
whether humans should or should not be "co-creators" in the relevant sense. For our 
purposes, it is enough simply to point out that the leading religious commentators in the 
public policy debate thus far do not agree that all "interference" of the sort involved with 
GE is morally objectionable 
Hubris is frequently associated with the charge of playing God. Some have 
termed this an "arrogant interference in nature," meaning that "in 'creating new life 
forms' scientists are abusing their learning by interfering with nature" (US President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, 1982, p  55). (We will consider "interfering with nature" just 
below.) Chadwick, in her article on cloning, considers the "playing God" objection to be 
that, in "try[ing] to gain some control over life and death .. [m]an is seen as overreaching 
himself' (Chadwick, 1982, p. 203) 
If the argument is against hubris, or overreaching, on the part of humankind, then 
it seems that some account of humankind's morally proper place is needed. ls the 
argument that there is a threshold over which one must not cross in the pursuit of 
knowledge related to GE, or in acting on that knowledge? Surely there must be a reason 
for circumscribing human GE in this way and declaring it morally off-limits 
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Chadwick's attempt to give a reason seems plausible. According to Chadwick, 
actions that are associated with the terms "hubris" or "overreaching" are actions that have 
unforeseeable consequences that are undesirable either because they tend to "arouse 
anxiety" in people, or because they may actually lead to bad consequences (ibid , pp. 
203-204) What is the proper response when faced with an action that might reasonably 
be considered overreaching? "Rather than ruling out the action with no more ado . it 
may be preferable to consider the possible consequences, and adopt some kind ofrisk­
assessment" (ibid , p  204)  
A third interpretation of the "playing God" objection is roughly a secularized 
version of the f rst, with nature's rightful domain taking the place of God's domain. The 
claim implies that nature is sacred or inviolable. The most obvious problem with this 
objection is that we seem to violate nature all the time. ls prescribing eyeglasses for 
myopia a violation of nature (US. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, p 55)? What 
about using the modern, artificial marvels of medicine to interrupt the "natural" course of 
cancer and other major diseases? Or, for that matter, what about damming rivers, 
educating our children, or spaying our pets? It seems that we must conclude that not all 
human-directed change in nature entails a violation of nature. So which changes are 
violations and which are not? 
Chadwick considers the objection that certain actions or procedures are wrong 
because they are "unnatural." As one plausible interpretation, she says that this claim is 
equivalent to claiming that the action in question, if carried out, prevents members of the 
species from functioning properly  She gives as an example the moral objection against 
keeping hens in battery cages because it prevents them from spreading their wings, a 
natural function for hens. Analogously, then, the argument from function would claim 
that there are "certain very basic features with which we associate being human" that are 
threatened by some practice such as GE (Chadwick, 1982, p 202) 
Chadwick cites two main problems with the argument from function First, it is 
difficult to give criteria for basic human features or functions. Second, a moral 
assessment based on "naturalness" seems to be at a disadvantage compared with an 
assessment based on people's preferences or desires. At the very least, the latter are 
easier to identify (ibid , p. 203) 
The issue of naturalness - specifically, the question of the "sacredness" of human 
nature - will be revisited below. For the time being, however, we are forced to conclude 
that the playing God objections as formulated above are not particularly compelling. 
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In spite of the political consensus having been reached that germfine gene therapy 
in humans was off-limits, the groundwork has been laid for revisiting the question of the 
moral permissibility of this technology. The prohibition against germline genetic 
intervention, as articulated in Splicing Life, appeared to be based mainly on the fact that 
technology heretofore has not been at an acceptable level of risk for use in humans. 
This implies that once technological advances minimize the risk sufficiently, this primary 
obstacle to human GE will have been removed. We have argued above (see Objection 
#1) and in Chapter 2 that there is good reason to expect the necessary technological 
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advances. We will assume, therefore, that human GE will become safe in the foreseeable 
future. 
Although risk of harm was the most prominent of the objections to germline gene 
therapy (human GE), it was certainly not the only objection Thus, we were led to 
consider eight other common ethical objections to human GE (Objections #2 through #9, 
above). While space does not permit an exhaustive treatment of each objection, the 
foregoing discussion indicates that none of these other objections are particularly 
compelling This implies that, once human GE becomes acceptably safe, there will be 
little ethical momentum, so to speak, on the side of those who would wish to continue to 
restrict germline gene therapy 
One need not look far to see evidence of this open-mindedness towards human 
GE. In fact, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, some academics again opened the 
question of the moral acceptability of germline genetic interventions (Walters, in Jonsen 
et al., 1998, p. 257). These academic discussions led in 1990 to a consensus statement 
called the Declaration oflnuyama, which was remarkable for its openness to the prospect 
of treatment germline gene therapy, as the following clause indicates 
The modification of human germ cells for therapeutic or preventive purposes 
would be technically much more difficult than that of somatic cells and is not at 
present in prospect Such therapy might, however, be the only means of treating 
certain conditions, so continued discussion of both its technical and ethical 
aspects is essential. Before germ-line therapy is undertaken, its safety must be 
very well established, for changes in germ cells would affect the descendants of 
patients (in Jonsen et al., 1998, p. 323) 
The foregoing discussion indicates that the moral prohibition against germline 
genetic interventions will be relaxed once these interventions become acceptably safe 
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This leaves the prohibition against enhancement - the second cornerstone of the orthodox 
view on human gene therapy - as the lone remaining ethical constraint on human GE  
We now turn to a discussion of the objections against human genetic enhancement 
Objections to Genetic Enhancement 
The objection to human genetic enhancement is not as well formulated as are the 
objections to germline interventions generally  In this section we will highlight some 
difficulties with the claim that human genetic enhancement as such is ethically 
objectionable. 
The treatment-enhancement distinction is problematic 
In the bioethics literature on enhancement, a central problem is the difficulty in 
defining exactly what is meant by the terms treatment and enhancement (REFS) 
Nevertheless, the examples given are consistent with our common-sense expectations 
Examples of treatment GE (germline gene therapy) are the proposed genetic 
modifications that would pre-empt cystic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, Lesch-Nyhan 
syndrome, and the other single-gene disorders mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Examples of enhancement GE are increased physical height, decreased need for sleep, 
increased longevity or lifespan, increased memory, decreased aggression, and improved 
general cognitive ability (Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp. 101-107; Whitehouse, Juengst, 
Mehlman, & Murray, 1997). In other words, treatment - the proper domain of medicine 
- has to do with improvements from a state ofbelow-normal functioning (disease or 
disability) to normal or at least closer-to-normal functioning, while enhancement has to 
do with improvements from normal functioning to above normal or at least higher 
functioning. Let us take this common-sense understanding of the terms treatment and 
enhancement as our starting point. 
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The question now is this: can we be ethically opposed to enhancement if we are 
not opposed to treatment? In other words, can we justify being opposed to improvements 
from normal-to-"supernormal" when we are not opposed to improvements from 
"subnormal" -to-normal? Aren't improvements just improvements? 
A common view is that "health" means freedom from disease or disability. 
According to this view, the purpose of health care or medical treatment (including 
preventive treatments) is to "maintain, restore, or compensate for the restricted 
opportunity and loss of function caused by disease and disability" (Sabin & Daniels, 
1994, p. I 0). An alternative view is that embodied in the controversial World Health 
Organization definition of health - "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well­
being" ( quoted in Parens, 1998, p  S2). Sabin and Daniels call these views "hard-line" 
and "expansive," respectively ( 1994, p. 5). The distinction in the literature between 
treatment and enhancement seems to assume the hard-line - or normal function - view. 
There are problems with the hard-line, or normal-function, distinction between 
treatment and enhancement (see Parens, 1998, pp S3-S4) First, it is often unclear when 
a certain biological state should be classified as a disease or disability, and when it should 
be classified as normal though disadvantageous That translates directly into an unclear 
boundary between treatrnent and enhancement. Since both treatment and enhancement 
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are improvements, perhaps it makes more sense, following Walters and Palmer (1997, pp. 
109-110), to distinguish between health-related and non-health-related enhancements. 
On the other hand, this only seems to postpone the question of what constitutes "health." 
To better illustrate this difficulty, consider the following cases involving the use of 
human growth hormone (see Lantos, Siegler, & Cuttler, 1989; Parens, 1998): 
1) Child A suffers from a brain tumor that causes a defciency in the secretion of 
growth hormone (GH), and has a predicted adult height (without GH 
treatment) of 5 feet 3 inches 
2) Child B, whose parents are both very short, is not GH-deficient and has a 
predicted adult height (without GH treatment) of 5 feet 3 inches 
Of Child A, the advocate of the normal-function view of health and disease would 
presumably say that this is a case of disease, and administering growth hormone to this 
child would therefore constitute medical treatment. But what then should be said of the 
other case? Assuming that Child A and Child B will both suffer equally from short 
stature, and benefit equally from growth hormone therapy, do we say that only in the case 
of Child A do we have disease, and therefore only in that case is growth hormone 
supplementation justifiable? Is it not the effect, rather than the cause, that is morally 
relevant here? This criterion - i e, level of growth hormone - for moral line-drawing 
seems unsatisfactory. 
Another problem with the normal-function model is that it implies a theoretical, 
and not merely a statistical, account of the organism That is, it requires that we be able 
to give definitive criteria for the (normal) human being, implying that the "human being" 
is an unchanging part of the universe - a natural kind rather than a convenient 
classification for an organism whose "nature" continues to change over evolutionary 
time. We will pursue the question of human nature further in subsequent chapters. For 
present purposes, suffice it to say that attempts to defend the view that human beings are 
a natural kind have generally been unconvincing 
Thus, our inability to define human normality, health, disease, and so on, make it 
impossible to make a logically consistent distinction between treatment and 
enhancement. 
In response, it might be argued that, despite the imprecision of concepts such as 
"normality" or "species-typical functioning," it defies common sense to say of at least 
some cases that they cannot be clearly identified as either enhancement or treatment. 
Continuing with examples related to hormone use, consider the following two examples 
Example 1. A professional baseball player ingests hormones and thereby boosts 
his strength to such a degree that he smashes the record for home runs in a single 
season 
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Example 2: A breast cancer patient takes certain hormones and thereby causes her 
cancer to go into remission. 
Is it plausible to say of these examples that we cannot distinguish one from the 
other? Can we deny that the first is an instance of enhancement and the second an 
instance of treatment? Perhaps the objection is that there will frequently be cases - such 
as the growth hormone deficiency example - that are not so clear-cut. But just because 
there are borderline cases does not mean that there are not also clear cases, and in clear 
cases a morally relevant distinction between treatment and enhancement can and should 
be made. 
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In spite of our not having satisfactorily resolved this question, let us for the sake 
of argument grant that a distinction can be made between treatment and enhancement. 
We do so for two reasons. First of all, there have been clues that our attempts at moral 
line-drawing may be directed at the wrong target Recall that, in referring to potentially 
objectionable genetic enhancements, we have f equently used the parenthetical phrase 
"certain kinds or degrees of' to qualify "enhancement." In addition, it has been asserted 
that relatively minor enhancements, such as plastic surgery, do not seem morally 
problematic. These two observations taken together suggest that, if there is a line to be 
drawn between morally significant and insignificant (genetic) alterations, then the line is 
not the same as that separating treatment from enhancement. This suggestion will be 
taken up in later sections The second reason the Permissive View proponent might, for 
the sake of argument, be willing to concede this point (i.e , that treatment and 
enhancement can be distinguished) is that she may issue a more direct challenge to the 
defender of the Restrictive View. That challenge is taken up in the next section. 
Even if we can make the distinction between treatment and enhancement, what is morally 
wrong with enhancement? 
Earlier the example of Prozac, or a Super Prozac, was used to suggest that 
enhancement of already existing persons becomes morally problematic when the degree 
of change involved reaches a critical threshold, at which point the "self," or personal 
identity, is threatened. Whether or not such a view can be defended in the case of 
pharmacological enhancement of already existing persons, it was argued that loss of 
personal identity over time was not at stake in the case of genetic enhancement because 
the thing that is enhanced is a one-cell embryo and not a person. And harm, it was 
argued, was not at issue with (safe) human genetic enhancement for the simple reason 
that an enhancement, by definition, is a beneficial modification. 
If personal identity over time is not threatened nor harm entailed by (germline) 
genetic enhancement, what of ethical significance is threatened? 
In our earlier discussion of eugenics, we observed that the old (pre-GE) eugenics 
aimed at improving humans Whatever the improvement, the offspring would be a 
human being. The new (GE-) eugenics could potentially aim at improving on 
humankind Some improvements could conceivably yield an offspring that is not a 
human being We asked earlier Is it only certain kinds or degrees of enhancement that 
are morally problematic? Maybe the answer is yes - those enhancements that threaten 
our humanness. 
Is (safe) radical human genetic enhancement intrinsically regrettable? 
It seems that there are two possible positions on the above-stated question 
I) Even very radical genetic enhancements are not ethically regrettable. 
2) Very radical genetic enhancements are ethically regrettable (although minor 
enhancements are not) 
The first position seems to conflict with our pre-philosophical intuitions - that is, 
roughly, the intuitions we have prior to in-depth philosophical reflection or 
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argumentation This claim is saying that human GE would be ethically acceptable even if 
we created a human-derived organism that bore no or few recognizable human features -
such as Silver's GenRich - and it rejects the claim that genetic enhancement is inherently 
wrong or ethically problematic Let us call this the Permissive View on human GE 
97 
The second position, on the other hand, is problematic even though it sits well 
with our pre-philosophical intuitions Let us call this view - i.e., that there is something 
inherently wrong or objectionable with at least certain kinds or degrees of genetic 
enhancement - the Restrictive View on human GE  The difficulty with the Restrictive 
View is that, once we have granted that neither germ line GE nor enhancement per se are 
inherently wrong, it is not obvious what of ethical significance is lost with radical genetic 
enhancement For the moment, this Restrictive View has been supported only by 
appealing to the implausibility of the Permissive View. But what positive argument can 
be given in support of the Restrictive View? 
The Restrictive View implies that something of ethical significance is at stake 
when we consider certain types or degrees of ( even beneficial) genetic alteration. This is 
the case, it will be recalled, not because we have violated the moral status of the one-cell 
embryo, nor because there has been a loss of personal identity, nor because someone has 
been harmed. We have found those and other arguments unpersuasive, and hence have 
agreed to set those arguments aside The Restrictive View holds that radical genetic 
alterations - even enhancements - destroy or diminish something intrinsically valuable. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, it remains an open question whether the Restrictive 
View and the core intuition that motivates it are rationally defensible, or whether, on 
balance, the Permissive View is on firmer ground It is to this question that we next tum 
Before doing so, however, it will be useful to reconsider both the practical and 
philosophical importance of the question at hand. 
Is the Permissive View a straw man? 
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It might be argued that the Permissive View is a straw man, since no serious­
minded person would hold such a view, and, as we have already noted, there is broad­
based consensus that undertaking genetic enhancement, radical or otherwise, is morally 
impermissible. So whom are we trying to persuade? And, as a practical matter, why is it 
urgent or even necessary to explicitly formulate grounds for the Restrictive View if all 
agree that the latter is correct? In response, it can be said that few have actually seriously 
considered the Permissive View - at least not explicitly and in a public forum Some 
serious-minded commentators (Glover and Silver are two) have, and have found that 
view defensible, although each has had significant ethical reservations about potential 
consequences stemming from genetic enhancement. Further, the ethical challenges posed 
by enhancement are now taken seriously in a way they weren't even as recently as the 
early 1990s. As Erik Parens relates ( 1998, p. S2), at a 1993 meeting at the Hastings 
Center (an independent center for studies in bioethics), senior scholars refused to take the 
issue of enhancement seriously. Yet four years later, "the first NIH Gene Therapy Policy 
Conference was devoted to that very topic." 
In fact, it seems to be the case that the Permissive View is more easily defensible 
than the Restrictive View. The Restrictive View relies on some notion of humanness As 
we shall see, if humanness is just biological humanness, then the Restrictive View is 
difficult to defend. If it is some broader notion of humanness, then it is no small matter 
to say (and we shall try) what that broader notion is. Weighing in against the Restrictive 
View is the fairly common position in philosophy that human beings are morally 
significant in virtue of their being persons, where personhood is understood to consist in 
the possession of certain psychological properties  This seems to make humanness 
ethically irrelevant to the extent that it has necessary connections to such things as the 
human form or species membership (That is, neither possession of human form nor 
species membership is a necessary condition for psychological personhood ) 
99 
The Restrictive View would not deny that (psychological) personhood is ethically 
important. It would, however, argue that personhood does not capture all that is morally 
important about human beings. Thus, the Permissive View is incomplete because it 
omits the fundamentally important notion of humanness 
But the question can be put again - as a practical matter, is the pursuit of the 
Restrictive View of any importance in the formulation of public policy? 
An affirmative answer may be given for the following reasons  First, if the 
various "other objections" do not hold in the long term - as suggested in this chapter -
and there is over time an increasingly greater demand for genetic enhancement, then we 
will face increasing pressure to justify the Restrictive View if we are to deny this benefit 
to those who demand it. Second, even if one or more of the "other objections" do hold -
meaning that we need not rely on the admittedly difficult and elusive basis for the 
Restrictive View to restrict genetic enhancement - it will nevertheless still be important 
to develop, if possible, the notion of humanness upon which the Restrictive View 
depends. If a rational articulation of morally significant humanness can be given, then 
we will have made clear ( or clearer) something of central ethical importance that helps 
explain our intuitive moral aversion to enhancement generally and genetic enhancement 
in particular. Future ethical assessments, then, would need to include the impact on 
humanness as a significant ethical criterion. 
All of this assumes that some sense can be made of the Restrictive View and 
humanness. What if that effort proves futile? Will the insights gained in a fruitless 
pursuit of the Restrictive View still be important for the formulation of public policy? 
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If, following Glover and others, we can find no justification for the Restrictive 
View, then the implications for public policy are, if anything, even more dramatic. What 
is implied is that the sort of scenarios envisioned by Glover and Silver are not inherently 
wrong. That is, radical enhancements of humans would be morally permissible if other 
moral objections ( e.g., harm. eugenics abuses, and just distribution of genetic technology 
resources) are adequately addressed. (The implications for public policy will be taken up 
in more detail in Chapter 6.) 
What conceptions of humanness or intrinsic human value could make the 
Restrictive View plausible, in light of the formidable obstacles that have been placed in 
its way in this chapter? And what can be said in favor of the Permissive View? These 
questions will be taken up in the following chapters. 
CHAPTER FOUR: IS THE PERMISSIVE VIEW INCOMPLETE? 
We ended the last chapter contrasting the Permissive and Restrictive Views on 
human genetic engineering The Permissive View holds that there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with even radical human genetic enhancement. The Restrictive View holds that 
there is something intrinsically wrong with radical genetic enhancement. Ifwe assume, 
per the arguments in Chapter 3, that the usual consequentialist and other arguments are 
unlikely to justify restrictions on human GE in the long term, then the Permissive View 
implies that even very radical, non-harmful departures from present-day humankind, such 
as the GenRich, are morally permissible The Restrictive View implies that there is an 
ethically significant remainder - something remaining which, if violated, would be 
ethically regrettable The motivation for the Restrictive View is quite simply the 
implausibility of the Permissive View and its implications. 
The question that this chapter and the next will address is this Are there any 
rational underpinnings to the Restrictive View? ls the underlying moral intuition - i e , 
that radical genetic enhancements per se are ethically objectionable - sound? To make a 
case for the Restrictive View, three things must be accomplished. First and most 
important, we are in need of a conception of ethically significant "humanness," human 
sacredness, or human intrinsic value. Second, this "humanness" must be capable of being 
violated by radical genetic enhancements. And third, it must be shown that such 
violations are ethically objectionable These challenges will be taken up in the Chapter 5. 
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In the present chapter the Permissive View will be held up for closer scrutiny. 
Thus far we have said little to suggest that a case can be made for it. While few writers 
have explicitly argued that radical genetic enhancement of humans is not intrinsically 
wrong, several have argued against the claim that genetic enhancement generally is 
intrinsically wrong (Recall that our qualifier "radical" indicates a change that results in a 
loss of biological humanness. That is, roughly, the offspring in question would not be 
recognizably human and would be incapable of interbreeding with unaltered human 
beings ) It will be seen that personhood, understood in psychological terms, plays a 
central role, whereas our status as human beings seems to be peripheral, corning into play 
only in virtue of its facilitation of our psychological lives These arguments against the 
intrinsic wrongness of genetic enhancement are helpful. Psychological personhood is 
important, and its preservation of obvious moral significance. However, it will be 
suggested that the ethical picture that is painted by this wholly person-oriented view is 
lacking An alternative view that places human beings in an ethically fundamental 
position will be proposed. A critical discussion of that proposed view will be the subject 
of the next chapter 
In Favor of Human Genetic Enhancement 
Almost as soon as the orthodox position on human gene therapy was articulated in 
Splicing Life and Recommendation 934, the moral prohibition on human genetic 
enhancement was called into question. Jonathan Glover's 1984 book, What Sort of 
People Should There Be ? , was influential both for its clarity and for its prescience. 
Glover argues persuasively for a "greater willingness" to consider changing human 
nature. There are three methods by which we might change the genetic composition of 
future generations. First, there is environmental change, which might be brought about 
by such things as medical discoveries and even tax policies Second, there are eugenic 
policies of the sort discussed in previous chapters  These may be considered "intended" 
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environmental changes And third there is genetic engineering (Glover, 1984, pp 26-27)  
GE is preferable to conventional eugenics both because it can have an immediate effect 
that traditional breeding cannot, and because it escapes a number of moral objections 
associated with conventional eugenics having to do with violations of autonomy (ibid , 
pp. 27-29) 
Glover is sympathetic to the Permissive View. He agrees with proponents of the 
orthodox view on gene therapy that safe germline gene therapy (human GE) for medical 
purposes is morally permissible He differs from orthodox view proponents, however, 
with respect to human genetic enhancement Glover seems to be motivated in part by the 
vagueness of the notion of"human nature," and in part by a dissatisfaction with certain 
aspects of contemporary humankind (ibid., pp 55-56) 
The idea of"human nature" is a vague one, whose boundaries are not easy to 
draw And, given our history, the idea that we must preserve all the 
characteristics that are natural to us is not obvious without argument. Some deep 
changes in human nature may only be possible if we do accept genetic 
engineering It is true that our nature is not determined entirely by our genes, but 
they do set limits to the sort of people we can be.. Given the risks that positive 
genetic engineering is likely to involve, many people will think that we should 
reject it, even if that means putting up with human nature as it is And many 
others will think that, quite apart from risks and dangers, we ought not to tamper 
with our nature. I have some sympathy with the first view.. It is less easy to 
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sympathize with opposition to the principle of changing our nature. Preserving 
the human race as it is will seem an acceptable option to all those who can watch 
the news on television and feel satisfied with the world. It will appeal to those 
who can talk to their children about the history of the twentieth century without 
wishing they could leave some things out. When, in the rest of this book, the case 
for and against various changes is considered, the fact that they are changes will 
be treated as no objection at all. 
It is interesting to note that Glover seems to have in mind changes that, however 
substantial, would leave us human persons. Despite his misgivings about vagueness, he 
clearly thinks that it is not meaningless to speak of human nature. He speaks of"deep 
changes in human nature" and the "sort of people we can be." The title of his book, from 
which the passage quoted above was taken is What Sort Of People Should There Be? Of 
course, this is just suggestive, and it is not clear from this account what Glover would 
think of the sort of radical changes that we are interested in - i.e., changes so radical that 
the resultant would uncontroversially be considered non-human. 
In addition to the sort of"moral enhancement" (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 126) 
alluded to in the passage quoted above, Glover envisions the possibility of intellectual 
enhancement. There may be certain concepts that are simply beyond the powers of 
comprehension of humans today As Glover puts it, quoting British biologist JBS 
Haldane, "the universe may be 'not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we 
can suppose'. Just as calculus is too much for a dog's brain to grasp, so some parts of 
physics might turn out to be too difficult for us as we are" (1984, p. 180). If our 
intellectual capacities can be (safely) expanded through genetic engineering, Glover sees 
no reason why we should not do so. 
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Glover, in the following example, suggests that foreignness relative to present-day 
humanness is ethically irrelevant We are asked to imagine that we wanted to genetically 
engineer a "half-human slave species" that would be useful to society (ibid., pp. 39-41). 
This semi-human species would perform society's menial or physically demanding labor, 
and do so quite contentedly. An initial reaction might be that it is wrong to create 
"contented mental defectives" rather than normal humans. But, Glover asks, is it more 
accurate to classify these beings as defective humans or, say, "super-cows" (ibid , p. 39)? 
The answer is not obvious. If one were (arbitrarily) to classify the half-human species as 
super-cows, then it seems that one would tend to think of the genetic alteration as a 
benefit to cows, rather than, as in the other case, a harm to humans. 
There is something paradoxical about this example Normally we would consider 
deviations from humanness in the direction of subnormal functioning as ethically 
regrettable. Let us imagine that a mad scientist were able to genetically engineer 
offspring - derived from human and non-human (say, bovine) genetic material - with a 
range of mental disabilities, from mild to severe. Increasing levels of disability would be 
achieved by increasing the ratio of non-human to human genes. It goes without saying 
that, as we move along the continuum from normal to increasingly diminished 
functioning, we feel an increasing sense of regret, just as we find more severe cases of 
mental retardation more regrettable than less severe cases. Glover's example seems to 
suggest, however, that such outcomes are only regrettable if the offspring are human. We 
might reach a point on our scale of hybridization and disability at which we no longer 
would classify the offspring as human; we would classify it as a cow. And at that point, 
' 
the hybrid offspring might be functionally superior to cows. Thus, although we have 
continued along the scale of increasing disability and associated ethical regret, all of a 
sudden with the change in biological classification, the outcome is no longer regrettable! 
106 
Glover suggests that our moral reaction in this case might simply be hostility to 
the blurring of our system of classification If so, then we might dismiss it as a 
"revulsion against anomalies," similar to revulsion against miscegenation (ibid., p. 40) 
That is, biological humanness should be irrelevant to our ethical regard for others just as 
race is irrelevant. Glover's "supercow" example is complicated by the question of 
whether, in creating the half-human slave species, our mad scientist has harmed that 
future individual. We now see that the question is not quite as straightforward as we 
seem to assume in our labeling the inadvertent creation of monstrous subhumans 
"irreversible harms" (see Chapter 3) And we have not yet even raised afurther 
complication, namely, the difficulty in saying that we have harmed a subhuman creature 
by bringing it into existence it owes its very life (with which it is contented) to our act. 
A full discussion of the potential ethical significance of biological classifications 
and the moral consideration of future persons is beyond the scope of the present work 
The issue at hand is human genetic enhancement, or alterations in the "superhuman" 
direction rather than the subhuman - and with that we avoid at least the harm-related 
complications of the subhuman cases. However, Glover's implication that humanness, in 
a narrow biological sense, should have no bearing on our moral regard for others is 
relevant to the issue of radical human genetic enhancement. The Restrictive View 
advocate claims that even if we improve on humankind, it would be regrettable if we lose 
humanness. Humanness has a deep ethical significance that race does not Hence, a 
revulsion against an anomalous human hybrid is not analogous to a revulsion against 
miscegenation  
Glover takes seriously the possibility of risk - i e, of making an irreversible 
genetic mistake - but argues that this justifies a "principle of caution" and not a ban on 
human genetic enhancement (ibid , p. 42) As noted previously, he advocates a "mixed 
system" of parental initiative in genetic decisions limited by a centralized veto power 
(ibid , p. 51 ). 
Walters and Palmer are generally sympathetic to the Permissive View as well  
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While distancing themselves from the ill-fated eugenic goals of the past ("we do not have 
in mind .. a perfect society or ideal human beings" (I 997, p 132)), they "are open to 
gradual improvements, appropriately distributed, in [some] human characteristics" (ibid, 
p 132) Walters and Palmer categorize enhancements as physical, intellectual, or moral. 
Physical enhancements are further classified as health-related or non-health-related 
Those enhancements that are seen as relatively unproblematic are the health-related 
physical enhancements (e g., a bolstered immune system), and intellectual enhancements 
that bring children from subnormal to normal functioning (Both of these would be 
considered "treatment" gene therapy according to our distinction between treatment and 
enhancement - see Chapter 2 ) The other kinds of enhancement are viewed as more 
problen;atic - but not intrinsically objectionable  Walters and Palmer have two concerns. 
The frst is "what might be called a new form of child abuse," i.e., parental decisions 
about the genetic engineering of future children that are not in the best interests of those 
children (ibid., pp. 131-132) This concern, though, could be addressed by some form of 
regulation, such as Glover's proposed centralized veto power (above) The second 
concern is over equitable access to genetic enhancement - an ethical issue that is not 
unique to human GE. But the main point, for our purposes, is that human genetic 
enhancement is not viewed as inherently wrong. 
A third proponent of human genetic enhancement is philosopher John Harris. 
Like Glover, Harris does not take the simple fact that human genetic enhancement may 
change human nature to be a sustainable ethical objection In his book Wonderwoman 
and Superman ( 1992) he argues that it is clearly fallacious for us to reason that human 
nature just is the nature that contemporary humans possess 
108 
The fallacy here, and for once it is proper to talk of something as hard and 
concrete as a fallacy, is that human nature is constituted by its complete 
description at a particular moment in time In other words that human nature just 
is the nature of the humans now existing Human nature is changing and evolving 
constantly and we are very different from our ancestors. Our descendants, if the 
species survives, will differ from us in ways it would be hard to predict. We have 
changed and can still change radically and still be human  (p  171; emphasis 
added) 
Harris's view - that we can change radically and remain human - seems to be based on 
the fact that we have changed radically over evolutionary time. But the former statement 
only follows from the latter if it is true that our very distant ancestors were human And 
by any account, our very distant ancestors were not human (The point, after all, of the 
theory of evolution is that humans evolved from non-humans - from apes ) 
Perhaps Harris, in referring to our evolutionary origins, has in mind a time in the 
not-so-distant past, when humans were very different from their contemporary 
counterparts, but were still human. And perhaps in referring to "radical" change, Harris 
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has in mind changes that would make our descendants strikingly different from 
contemporary humans, but still human. If this is what Harris has in mind then one might 
grant him his point. But then, of course, one will also want to know what to think of our 
more distant ancestors and descendants - i.e., our ape ancestors, and our non-human 
descendants. When one has these evolutionary ancestors and descendants in mind, then a 
revision to Harris's conclusion is called for We have changed and can still change to 
such a degree that "we" (i.e., our descendants) are no longer human. 
Harris is not alone in being imprecise on this point. His comments are 
reminiscent of Glover's (above) Walters and Palmer also continue to use the word 
"human" in reference to our genetically-enhanced descendants ( 1997, p 133): 
While there are historical and evolutionary reasons for human nature's being as it 
is, we do not view the human race as being fated to accept the current state of 
affairs. Rather we accept the possibility of change in human nature and have tried 
to argue for the ethical acceptability of certain kinds of planned changes in the 
characteristics of future human beings In our view, such genetic enhancements 
are an important part of the overall task of attempting to provide a better life and a 
better world to our descendants. 
The explanation for the continued use of"human" may simply be that indicated above -
namely, that the authors are envisioning a relatively close technological horizon, before 
which (safe) wholesale changes to humankind are feasible 
Silver, however, recognizes this potential for loss of humanness explicitly in his 
futuristic scenario, in which the (unenhanced) "Naturals" are one still-human species, and 
the GenRich clans are several distinct no-longer-human species (1997, pp. 240-249) 
Even with this explicit recognition, he does not view changes in human nature - even to 
the point of a loss of humanness - as morally significant in themselves. Our attempts to 
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make human life sacred have been misguided What we have taken to be sacred about 
human beings has, Silver argues, dwindled over time Few insist that the entire human 
body is sacred (an exception may be certain Christian Scientists). Some insist that the 
cell nucleus is sacred. Silver has in mind here those who fnd JVF with microinjection of 
sperm morally acceptable as a treatment for infertility but would reject human GE But 
now for many even the genes are not considered morally inviolable, given the increasing 
acceptance of the prospect of treatment germline gene therapy. Thus, human sacredness 
ultimately seems to have vanished. "This frightening notion compels some people to 
draw a final line .. around the genetic material" (ibid , pp. 234-235). 
But it is flawed reasoning that leads us along this progression from body to DNA 
in search of the "essence of human life " The flaw is centered on the ambiguity in the 
term "life!' The two relevant meanings of"life" (so to speak) are what Silver calls "life-
in-general" and "life in a special sense" (ibid., pp. 18-23) By "life-in-general," Silver 
just means biological life, characterized by such things as ability to use energy, 
reproduce, and evolve. Both humans and bacteria have life in this sense. By "life in a 
special sense" Silver means conscious life, which requires an "ability to feel and express 
a range of genuine human emotions and, most important, their attainment of the uniquely 
human condition of reflective self-awareness" (ibid , p. 22). The essence of human life is 
not to be found in biological life, Silver claims, but rather in conscious life (ibid , pp. 
235-236)  And controlling the essence of human life should not be morally off-limits 
Why not seize this power? Why not control what has been left to chance in the 
past? Indeed, we control all other aspects of our children's lives and identities 
through powerful social and environmental influences and, in some cases, with 
the use of powerful drugs like Ritalin or Prozac. On what basis can we reject 
positive genetic influences on a person's essence when we accept the rights of 
parents to benefit their children in every other way? (ibid., p. 236) 
Thus, there appears to be agreement among most commentators that human 
genetic enhancement has the potential to change human nature. Our motivating intuition 
for the Restrictive View was that such changes would be, in themselves, ethically 
regrettable. This intuition has now been more forcefully challenged, leaving us to 
wonder, is loss of humanness really ethically important? 
A More Plausible View?: Moral Importance Attaches to Psychological Personhood, 
Not Humanness 
Perhaps we have been making too much of humanness in suggesting that some 
deep ethical significance attaches to it. In practice, it seems that we attribute moral 
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standing to individuals who possess certain mental or psychological characteristics On a 
very basic level, creatures capable of feeling pain are, in virtue of that capacity, taken to 
be worthy of a basic moral consideration namely, they should not be made to suffer 
unless there is a compelling ethical justification for doing so  And if there is such a 
justification, harm should be minimized. The capacity for feeling pain is, of course, 
dependent on an organism having a certain neurological constitution. 
More neurologically advanced organisms have more sophisticated mental and 
psychological capacities Examples are the capacity for memory, emotions, rational 
thought, and self-awareness According to a common philosophical view, it is the 
possession of psychological capacities such as these that determines whether or not an 
organism is a person A person, according to Locke, is "that conscious thinking thing . 
which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and 
so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends" (Locke, 1856, p. 214). 
There is disagreement about exactly which psychological capacities are essential for 
personhood, although (following Locke) rationality and self-consciousness seem to be 
held in particularly high regard (Harris, 1985, p. 15). 
Our ethical treatment of one another is in many ways consistent with this 
psychological view ofpersonhood Thus, we terminate the lives of the irreversibly 
comatose (or "brain-dead") and anencephalic babies. Those without neurological (and 
hence psychological) activity and no possibility of such activity in the future are, in 
effect, absent. They are non-persons - bodies without minds - and as such are not 
entitled to the usual moral respect that human persons receive. More precisely, we judge 
that there is no one there to be entitled to moral respect or anything else 
If persons are essentially psychological, then biological humanness (membership 
in the species Homo sapiens) is not, in principle, a necessary condition for personhood 
Thus, on a generous interpretation of"person," one might argue that other non-human 
organisms (chimpanzees or dolphins, for instance) are persons. Similarly, one can 
imagine a day when, thanks to phenomenal advances in the feld of artificial intelligence, 
robots are produced that are self-aware, and capable of rational thought and memory. It 
is of course a matter of sheer speculation as to whether such advances are possible But 
the relevant point here is that, if such intelligent robots were created, they would be 
morally significant persons according to the psychological view Thus, it is a contingent 
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fact that persons (morally significant beings) are embodied in human form and exhibit 
other species-typical characteristics. We can imagine other possibilities and in those 
cases placing human persons on a higher plane than non-human persons would require 
justification, the basis or even possibility of which is not obvious. 
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Silver's GenRich super-beings would be persons as well. And ifit is personhood, 
and not biological humanness, to which ethical importance attaches, then the fact that the 
GenRich are non-human (non-Homo sapiens) - according to this view - is irrelevant to 
their moral standing 
GE-Accelerated Evolution 
Yet our intuitive misgivings about the GenRich persists, and they depend notjust 
on the degree of foreignness, or loss of biological humanness, of the GenRich. They also 
depend on the time interval over which our GE-accelerated evolution has occurred. 
Imagine that, through human GE, we create over the course of the next year (rather than 
over several centuries, in Silver's version) a GenRich organism And let's assume that 
this organism (call it "GenRich-A") is exactly the same kind of organism as that which 
would have evolved from Homo sapiens naturally (i.e., without technological 
intervention through GE) over the course of the next, say, 100,000 years. GenRich-A is 
non-human, meaning (roughly) that the difference between GenRich-A's appearance and 
behavior and that of contemporary Homo sapiens is at least as great as the difference 
between contemporary Homo sapiens and chimpanzees. In addition, GenRich-A cannot 
interbreed with contemporary humans Finally let us stipulate that GenRich-A possesses 
all of the psychological capacities that are definitive for personhood, and possesses them 
at least to the same degree that contemporary humans do. 
What can we say of the ethical ramifications of creating GenRich-A, of its 
appearance on such short notice? If GenRich-A had appeared I 00,000 years hence, the 
product of"natural" evolution, its appearance on the planet would, in itself, have no 
ethical implications whatsoever. Can we plausibly say, then, that GenRich-A's 
appearance next year, in itse(f, has ethical implications? According to the psychological 
view, the appropriate response would seem to be that only (psychological) personhood 
matters. And since GenRich-A is a person, there can be nothing inherently objectionable 
in its creation. It is incumbent upon us to get over our "revulsion against anomalies" and 
see non-human persons for the persons they are. Yet we feel a sense of moral alarm 
about the appearance of the non-human GenRich-A next year that we do not feel about 
the appearance of GenRich-A J 00,000 years from now. And whether or not that moral 
alarm is merely a revulsion against its anomalous nature or a revulsion defensible in 
ethical terms remains an open question. 
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Suppose that at roughly the same time that GenRich-A was created, it was 
discovered that whales are possessed of even greater intelligence than anyone had 
suspected. Suppose that, among other scientific revelations, we managed to decipher 
whale language and found that their communications provided unequivocal evidence that 
whales have all of the psychological characteristics that we take to be indicative of 
personhood Their psychological life, we find, rivals our own in terms of the level of 
115 
intellectual and emotional sophistication Ifwe imagine whales to be as we have just 
described, we would want to say two things about them First, we would' say that they are 
persons in some full sense of the word That is, whales would be on a par with humans, 
as opposed to dogs or chimps or other non-human animals that (as far as we can tell) only 
marginally meet our psychological criteria for personhood  Second, whales, in virtue of 
their (full) personhood, must now be recognized by humans as moral peers, i.e., as 
creatures of approximately equal moral significance So the fact that whales are non­
human (non-Homo sapiens) is irrelevant to their moral standing; and the fact that humans 
are human (Homo sapiens) is irrelevant to their moral standing. More simply, species 
membership is irrelevant to the moral standing of any creature. Again, only personhood 
matters, ethically speaking. Getting back to GenRich-A's accelerated appearance it 
seems that, just as with the whales, A (and all A-like creatures) must now be recognized 
by humans as creatures of roughly equal moral importance. 
The Moral Standing of Human "Non-Persons" 
We have been discussing a view that holds that we are morally important in virtue 
of our personhood (understood in psychological terms) and not in virtue of our 
humanness. The argument against the importance of"human being" looks like this 
(Diamond, 1991, p. 35) a) We are morally important in virtue of certain properties we 
possess b) The properties tied to our biological classification as human beings are not all 
morally relevant  c) Properties that are morally relevant are such things as self-
consciousness, capacity for reasoning, etc  d) Anything that has such properties is 
morally important. e) "And so it would be better to use a word like 'person' to mean a 
being that has these properties, to bring out the fact that not all human beings have them 
and that non-human beings conceivably might have them." 
What, then, are we to make of human beings that lack the psychological 
capacities that are taken to be definitive of persons? When one thinks of the kinds of 
things that might arguably be considered human non-persons one thinks, for example, of 
the irreversibly comatose, the profoundly retarded, and fetuses Clearly most people 
attach some, and often great, moral importance to individuals in each of these three 
categories 
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Since one's status as a person ( on this view) depends on the possession of certain 
psychological capacities, and since those capacities can be present in different individuals 
in varying degrees, it seems natural to conclude that there must be varying degrees of 
personhood (Perring, for one, has so argued (1997).) One might infer from this that 
there are corresponding degrees of moral standing. Persons of high intelligence would be 
of greater moral standing, while intellectually disabled persons would be of lesser moral 
standing (Edwards, 1997) Even if one rejects the idea of a continuum and insists that 
personhood is a threshold concept, it seems that certain non-human animals (dogs, say) 
have more to commend them, mentally speaking, than do humans at the end stages of 
Alzheimer's disease. 
Most would find such an assessment of the intellectually disabled offensive And 
we can point to many examples of our treatment of the intellectually disabled that belie 
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the claim that they are of lesser moral status - as when a beloved family member is 
lovingly and respectfully cared for well past the onset of an all-encompassing dementia. 
On the other hand, however, there is evidence in support of this claim. Consider, for 
example, our moral consideration of a fetus or neonate born with Down syndrome. A 
prenatal diagnosis with Down syndrome is considered sufficient justification for 
terminating a pregnancy And until the early 1980s, a diagnosis of Down syndrome or 
similar mental disability was used to justify withholding nourishment leading to death by 
starvation (ibid , pp. 31-33) In the case of a normal fetus or infant, such options would 
be considered unthinkable While some severely disabled adults are placed in institutions 
by loving families who visit regularly and generally look after their interests, many are 
abandoned in squalid institutions or poorly regulated homes by persons who would not 
dream of treating a physically ill family member in such a fashion 
Whether there are plausible justifications for the differential treatment of the 
intellectually disabled that do not imply a lesser moral status is a matter that will not be 
debated further here. For our purposes, it is enough to note that a) some human beings do 
not seem to qualify as persons, and b) the psychological view of personhood implies that 
(human) non-persons are not intrinsically morally important. 
What, if anything, could justify our belief that these human non-persons are 
intrinsically morally important? One attempt to shed light on this question has been 
made by Ronald Dworkin, whose views on the abortion debate and the "sacredness" of 
human life provide a good starting point. 
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Dworkin's "Sacredness" 
Dworkin, in his book about abortion (1993, pp  68-101), has argued that the views 
of advocates on both sides of the political issue are flawed They are flawed for two 
reasons. First, the arguments are based on the claimed existence or non-existence of 
rights. But it makes no sense to assign rights to beings that cannot be said to have 
interests, and this is the case with (at least early stage) fetuses  (We will not pursue these 
arguments here.) Second, these rights-based arguments are inconsistent with the stated 
beliefs of the very people making those arguments  According to Dworkin, what people 
truly believe - i.e., what gives an internally consistent account of their positions - is that 
human life, including fetal life, is intrinsically valuable. The political disagreements arise 
from a conflict between two different kinds of intrinsic value. Dworkin posits a secular 
kind of sacredness, or moral inviolability, as the basis for a better, internally consistent 
explanation of the body of views on abortion 
Dworkin believes that views on abortion are internally inconsistent. Opponents of 
abortion claim that the fetus has the same right to life as (non-fetal) human persons do 
However, most abortion opponents are willing to make exceptions in cases of rape or 
incest This entails that they are willing to kill an innocent person ( or at least a living 
human being with a right-to-life equal to adult human persons) in order to spare the 
pregnant woman a harm that, while substantial, is clearly less severe than loss of lif  
Abortion proponents claim that the fetus ( or at least the early fetus) is not a person 
( or rights-bearing entity) and therefore has no right to Ii fe But most feel a sense of regret 
that increases in direct proportion to the stage offetal development even at fetal stages 
prior to viability or sentience - the stages normally taken as the earliest possible for 
personhood or the possession of interests and rights This entails that there is something 
other than personhood that is morally significant 
This collection of views, according to Dworkin, leads to the following 
foundational premise: "It is intrinsically regrettable when [even embryonic] human life, 
once begun, ends prematurely" (ibid , p  69; emphasis in original). That is, human life is 
intrinsically valuable, or valuable independent of any usefulness or desirability to people. 
Intrinsic value is contrasted with instrumental value (dependent on usefulness) and 
subjective or personal value (dependent on people's desires). The example of a 
Rembrandt painting is given to illustrate the concept of intrinsic value: "We say that we 
want to look at one of Rembrandt's self-portraits because it is wonderful, not that it is 
wonderful because we want to look at it" (ibid , p 72). 
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The objection might be raised lf human life is intrinsically valuable, then why do 
we not believe that more human life is necessarily better? Dworkin claims, in response 
that there are two categories of intrinsic value (ibid., p. 70) Things may possess 
incremental (intrinsic) value. The more of such things there are, the better. Or things 
may possess sacred (or inviolable) value. These things are intrinsically, but not 
incrementally, valuable 
We believe that human lives are intrinsically valuable: We view death as a loss 
even when we attach no instrumental or subjective value to the deceased. So, of the two 
types of intrinsic value introduced above, what kind is attached to human life? Dworkin 
claims that human life is sacred or inviolable, not incrementally intrinsical)y valuable. 
"[T)he sacred is intrinsically valuable because - and therefore only once - it exists" 
(ibid., pp. 73-74)  
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A thing may become sacred in two ways - first, by association or designation; and 
second, through history or genesis (ibid , pp 74-75)  An example of something 
possessing associational sacredness is the American flag (Dworkin considered this 
relatively unimportant) Examples of things held to possess the second type of 
sacredness - which I will call developmental rather than historical or genetical8 - are 
great paintings, and animal species 
Since humans are an animal species, humans possess developmental sacredness. 
They are sacred in virtue of their genesis, or the creative process of their development 
But their development is, according to Dworkin, of two morally significant types. To 
refer to the first of these, Dworkin uses the terms "natural,. sacredness, or the "natural 
investment" inherent in humans Humans possess natural ( developmental) sacredness in 
virtue of the creative process of human embryonic, fetal (and later) development. Human 
persons are also sacred in virtue of the creative process of their life in society - the hopes, 
aspirations and life projects that they have, etc. Thus, the second of the two types of 
developmental sacredness possessed by humans is what Dworkin calls "human" 
sacredness, or the "human investment." 
8Dworkin's terms may have confusing connotations here: "Hisiorical sacredness" might be taken to mean 
"held sacred at some point in the past." "Genetical sacredness" - given the emphasis o� molec�ar 
biology and genetics elsewhere in this paper might be taken to mean "sacredness associated with the 
genes." 
A recapitulation ofDworkin's categorization of values looks like this 
Three types of value 
I) instrumental 
2) subjective ( or personal) 
3) intrinsic 
Two types of intrinsic value 
I) incremental 
2) sacred (non-incremental) 
Two types of sacredness 
I) associational 
2) developmental 
Two types of developmental sacredness (of humans): 
I) natural 
2) human 
Thus, we will use the shorthand terms "natural sacredness" and "human sacredness" to 
refer, respectively, to natural, developmental, non-incremental, intrinsic value; and 
human, developmental, non-incremental, intrinsic value 
We take the abortion of fetuses to be more problematic the older the fetus is  
Likewise, most believe it is a greater tragedy when an 8-year-old dies when compared 
with the death of a newborn (ibid., pp. 86-87) "Most people's sense of that tragedy, if it 
were [graphed], would slope upward from birth to some point in late childhood or early 
adolescence, then follow a flat line until at least very early middle age, and then slope 
down again toward extreme old age" (ibid., p 87). The simple loss-of-life view the 
view that the tragedy is greater if the number of expected life-years lost is greater - fails 
because it focuses only on the future, and ignores past investments, plans for the future, 
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expectations, etc It is these past things that make it more tragic to lose a 8-year-old than 
an infant. The 8-year-old has a greater human investment. 
Dworkin uses the term "frustration" to "describe this more complex measure of 
the waste of life [that refers to a] combination of past and future considerations that 
figure in our assessment of tragic death" (ibid , p  88) The frustration-of-life view better 
fts our views about tragic death than does the simple loss-of-life view  Abortion is 
worse later in pregnancy because a greater natural investment has been wasted. 
So Dworkin's dichotomy natural sacredness inherent in the biological creation 
and "human" sacredness inherent in the creative endeavors of the human person -
provides a view of what is sacred, or of intrinsic value to humans. Does this 
interpretation of the intrinsic value of human beings accomplish what we need it to 
accomplish? 
With respect to providing a basis for the moral standing of human "non-persons," 
Dworkin' s conception of sacredness arguably fares better than the unadorned 
psychological view of personhood. Dworkin's "human" sacredness obviously requires 
that its possessor have certain minimal psychological capacities (or roughly, requires 
personhood), since a non-person simply is not capable of having future plans, life 
projects, deep commitments, and so on. However, natural sacredness inheres in the 
biological creation - the organism. Thus, natural sacredness might serve as a basis for 
elevating the lower moral status that intellectually disabled persons are claimed to hold. 
Whether this elevation is sufficient is another matter. ls the natural investment of 
humans greater than that of other mammals whose biological "creation" rivals the 
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sophistication of our own? It is not clear why human biological creation should be held 
in higher regard than the biological creation of dogs or horses. And if the natural 
sacredness of dogs, horses and humans are more or less comparable, then critics might be 
expected to find Dworkin 's natural sacredness an inadequate foundation for the moral 
status of human non-persons 
That this lack of a clear connection between "sacredness" ( or intrinsic human 
value) and humanness is problematic can be seen also when we assess whether 
Dworkin's sacredness has provided grounds for objecting to human genetic enhancement  
We want to know, does human genetic enhancement violate (either type of) Dworkinian 
sacredness? 
The answer at first glance appears to be no. By stipulating that the alterations are 
enhancements, it seems that natural or human investments would, if anything, be greater 
in enhanced individuals as compar�d with unenhanced, all else being equal. 
Here again it is hard to know how far Dworkin would have us go. Is it crucial to 
natural sacredness that the natural or biological creative investment is human (i e., of the 
species Homo sapiens)? And is it crucial to "human" sacredness that the creative 
investment embodied in our projects and deep commitments has to do with our human
personhood? These notions of sacredness conceptualized as creative investments do not 
seem to depend on the preservation of biological humanness. The intrinsic value seems 
to reside in the creation or the creative act If that is the case, then - as just noted - other 
biologically complicated mammals (e.g., apes and dogs) would possess natural 
sacredness in much the same way that humans do. And genetically engineered, human-
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derived creatures of the future - in virtue of their creative projects and commitments -
would possess "human" sacredness in much the same way that contemporary humans do 
So it seems that neither (biological) humanness nor human-personhood is 
necessary for the possession of sacredness of the sorts that Dworkin postulates. Thus, we 
have no ground yet for finding the genetic enhancement of humans to be morally 
impermissible. 
The point of introducing Dworkin' s theory, in spite of the fact that it is not 
obviously useful in arguing against radical genetic enhancement, is that it illustrates that, 
as suspected, humanness will have to be central in any notion of sacredness that is to be 
employed in arguing for the Restrictive View. Can we find a ground for sacredness that 
has a central role for some notion of humanness, such that even apparent improvements 
over contemporary humankind would be ethically regrettable? 
Human Beings, Not Essentially Psychological Persons, Are of Fundamental Ethical 
Importance 
In our discussion to this point there has been a tacit separation of considerations 
of the mind from considerations of the body. Personhood is largely or entirely associated 
with the mind, and humanness with the body. Thus, we take it as uncontroversially true 
that (human-derived) embryos and early fetuses, anencephalic babies, the irreversibly 
comatose ("brain-dead"), corpses, and the profoundly intellectually disabled all are 
human. And our differential treatment of these human "non-persons" indicates that they 
have either little or no moral standing relative to human persons. Our sacredness - our 
intrinsic moral value - depends on the mind; the body is unimportant. 
Humanness, as commonly conceived, is essentially a matter of biological 
classification species membership We are one kind of animal among many, each 
representing a particular branch on the evolutionary tree, some kinds having evolved 
from others The fact that human animals came into existence at all had to do with 
innumerable quirks of evolutionary fate. The claim that human animals (assuming they 
avoid extinction) will evolve into something else - a non-human species - is widely 
accepted. This solely biological conception of humanness seems like an extremely poor 
foundation on which to build arguments in favor of"human" sacredness 
Some philosophers, however, have argued for the central moral importance of the 
human being, and have meant by that term something distinct from "member of the 
species Homo sapiens," or "person" according to some psychological criteria of 
personhood The mind-body dichotomy plays no part in this conception of human being  
In fact, this dichotomy interferes with our proper moral regard for others  
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In the next chapter, we shall see what this conception of humanness looks like and 
see also whether it provides a sufficiently strong basis for the Restrictive View. As noted 
earlier, in order to provide that strong foundation, several things must be accomplished 
First, a plausible notion of morally signifcant "humanness" must be described. Second, 
it must be shown that radical human genetic enhancement violates that "humanness." 
And third, it must be shown that such a violation is morally regrettable. In light of our 
discussion of the GenRich-A, we may now add an additional requirement We must 
account for the fact that our moral objection to the appearance of the GenRich depends 
on the suddenness of their appearance 
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CHAPTER FIVE: HUMAN BEING-NESS AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE 
RESTRICTIVE VIEW 
The current policy on human gene therapy is shaped in large part by ethical 
considerations A number of ethical objections have been made (per Chapter 3), and on 
the collective strength of these objections some types of human gene therapy are 
restricted. First, germline gene therapy (or human genetic engineering) is not permitted; 
and second, enhancement gene therapy (whether in germ or somatic cells) is not 
permitted As argued above, the objections commonly raised against human gene therapy 
are either time-bound or cannot be expected to justify a restrictive policy in the long term. 
In particular, it is expected that human GE will become acceptably safe (per Chapter 2) 
And since safety is the primary reason for restricting germline genetic interventions in 
humans, we may expect that the prohibition against human GE will be relaxed in the not-
too-distant future The prohibition against human genetic enhancement also seems to rest 
on rather shaky ethical foundations. Thus, again in the long term, we may expect an 
incremental expansion of the range of germline genetic interventions considered ethically 
acceptable - starting with treatment and moving eventually to enhancement. 
The moral line between treatment and enhancement seems to be drawn in the 
wrong place. Yet there remains a sense that some moral line should be drawn. Even if 
one considers only genetic enhancements, or improvements, radical deviations that 
threaten humanness seem morally problematic. That is, a Permissive View on human GE 
- declaring even radical human genetic enhancement morally permissible - strikes us as 
implausible A Restrictive View - claiming that radical human genetic enhancement is 
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not morally permissible - seems more plausible (per Chapter 4)  Yet it has proven 
difficult to say what of moral significance, if anything, would be violated in such cases. 
The Restrictive View seems to need grounding in some notion of intrinsic value or 
"sacredness" that is associated with humanness, although we have yet to find an aspect 
of, or conception of, morally significant humanness that might be jeopardized by radical 
genetic enhancement  
In our pre-philosophical reflections, we are inclined to think that both biological 
humanness and psychological personhood are morally significant in some deep sense. 
But it has proved difficult to defend the view that human sacredness inheres either in 
biological humanness or in psychological personhood. Is there a view of morally 
significant humanness - or sacredness - that preserves this pre-philosophical intuition 
which has motivated the Restrictive View; that is potentially jeopardized by radical 
genetic enhancement; and that avoids the shortcomings of the other attempts to ground 
sacredness? 
In the present chapter we will consider a view, drawn from the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein, that attempts to meet these desiderata That view, as articulated by 
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Cockburn9 with insight from Cora Diamond on the role of"imaginative understanding" 
of others, suggests that human sacredness is a property human beings have in virtue of 
their membership in a network of morally significant relationships - membership in a 
moral community Cockburn argues that it is "the tangible persisting human being - a 
being with a distinctive bodily form and having its own distinctive kind of value" - that is 
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morally significant (p x) It is towards this tangible human being (and not disembodied 
or essentially psychological persons) that we have instantaneous responses, or attitudes, 
that are of central ethical importance It will be argued that the human being-centered 
view accommodates our sense that human sacredness is grounded in biology and our 
sense that it is grounded in psychology. Moreover, it appears that human being-ness 
could potentially be jeopardized by certain genetic enhancements, and thus might serve 
as a guide in our re-drawing the moral line between problematic and unproblematic 
human GE Finally, it accounts for our sense of an extended moral community centered 
on human beings yet with the potential for being extended to include a broader range of 
others. 
"Attitudes" Are Fundamental 
Cockburn holds that what a person is "cannot be separated from those attitudes 
which are expressive of a recognition that an individual is a person" (p  ix) IO Now 
"attitude" here has a special meaning Wittgenstein used the term to refer to the 
instantaneous feelings and responses we have towards one another, responses that are not 
the result of conscious deliberation. As an example, think of the anguish a mother feels 
in observing her child in pain. She responds instantaneously and with deep feeling The 
response is non-rational, in the sense that there is no quick assessment of the facts of the 
9 we shall rely on Cockburn's Other Human Beings (1990) for an articulation of this view. All page 
references in this section are to this work unless otherwise noted. 
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matter followed by a conclusion that the appropriate moral response in these 
circumstances is anguish The instantaneous moral recognition of other is seen in other 
situations as well, such as when the same mother observes her child joyfully playing and 
responds instantaneously - viscerally, one might say. To say that she is pleased because 
she infers from her son's behavior that he is enjoying himself - that she is glad about the 
evidently good state of affairs - gives an incomplete account And what she feels in 
response to her son suffering, say, a cut finger, cannot be completely accounted for by the 
expected bad consequences (p. 4). 
Cockburn (p 6) quotes Wittgenstein "My attitude towards him is an attitude 
towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul" Wittgenstein is not using 
"soul" in a theological sense. He is referring to the core of the individual human being. 
The idea here is that "attitudes towards" rather than "beliefs about" others should be 
central or fundamental to our ethical thought (p. 7). My moral responses to another do 
not follow from a rational deduction that includes an appraisal of evidence of the other's 
personhood In other words, "Wittgenstein seems ... to reject the view that the attitude 
which we have towards another rests on something else: our grasp of the kind of being 
that the other is" (p. 9). 
How could it be that attitudes are fundamental in this way? After all, it seems that 
there must be some justification, based on some intrinsic features of the individual, for 
our moral attitudes towards others lf we have, on the one hand, chickens being gathered 
for the slaughter, and on the other hand, human beings being gathered for the slaughter, 
10 In Cockburn's usage, "person" implies moral importance, not the possession of certain psychological 
we respond differently to each case And when asked why we are so strenuously trying 
to intervene to save the one sort of creature and not the other, our explanation would no 
doubt include the distinction that the human animals are more than the non-human 
animals. They are persons and therefore are worthy of special moral consideration And 
when asked further how we know that the human animals are persons (and chickens are 
not), we would most likely recite some version of the now-familiar list of psychological 
capacities that define personhood Isn't it the recognition that the object or individual in 
question is a person that leads to our responsive attitudes towards others? 
Appealing to P:sychologica/ Persons Does Not Justify Our Moral Treatment of Others 
We are looking for an explanation of what makes someone worthy of moral 
consideration. What leads us to the ethical attitudes, or moral regard, we have towards 
others? What justification do we have for treating others in the way we usually do, as 
opposed to, e g, using others as means to our ends? 
131 
The special justification given by the advocate of the psychological view of 
personhood is that there is present in others an imperceptible, essentially psychological 
person. Cockburn offers two challenges. First he challenges the idea that we even need a 
special justification for our (Wittgensteinian) attitudes towards - our usual moral 
treatment of - others. To say that we need a special justification for our usual treatment 
of others is to imply that some other attitude is the norm. "What, then, is the norm? Are 
we to say that things in the world are to be used in our attempts to achieve our ends 
capacities. 
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unless reason is given, in particular cases, for thinking otherwise?" (p. 15) Cockburn has 
no argument against this assumption His aim is simply to expose it as an assumption 
and juxtapose it with the assumption "that nothing in the world is simply a thing to be 
used in our attempts to achieve our ends ..  " (p  16)  To the extent that we do not accept 
the former assumption, we do not accept the need for special justification of our attitude 
towards others  
Cockburn's second challenge is that the special justif cation itself does not do the 
work it claims to do We attach special significance to things that people do, or actions, 
that we do not attach to things that merely happen to people. What distinguishes actions 
from things that happen to us? The former require willing while the latter do not And 
willing is something that a (psychological) person does According to the special 
justification, since nothing in the perceived world can ground our attitudes towards 
others, there must "be an occurrence in a non-extended entity without mass, solidity or 
spatial location which lies behind what we actually observe" (p. 19). This essentially 
psychological person can ground our attitudes 
But Cockburn asks, "how does what happens in this other realm ground - provide 
reason for - such responses?" (p. 19). We've gone from the question (or "mystery") of 
how things in the everyday, perceived world ground our attitude toward others to how 
things in the unperceived, mental world provide such a ground. It seems that we want an 
explanation of willing, and for that we turn to essentially psychological persons  But, 
Cockburn says, we've all directly experienced willing, so how could a further attempt to 
explain - by invoking psychological persons - help ( 19)? He concludes, "To leave a 
place for the special kinds of significance which we attach to what people do we must 
then, at the beginning, reject the paradigm of rationality in action which led us to think 
that 'a man, considered as a moral being, is not really in the world at all"' (22). 
In response to Cockburn's challenges, it might be objected that appealing to 
psychological persons, or minds, makes available a justification for our ethical attitudes 
towards others - a justification that is not available to Cockburn's human being-centered 
view. Our ethical attitudes are justified by appealing first to our own first-person 
experiences (e.g., of pain), and next to the argument from analogy. 
This type of justification came to prominence in the work of Rene Descartes 
Descartes wanted to know how he could have certain knowledge about anything. How, 
for example, could he be sure that his sense perceptions really corresponded to objects in 
the real world? Was it not possible that they could be images in a dream, or images 
conjured by a spiteful demon? If that were possible - and it seemed difficult to prove 
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that it was not - then we have reason to doubt all of our sense perceptions. Or in the 
words of Descartes, "it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it 
is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived" 
(Descartes, 1993a, p. 28). In turn, we have reason to doubt virtually all of knowledge, for 
when one begins to give reasons in support of the claimed truth of virtually any piece of 
knowledge, the chain of reasons leads eventually and inevitably back to sense 
perceptions (Purely formal knowledge, such as mathematics, is an exception.) Faced 
with this all-consuming skepticism, Descartes sought something certain upon which the 
foundations of knowledge might be built. The realization that Descartes comes to is that 
he cannot be deceived about his own existence. "We must come to the definite 
conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I 
pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it" (Descartes, 1993b, p. 194). From this 
starting point, Descartes "goes on to discover that he is essentially mind and, using the 
mind's understanding, concludes that he can have infallible knowledge about 
psychological states" ( see Descartes, 1993b, p. 196; Pojman, 1993, p. 193). 
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Thus, according to Descartes, I can be sure through the immediacy of 
introspection that I exist - not the body that I perceive, but the immaterial thinking 
subject l But since others are not available to us through this sort of introspection, how 
do we know that these perceived others are thinking subjects, or essentially psychological 
persons? How do we know that "other minds" exist? The traditional view rests on the 
argument from analogy. Mill, for example, says, "I conclude [that other minds exist] 
from certain things, which my experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be 
marks of it . I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, 
they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition 
offeelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which 
in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings" (quoted in Pojman, 1993, 
pp 455-456). 
Let us return now to our original problem i e , how we justify our 
(Wittgensteinian) attitude towards others. The advocate of psychological personhood is 
saying that "[t]he 'arbitrariness' of my attitude towards others is removed by showing 
that it is the analogue in relations with others of the attitude which is clearly securely 
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grounded in the case of my thought about myself' (Cockburn, 1990, p 3 5) Thus, for 
example, when I see someone step on a nail, and then see the contorted facial expressions 
and hear the screams of agony, I take this experience to be analogous to my own first­
person experience of pain (Pojman, 1993, p  466) 
Cockburn argues, in the same way many others have, that this special 
justification, appealing to one's own first-person experience and the argument from 
analogy, fails It fails because there are first-person/third-person asymmetries. 
Continuing with the example of pain, Cockburn argues that my own pain is something to 
be a) relieved by me, and b) feared by me. But another's pain is something to be a) 
relieved by me, but b) not feared by me. This points up a flaw in the argument from 
analogy. When I step on a nail there are three stages the action (stepping on the nail); 
the feeling of pain; and the outward expression of pain. What we see in others are the 
first and third stage, but not the second, making the analogy imperfect (Pojman, 1993, p  
466) Since I do not literally feel, or have nerve-mediated sensations of, another's pain, I 
do not have the visceral reaction of fear that comes with my own experience of 
impending pain 
Another dissimilarity between the first-person and third-person experience of pain 
has to do with the importance of the human form My horror at another's pain attaches to 
her bodily form (especially the expressive face and eyes). But my horror at my own pain 
is unattached to my (visualized) bodily form This is true also with respect to anger 
introspection of my own anger won't reveal to me what we typically find disturbing about 
another's angry glare (Cockburn, 1990, pp  37-39)  
Following Wittgenstein Co kb h · · 
, c urn argues t at my own experience of pam does 
not "show me that pain is something to be relieved and something to be feared" (p. 40). 
Instead, my attitude towards my present pain "pre-empts any questions about 
justification;" it "does not stand in need of justification" (p. 41 ). 
The Importance of the Human Form 
If we are to illuminate the notion of attitudes, we must look first to the role of the 
human body or human form, for it is frequently the expressive human form that evokes 
our responsive attitudes. We have already taken note of several examples. There is the 
parent's anguish in response to her child's pain, and her moment of elation, her thrill that 
comes in watching her young child absorbed joyfully in his play. When a child opens 
presents, for instance, "the particular way in which [the parent] is moved cannot be 
characterized independently of the pleasure that he takes in her manifestations of joy" (p 
67). Our horror at another's pain is tied to the other's bodily form - the look of suffering 
in the eyes, the contorted facial expressions, etc. The other's bodily form possesses a 
richness of expression that is important in our responses to the other's states. 
People who lack this responsiveness, these appropriate attitudes towards others, 
have a deficit that is profoundly important This is how we should regard, taking 
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Cockburn's example, slave-owners who view their slaves as automata and justify their ill-
treatment of the slaves by saying - and, we will assume, sincerely believing - that slaves 
are not the kind of thing that feels pain. For Cockburn, awakening a proper moral regard 
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in the slave-owners is not ( or not merely) a matter of correcting the mistaken belief about 
susceptibility to pain What matters most is not that the slave-owner has incorrectly 
classified the slaves; it is that he has not paid proper attention to them. It is not that -
since we both see the same thing and he has an inappropriate attitude - there must be an 
imperceptible person to explain the discrepancy  It is the extended, tangible human being 
in front of him that makes him wrong - and that makes this a moral judgment (p  47) 
The slave-owners do not share with us a critical part (p. 47) They are like dogs 
who inexplicably react angrily only to members of a certain race They are, in a sense, 
"alien" (pp. 49-50) And we should say the same of slave-owners whose sole motivation 
for not inflicting pain on their slaves is that one has a moral duty not to inflict pain on 
things that feel pain. Such a position is a matter of detached reasoning, and the person 
who holds it need only be convinced of some flaw in his reasoning in order to consider 
beating slaves morally permissible While we might wish to find the ethical behavior of 
this slave-owner more commendable than that of the first, what separates the two is 
nothing more than the ability to correctly ascertain the biological fact of the matter (i.e., 
that slaves feel pain) and reason logically from there. We may be grateful, given that 
there are slave-owners, to have more of the second type than of the first - bringing about 
less suffering is of obvious moral relevance. But it is not everything. To the extent that 
we lack responsive attitudes towards others, we are incomplete and our moral sense is 
alarmingly shallow. 
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Thus, the extended, tangible human being with its characteristic form and range of 
behaviors is returned to a central place in our ethics. "Disembodied minds" are not the 
proper objects of our moral concern. 
The Legacy of the Mind-Body Dichotomy 
We have inherited the philosophical notions of mind and body, and they have not 
served us well as a basis for our ethical thought  Mind and body, Cockburn argues, 
"displace the notion of the human being from its fundamental place in our ontology" (p. 
55). "There is a single divide in nature which can be said to be the divide of fundamental 
moral significance (A being either has a 'mind' or it does not)" (p. 56). The extended, 
tangible human being, on the other hand, is "of secondary importance in our relations 
with each other; the philosophical notion of a 'body' is a direct expression of this 
tendency" (p. 56) 
Physical contact with others, the sight of others, or their presence matters to us. 
We react to the bodily form of others; we don't just regard that form as the source of 
evidence about their state of being. Our reaction upon seeing another in acute pain is not 
mere squeamishness or aesthetic revulsion Another's pain calls for more than just 
rational appraisal followed by appropriate moral action (removal of pain). It calls for a 
sense of horror in the observer Bodily form (esp. the face) is crucial to the horror­
inducing demonstration of pain. Thus, the disembodied or essentially psychological 
"self' is incomplete (pp. 66-70). 
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Cockburn's goal has been to "cast doubt" on the idea that it is desirable or 
admirable to be the sort of person who is unmoved by suffering but efficiently goes about 
removing it (p. 70) The connection between pain (joy, etc.) and the human form "goes 
deep"; and the extended, tangible human being is "the only possible object [of our] 
responses to others which are central to our thoughts of them as persons" (p. 73)  
But Cockburn's central role for the human form meets a strong moral objection  
Must we say that our appropriate "responses to persons" are (rightfully) compromised by 
certain disfigurements and disabilities (pp 77-78)? Cockburn responds that "there is no 
more room for the denial that something of fundamental importance is lost with physical 
damage than there is for the denial that something of fundamental importance, a person, 
is lost with death" (78). The character of our concern changes, but the degree ought not 
(78-79). Cockburn does not elaborate on this response, which seems rather inadequate. 
After all, the complaint about the psychological view of personhood was that it too easily 
excluded the mentally disabled from the shared moral community. On Cockburn's view, 
are we not simply excluding from the moral community persons with certain 
disfigurements instead of persons with certain mental impairments? This objection can 
be accommodated by incorporating Diamond's views on the imaginative understanding 
of others, which we take up in the next section. 
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"Human Being" Is Not Analyzable 
It has been argued that the psychological view ofpersonhood, and the remnants of 
the mind-body dichotomy generally, are inadequate, and that the extended, tangible 
human being should resume a place of central importance. The question then arises, "in 
virtue of what features do you identify this as a human being?" (pp. 119-120) Cockburn 
responds, "on the basis of what it looks like and how it behaves" (p. 120) - but necessary 
and sufficient conditions.for being a human being cannot be given. 
It does not follow from being unable to state necessary and sufficient conditions 
for being a human being (or person) that there are no human beings (persons) (p 108) 
After all, we can't cite necessary and sufficient conditions for being a bush (as opposed to 
a tree), but there are bushes. There is no reason to assume that "human being" or 
"person" must be analyzable, i.e., must be able to be put into other terms without loss 
The notion that a human being just is a mind and body together "is a particularly 
pernicious version of this confusion" (p  109)  
Any suggested defining feature ofpersonhood seems at times ludicrously 
inadequate. For example, Cockburn says, "not all human beings will emerge as beings 
who are not to be killed or eaten" (pp. 112-113) But all human beings will so emerge if 
we look to human being-ness - rather than.features of human beings - as the foundation 
for our treatment of others. This is reminiscent of our discussion in the previous chapter 
of human "non-persons" - i e , human beings who did not meet the criteria for 
personhood according to the psychological view It is reminiscent also of Cora 
Diamond's critique of certain arguments against eating meat. 
Diamond (1978) objects, not to vegetarianism, but to arguments put forth in favor 
of vegetarianism by Peter Singer and other philosophers. Singer's argument is centered 
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on rights. We ascribe certain rights to non-rational humans (e.g., severely brain-damaged 
individuals) that we do not ascribe to non-rational (non-human) animals. For example, 
we do not eat non-rational humans, nor do we use them for laboratory experiments. Both 
non-rational humans and animals are capable of having interests since "the capacity to 
have interests is essentially dependent only on the capacity for suffering and enjoyment. 
This we evidently share with animals" (ibid , p 466). Diamond rejects this approach 
(ibid , p. 467) 
This is a totally wrong way of beginning the discussion, because it ignores certain 
quite central facts - facts which, if attended to, would make it clear that rights are 
not what is crucial We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in 
automobile accidents or been struck by lightning, and their flesh might be first 
class.. Now the fact that we do not eat our dead is not a consequence - not a 
direct one in any event - of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other 
purposes. It is not a direct consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to 
people. Of course it would cause distress to people to think that they might be 
eaten when they were dead, but it causes distress because of what it is to eat a 
dead person Hence we cannot elucidate what (if anything) is wrong - if that is 
the word - with eating people by appealing to the distress it would cause, in the 
way we can point to the distress caused by stamping on someone's toe as a reason 
why we regard it as a wrong to him. Now ifwe do not eat people who are already 
dead and also do not kill people for food, it is at least primafacie plausible that 
our reasons in the two cases might be related, and hence must be looked into by 
anyone who wants to claim that we have no good reasons for not eating people 
which are not also good reasons for not eating animals. 
We treat each other in certain ways - in the giving of names, in birth, in death, in 
our sexual relationships, in the obligations we have - not out of recognition of the 
particular class of beings that we belong to, nor out of recognition of the interests we 
each have (ibid , p. 469) Rather, it is all these things "that go to determine what sort of 
concept 'human being' is" (ibid , p 470). 
Some will nevertheless insist that human being must be analyzable. In response 
to these critics, Cockburn observes "The situation is a familiar one within philosophy 
While in one sense it is recognised that chains of reasons must come to an end 
somewhere it is felt that the point at which we allow them to come to an end in daily life 
cannot really be a satisfactory stopping place" (p. 113, citing Gass, 1957). 
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There is a parallel with the foundational role that the notion of duty plays in 
Kant's ethics. For Kant, when one asks, why should I act morally towards others, the 
only reply that can be given is, "Because it is your duty." Duty is morally basic. Thus, it 
is an illegitimate question to ask why one should do one's duty Similarly, on the human 
being-centered view, when one asks why we should act morally towards others, the only 
possible reply is, "Because she is a human being." Human being-ness is morally basic: 
No further justification is required nor can one be given 
On the one hand, then, we have the view that unanalyzable human being-ness is 
morally fundamental, where human being-ness cannot be reduced to other terms without 
loss  On the other hand, we have the view that essentially psychological personhood is 
morally fundamental, where personhood can - in principle at least - be reduced to other 
terms. What are the implications of each view for the kinds of commitments we have to 
one another? 
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Commitments and Personal Identity 
The psychological view, Cockburn argues, has unsavory implications for our 
commitments to one another. The psychological view holds that personal identity is 
preserved as long as psychological continuity is preserved. Thus, the Jane that I saw at 
lunch yesterday is the same Jane that I saw at lunch today if and only if the two Janes in 
question are psychologically continuous. Or more precisely, person Pl at time ti is the 
same as P2 at t2 if and only if P2t2 is psychologically continuous with P It I. There is no 
consensus on what is meant by "psychological continuity," but continuity of memory 
seems to be key. The idea is that, while I might undergo radical bodily transformations -
due to a disfiguring accident, plastic surgery, transplantations, amputations, etc. - that 
make me completely unrecognizable to those who knew me, as long as my mental life 
remains intact I remain the same person. 
Now, on the face of it, this view of personal identity over time seems to be on 
target. However, viewing people as "persisting character and memory complexes" (p. 
138, quoting Quinton) means that our commitments to persons are completely 
conditional When I say, "I love Jane," on the psychological view this is equivalent to 
saying something like "I love that person with those certain character and memory 
complexes." Let us imagine that Jane, with whom we have heretofore had a committed 
and loving relationship, is suddenly struck with Alzheimer's disease. In a matter of 
months or years, Jane deteriorates to the point that her mental life is totally disconnected 
from that of her "former self" Since we are now faced with a different Jane, so to speak, 
ought we to have the same committed relationship? On the psychological view, there 
seems ample room to doubt that we should  The commitment seems weak. On 
Cockburn's view - where the extended, tangible human being is centrally important - it 
is not just the psychological characteristics that matter 
The Irreplaceability of Persons 
If individuality lies in the possession of certain characteristics, then we are all, in 
principle, replaceable (pp 150-152) On the psychological view, what it is to be a 
particular individual is just to possess a certain set of psychological states. Thus, on the 
psychological view I am, at least in principle, replaceable by another who possesses the 
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same set of psychological states that I now have. Cockburn argues that our relationships 
take into account who this is, not just psychological features Individuals are not 
replaceable. But if individuals are irreplaceable, then it seems that they will need some 
unchanging core  That unchanging core, according to Cockburn, is the series of past 
events that make up each individual's personal history: 
[I]t is not that my concern about 'who this is' is dependent on the significance 
which this set of psychological characteristics has for me. Rather, the 
significance which the characteristics have for me is dependent on who this is; 
and the force of the words 'who this is' can only be brought out in terms of the 
idea that this is an individual - a human being - with a particular history (p. 158)  
By relying on the personal history that attaches to individuals, we can avoid the charge 
that, since neither body nor mind are changeless, the persisting self is an illusion, or has 
no deep significance (p 173). 
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The centrality of the tangible, extended human being individuated by his or her 
personal history also accounts for our attitudes towards the recently deceased. That 
history is essential to particular individuals leads to the idea that there is something 
significant in a corpse ( esp. of a loved one). There is something more than an "emotional 
hangover" in our feelings upon viewing a corpse (187-188) 
Cockburn has given a "central place" to terms such as "attitude," "ethical," 
"value," and "emotion," emphasizing our responses. This is in contradistinction to the 
empiricist ethical tradition, in which people are (tacitly) held to be "passively registering" 
the events in the world (208). Using those terms, Cockburn says, is "hazardous." By that 
he means that these terms may be mistaken as being separate from our moral responses to 
others But they are not prior to the re!>ponse, they are meant to signify the response 
(209). If we use those terms (from the empiricist tradition) and they are used as they are 
in that tradition (in the "prior to" sense), then we may be taken to be "taking seriously 
ideas [ e.g , the question of whether one should eat one's dead grandmother] which one 
does not think should be taken seriously" (210). But if those attitudes, values, and 
emotions are taken to signify the response, then such a question is not taken seriously 
from the start. 
This brief overview of a Wittgensteinian brand of humanness - which we are now 
calling "human being-ness" - is not intended to capture all there is to say on the subject 
The object has been to introduce a more robust notion of humanness, and to see whether 
this notion, human being-ness, provides a better foundation for the Restrictive View on 
human genetic enhancement. There are several key elements to this more robust view: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
First is the idea that the tangible, extended human being is of fundamental 
moral importance in our ethical thought. 
Second, the legacy of the Descartes - in our everyday conception of human 
beings as mind-plus-body - has not served us well in our development of a 
proper moral appreciation for others. 
Third, our attitudes - in the Wittgensteinian sense - to the human being are 
part of, not separate from, our moral response to others 
Fourth, the human form is important. The expressions of joy, pain, anger, 
etc., to which we respond are manifested through the human form 
Fifth, many things - e g., the significance we attach to birth, death, human 
sexuality - determine the concept "human being." 
The Evolution of "Human Being" 
How does Wittgensteinian human being-ness measure up against biological 
humanness (i.e., membership in the species Homo sapiens)? 
In previous chapters it was seen that biological humanness could not serve as an 
adequate foundation for human "sacredness," or intrinsic human value. Homo sapiens is 
a biological category, not a natural kind. We have evolved from non-Homo sapiens and 
presumably will evolve to a different non-Homo sapiens. Our species is constantly 
changing, although the rate of change gives the illusion of stasis. But we can imagine, 
with Silver (above), a scenario in which we accelerate our evolution to other non-human 
species This accelerated evolution scenario points up just how tenuous biological 
humanness is. 
But the human being-ness articulated by Cockburn, Diamond, and others is a 
different matter. Human being, on this view, is not a concept that can be put into others 
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terms without loss. Thus, for example, it cannot mean "membership in the species Homo 
sapiens." The fact that human being is not analyzable does not mean that the concept is 
empty There are approximately six billion biological organisms on this planet 
possessing a certain distinctive appearance and characteristics whom we recognize as 
human beings. The evidence that huma11 being is a meaningful concept is that, when we 
use the term, we almost always know what we mean. 
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The fact that we see stepwise variations in evolution - as opposed to, say, a 
smooth continuum of intermediate creatures between man and monkey - makes 
convenient the matter of classifying organisms in our language Moreover it leads to a 
conceptual reification of those categories The concept human being has evolved in our 
language as well The meaning of human being includes many subtle connotations that 
go well beyond the conventional "member of the species Homo sapiens." That is, 
although it would appear that the latter is a necessary element of human being, it is not 
sufficient Biological humanness (i e, species membership) does not completely capture 
the meaning of huma11 being, as the latter term has evolved in our language. Nor does the 
language of personhood according to the psychological view, as has been argued above  
It seems then that we have two kinds of evolution with which to concern 
ourselves. We have evolution in the biological sense - the evolution of the species Homo 
sapiens. But we also have the evolution of the concept human being in our language. 
Diamond speaks of an "imaginative understanding of what it is to have a human life," 
which she explains with an analogy. When we think of death, we may think of the 
biological concept ( or concepts) of death, or we may think of a non-biological notion of 
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death. By a non-biological notion, Diamond means "what we have made of the notion of 
death in this and other cultural traditions" [Diamond, 1991 #106, p. 60; emphasis in 
original] Our encounters with the death of others do not consist merely of the 
observation that there has been a cessation of vital biological functions in a certain 
individual. Death is marked, typically, with regret, sadness or grief, depending on how 
well we knew the deceased. There are rituals, typically memorial services and burials or 
cremations Gravestones may be inscribed with words that capture a cherished facet of a 
loved one's character or personality Analogously, when we think of human beings, we 
may think of the biological concept (or concepts) of human beings as one kind of animal, 
or we may think of a non-biological notion (or notions) of human being. That is, just as 
the non-biological notion of death goes well beyond the biological, similarly, according 
to Diamond, human being in most contexts goes well beyond the limited notion of 
species-membership. 
The notion of human being-ness requires an "imaginative development of the 
sense of what is mysterious in human life" (ibid , p. 40) Diamond gives two examples to 
illustrate what she means by a "sense of what is mysterious " The f rst example makes 
use of a D  H  Lawrence review of a book by H. M Tomlinson. In the book, a hunter on 
safari in Africa has killed a mother gorilla with its baby "still clinging to the breast." The 
hunter then proceeds to kill the baby so as to feel no remorse over having left it orphaned 
Lawrence calls this a "degenerate insentience" in the hunter. "It is not cruelty, exactly, 
which makes such a sportsman. It is crass insentience, a crass stupidity and deadness of 
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fibre" (quoted in ibid , p. 41). An imaginative understanding of the mystery of gorilla life 
is part (Diamond claims) of understanding the ethical dimensions of this situation. 
The second example refers to the transformation of Ebenezer Scrooge in 
Dickens's A Christmas Carol. Scrooge notoriously fails to respond to the plight of those 
around him. He is unmoved by the poverty and need of others in spite of the Christmas 
season and its tradition of generosity and good cheer The visits by the apparitions, 
during which among other things he revisits scenes from his own boyhood, cause a kind 
of rebirth in Scrooge On Diamond's interpretation, Scrooge's "being imaginatively 
touched by himself as a child is then present in the awakening of humanity in him" (ibid., 
p. 42). This "being imaginatively touched" is not the same as Scrooge using his 
imagination to envision, e g , what his actions might lead to for the Cratchits. On 
Diamond's view, imagination gives rise to an "opening of the heart" (ibid., p. 49) by 
which she means "that feeling of unavoidable solidarity; of the solidarity in mysterious 
origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and all 
mankind to the visible world" (quoting Conrad, ibid , p 50) 
One of the shortcomings that we attributed to the purely psychological view of 
personhood in the previous chapter was that it seemed to imply a lesser moral status for 
intellectually disabled individuals - or at least those with severe intellectual disabilities 
On the view of human being-ness advocated by Cockburn and Diamond, one would not 
fail to give proper moral recognition to, say, the severely mentally retarded. Diamond 
argues that there is no need to find a common ground or property on which to base our 
moral concern for the retarded. "They are seen as with us in being human, where that is 
understood not in a biological sense, but imaginatively. Someone may be touched by the 
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being touched 
an imaginative sense of shared humanity" (ibid , p  55) That recognition of human 
being-ness also grounds our sense of outrage at the rape of a severely retarded woman 
(ibid , pp. 55-56) 
Thus, the recognition of human being-ness in others, as Cockburn argues, is a 
non-discursive recognition of others as morally basic  The Wittgensteinian attitude 
towards other human beings forms the basis for our shared moral community 
Diamond's contribution is to suggest a means through which we might extend the shared 
moral community beyond normal human beings. 
Human Being-ness and the Restrictive View 
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Our motivation for looking for a broader, non-biological notion of humanness was 
that biological humanness is inadequate to ground the Restrictive View on human GE  
The Restrictive View, it will be recalled, says that radical genetic enhancement of 
humans is morally problematic An attempt to ground the Restrictive View in Dworkin's 
notions of"human" and natural sacredness, while important for other reasons, failed for 
this purpose since it did not appear that either type of sacredness would necessarily be 
diminished in human-derived enhanced species. We then sought a conception of 
humanness that would be jeopardized by radical genetic enhancement, and were led to 
the Wittgenstein-inspired views on the centrality of the human being  
Having now introduced the notion of human being-ness, we are now in a position 
to return to our main question Is human being-ness threatened by radical genetic 
enhancement? 
The answer is made difficult by the insistence that "human being" is not 
analyzable - i e , that any attempt to capture human being-ness in terms of essential 
features or properties that human beings possess will be inadequate If this is so, then we 
cannot simply look to see whether the genetically enhanced human-derived creatures 
have lost any of the defining features of human beings. 
Cockburn and Diamond, in the writings here considered, have in mind the 
contemporary world, not a Silveresque future in which the human species has diverged 
into several other species in a fraction of the time it would have taken without GE It is 
unclear, therefore, what each would have to say about our question But the following 
view seems to follow naturally from the foregoing discussion: 
• The capacity to instantaneously respond to (have Wittgensteinian attitudes 
towards) one another is of central ethical importance and is not accounted for in 
other views on what makes us ethically significant. 
151 
• Therefore, those genetic enhancements of humans that result in a loss of the 
capacity to have the appropriate attitudes, or moral responsiveness, to one another 
are ethically objectionable 
This diminished human being-ness - or loss of the capacity for moral 
responsiveness - might come about in either of two ways. A genetic alteration might 
have a first-person effect or a third-person effect. That is, human being-ness might be 
compromised through a diminished capacity in the moral agent to recognize others as 
human beings (the first-person effect). Cockburn's slave-owner comes to mind here, as 
does the gorilla hunter criticized by D. H. Lawrence (above) Alternatively, human 
being-ness might be compromised through diminished expressiveness in the observed 
(the third-person effect) We have indicated the importance of the human form, 
especially the eyes and face, as visual cues to which we instantaneously respond. 
Perhaps certain genetic alterations - while having many benefts and generally being 
viewed as enhancements - would as a side effect result in diminished outward 
express1 veness. 
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Another possible third-person effect comes to mind when one recalls Silver's 
fanciful description of a GenRich creature as a "lung-modified thick-skinned dark green 
human descendant" (Silver, 1997, p. 247) While it is hard to imagine that anyone would 
consider such a creature "enhanced," it is not inconceivable  lfwe assume, per Silver's 
thought experiment, that large communities of this sort of GenRich creature happily 
coexist; that these communities are not shunned by other communities in our future 
world, in which GE and its handiwork are no longer novelties; and that it is in virtue of 
their particular "design" that enviable opportunities for space exploration have become 
possible; then it is hard to see why we should not call this GenRich species enhanced 
But there is one respect in which this sort of radical enhancement might be ethically 
regrettable If radical enhancements resulted in human-derived creatures that were 
sufficiently alien or foreign in appearance, that foreignness might compromise our ability 
to recognize the visual cues that we so readily respond to in our fellow human beings. 
Let us consider again Diamond's example of the gorilla hunter. Diamond 
emphasized the importance of our capacity for "imaginative understanding" of what 
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things must be like for the gorilla mother suckling her young. The hunter's failure to 
come to this sort of deep understanding was taken as evidence of a serious moral deficit 
on the hunter's part. But one might argue that it takes more effort - a greater capacity for 
imaginative understanding - when the object in question is non-human We may not 
wish to excuse the gorilla hunter, at least if it is the case that gorillas resemble humans in 
certain relevant behaviors and characteristics that ought to have been recognized Yet it 
may nevertheless be true that our capacity for this sort of imaginative understanding is 
not unlimited. Even with a good faith effort, foreignness (e.g, in physical appearance) 
may place limits on the depth of our imaginative understanding of others. 
What kind of genetic alterations might result in a loss of the capacity to be 
morally responsive in this way? It is by no means certain that our knowledge of human 
genetics will ever be great enough to predict which specific genes, if altered, would cause 
this sort of loss Perhaps all that can be said is that, should our empirical observations 
show that certain genetic alterations have such an effect, the effect should be recognized 
as one that has ethical ramifications. 
Accelerated Evolution 
There is one other matter that we have yet to take account of In the previous 
chapter, the case of "GenRich-A" was presented GenRich-A, we stipulated, is a 
· II · d human derived organism that is created in one year's time. It just genet1ca y engmeere , 
so happens that GenRich-A is also exactly the same kind of organism as that which
 
would have evolved naturally (i e , without GE) in roughly 1 00,000 years. The fact that 
we only feel a sense of moral alarm over the prospect of GenRich-A appearing in one 
year, and not in 1 00,000 years, we observed, means that there is nothing morally 
problematic about GenRich-Aper se. 
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Now perhaps we are in a better position to see how the rate of GE-mediated 
evolution could possibly make a difference in the ethical acceptability of human genetic 
enhancement. It has just been suggested that certain radical genetic enhancements might 
create a foreignness between, say, enhanced and unenhanced groups. This foreignness 
would be ethically significant, we said, if it led to a diminished capacity among us for the 
kinds of instantaneous responsiveness that is central to our moral treatment of others It 
seems clear enough that mutual foreignness generally would increase in direct proportion 
to the rate of evolution. Another way to put this is to say that GE-accelerated evolution 
decreases the mutual similarity among us. 
Thus, we should not alter our evolution at such a rate that there is a continuum of 
creatures none (or few) of whom feels a sense of identification-with-kind With a 
continuum, there would be no appearance of kinds, as there is in today's species-filled 
world. And it is the appearance of kinds, not the metaphysical existence of kinds, that is 
necessary for identification-with-kind, which in turn is necessary for Wittgensteinian 
attitudes. 
Rate of GE-mediated evolution may not be the only factor that could potentially 
infuence mutual similarity (foreignness) The degree of speciation, or branching of the 
evolutionary tree, similarly would increase mutual foreignness (or decrease mutual 
similarity). But it is not our aim here to stretch the scientific limits of our thought 
experiment any further Instead let us return to the conception of human being-ness 
articulated in the present chapter for a final observation. 
It seems that we have strayed very far indeed from the bare notion of biological 
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humanness as a candidate for what is intrinsically valuable in human beings. Our 
conception of human being-ness elevates emotions, values and attitudes to a central place 
in ethics. And the human form, on this view, is no longer seen as devoid of ethical 
significance. However, it seems that we must sever the connection once and for all 
between the instantaneous moral responsiveness that we have called "human being-ness" 
in this chapter and biological humanness, or membership in the species Homo sapiens. 
For it seems that - to the extent that it is a fact - it is a contingent fact that it is only 
human beings who have the capacity for this responsiveness. As noted above, Cockburn 
and Diamond were not envisioning the world of the GenRich. In that world, the world of 
our thought experiments, there is no reason to assume that genetically enhanced, human-
derived creatures would not be capable of an "imaginative understanding" not only of 
their own kind, but other kinds as well. And we (Silver's unenhanced Naturals) might be 
capable ofresponding to a very broad range of"others " 
In the end, the lesson might be just this that a sense of identification-with-kind -
a sense of"who we are" - might be more than vague nonsense. Recalling Diamond's 
earlier example, we "may be touched by the response of a severely retarded person to 
music; and there may be in that being touched an imaginative sense of shared humanity" 
[Diamond, 1991 # J 06, p  55; emphasis added]. Even if we now use "humanity" in a 
much broader sense, we may find a world in which this instantaneous responsiveness 
between individuals does not exist (or is diminished) profoundly regrettable. Shared 
"humanity," as Diamond observes, is not nothing (ibid., p. 57)  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have addressed two central questions  First a two-part 
question: What is the current ethical basis for public policy restrictions on certain kinds 
of human GE, and is that basis stable? Second, can a rational basis be found to support 
the intuition that certain kinds or degrees of non-harmful human genetic enhancement 
violate what is intrinsically valuable in human beings? 
With respect to the first question, it has been argued that the current ethical basis 
for restricting germ line and enhancement GE is unstable. A number of ethical objections, 
taken collectively, constitute that ethical basis. Foremost among these is the objection 
that present-day human GE technology involves an unacceptably high level of risk for 
future generations However, as argued in Chapter 2, there is reason to expect that the 
technology will become acceptably safe. Once that happens, restrictions on human GE 
will need to be justified on other grounds When we considered (in Chapter 3) what 
those other grounds might be, it was argued that these other objections to human GE were 
not particularly compelling That is, they were not likely to slow the momentum of 
human GE technology, which promises great medical benefits, as well as considerable 
profits for the relevant industry. Thus, once human GE becomes acceptably safe, the 
ethical foundations for our current restrictions on human GE will be seen to be unstable 
If our intuition is correct that some limits on human GE are ethically called for, then we 
will have to seek support or justification for holding that view elsewhere  
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There is certainly room for argument on the foregoing points First of all, only 
time and technological progress will tell whether the technological breakthroughs needed 
to make GE safe will actually occur. During the course of the present research, two 
major developments have already occurred - the cloning of mammals from adult cells, 
and the isolation of human embryonic stem cells. But there is no way to rule out the 
possibility that unforeseen obstacles might make the achievement of safe human GE 
technically impossible Second, due to limits of space, a full treatment of the many 
objections to human GE has not been undertaken here. It may be that one or more of 
these objections - such as objections to embryo research or eugenics - will prove 
sufficiently strong to limit human GE, making the question of the intrinsic wrongness of 
changing human nature moot, at least as far as the pragmatic world of public policy is 
concerned. In other words, the ethical foundation for current policy on human GE may 
not be as tenuous as has been argued herein. Further analysis of the current set of ethical 
objections is therefore appropriate. 
With respect to the second question - regarding whether human GE is a potential 
threat to intrinsically valuable humanness - it has been argued that this question will 
become important to public policy because of the collective failure of other ethical 
objections to justify restrictions on human GE. We have engaged in a thought 
experiment in which we imagined a future world full of human-derived, radically 
enhanced creatures, conveniently exemplified by Silver's GenRich. The initial 
motivating intuition was that something was morally wrong with certain kinds or degrees 
of genetic alteration even when those alterations resulted in significant benefts and no 
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significant harms. The strategy in using such an extreme example of human genetic 
enhancement was to isolate the ethical variable that we suspected might be placed in 
jeopardy by human GE That variable, it was suggested, had something to do with 
humanness, although it was not clear at the start whether humanness would be equivalent 
to biological humanness (species membership) or a broader conception. If violating 
some notion of humanness were ethically objectionable, this surely would be seen in 
greater relief against the background of the radically deviant GenRich-populated future 
We might then say that our thought experiment yielded an important discovery - namely, 
the discovery that our isolated variable, provisionally called "humanness," is of 
fundamental ethical importance That discovery then could be used to determine whether 
less extreme cases of human GE would be ethically objectionable for the same reason. 
While not all enhancements seem to be morally problematic, there is a sense that 
some limits are ethically called for There is something intrinsically valuable, or 
"sacred," about human beings - at least that is the intuition that motivated this inquiry -
and humanness ought therefore to be preserved. Radical changes through (safe) human 
GE would violate human sacredness and thus would be morally objectionable. This 
position we called the Restrictive View on human genetic enhancement. The Permissive 
View, in contrast, denies that anything of moral significance attaches to our humanness, 
and thus denies that even radical genetic enhancements are morally problematic. 
Are we justified in holding the Restrictive View? To make a compelling 
argument, the advocate of the Restrictive View, we said, must show the following: First, 
a coherent notion of morally important humanness must be articulated. Second, it must 
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be shown that radical human genetic enhancement violates that notion of humanness. 
And third, it must be shown that such a violation is ethically objectionable  
lfwe ask now whether we have met these three requirements, the answer is a 
qualified yes. With respect to the first requirement, human being-ness, it was argued in 
the previous chapter, is a coherent notion of morally important humanness. Yet there is 
room for criticism. For example, the claim was made that, although one could not give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a human being, one could nevertheless not 
fail to recognize human beings. In a future in which genetic engineering has become 
commonplace, however, the lines between species may become blurred, and human 
beings may not be so readily distinguishable 
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The second requirement - that radical GE violate human being-ness - may also be 
called into question It is not clear whether certain radical genetic enhancements in fact 
would compromise human being-ness We have argued that it is reasonable to expect 
that some would, especially given the importance that the human form has in our 
immediate moral responsiveness to others - but this remains a matter of speculation 
Perhaps through "imaginative understanding" we have the potential to respond to a wide 
variety of others - human and non-human In fact, it seems that Diamond's call for 
"imaginative understanding" exists in a kind of tension with our recognition of human 
being-ness. That is, on the one hand the claim is made that human beings enjoy a 
morally privileged status On the other hand, we are called upon to look beyond the 
world of human beings to non-human others, to whom we might also have 
Wittgensteinian attitudes A clar'f1 t· f h. · · ·  ·  1 1ca ion o t 1s tension and its 1mphcat1ons for the 
notion of ethically significant human being-ness should be a subject for further study. 
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Yet these criticisms notwithstanding, the human being-centered view articulated 
above does seem to provide us with a plausible account of an intrinsically valuable 
humanness that could ground the Restrictive View. What do these arguments in support 
of the Restrictive View imply for public policy? We will look first at the implications for 
policy on human GE (or germline gene therapy), after which we will consider the 
implications in other policy areas as well 
Implications for Human Genetic Engineering 
A Re-Examination of the Orthodox Position on Human Gene Therapy 
What we have called the orthodox position on human gene therapy makes clear 
what is ethically permissible and impermissible Treatment gene therapy in somatic cells, 
if safe, is permissible  Germline and/or enhancement gene therapy is prohibited About 
this there is a fairly broad-based consensus. The underlying reasons for this position are 
not always fully and explicitly defended. It is clear that risk of irreversible harm is the 
primary concern with respect to germline genetic intervention. But should the 
technology become acceptably safe for use in humans, would there be some residual 
opposition on grounds unrelated to direct harm to future generations? There very well 
could be, but - as argued in Chapter 3 - it is unlikely that the other commonly voiced 
objections to germline gene therapy will prove so compelling that society will willingly 
forgo the enormous medical benefits that are potentially in store for us. In fact, a number 
of policy statements endorsing the prohibition of germline interventions have clearly 
indicated an openness to reconsidering the question once the technology became 
acceptably safe. There is every reason to expect that human GE will become acceptably 
safe (see Chapter 2). This leaves the orthodox view with only the prohibition against 
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genetic enhancement. And since it is not obvious how an enhancement, in itself, could be 
morally objectionable, the current consensus on human gene therapy appears tenuous 
indeed. 
The foregoing discussion makes a case for re-drawing the moral line. The line 
currently is drawn between human GE intended for treatment (or prevention) and human 
GE intended for enhancement  Glover, Harris, and others have argued that genetic 
enhancement is not intrinsically wrong and, therefore, we should give it serious 
consideration Preservation of human nature appears to carry little if any moral weight, 
on their views (see Chapter 4) The human being-centered view also holds that 
enhancement as such is not ethically objectionable. It does, however, suggest a distinct 
moral line between those genetic alterations that preserve human being-ness and those 
that compromise it In other words, the new ethical criterion is preservation of human 
being-ness, not biological humanness as the orthodox view implies In effect, this calls 
for current policy on human GE to become more permissive. 
Jncrementalism and the Rate of Evolution 
While we have argued for retaining a caveat to the Permissive View - roughly, 
human genetic enhancement that does not jeopardize human being-ness is morally 
unobjectionable - it seems that this limitation will have little practical effect in the short 
term. The kinds of genetic enhancements people are likely to want, once the technology 
becomes safe, are relatively modest, incremental improvements, not radical 
enhancements. Speculation about the kinds of human traits that future parents might 
wish to see enhanced in their offspring includes such things as decreasing the need for 
sleep, increasing intellectual capacities, bolstering the immune system, and so on 
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp  IO 1-108) Assuming that these genetic enhancements can 
be achieved without compensating losses (Glover, 1984, pp. 33-35), they do not strike 
one as coming even remotely close to the sorts of changes that might compromise our 
"shared humanity." 
The incremental nature of the expansion from treatment to enhancement GE will 
also be dictated by the need to gather empirical data on risk (higher risk can be justified 
more easily for cases of horrible genetic disease than for cases of non-essential 
enhancement), and by the step-wise progress of human genomics and GE-related 
technologies As a practical matter, then, incremental advances in human GE might 
make the question of radical genetic enhancement moot 
Earlier we argued that loss of human being-ness seemed possible only when the 
rate of GE-mediated evolution was relatively rapid Thus, Silver's GenRich scenario, 
which takes place over the course of a few centuries, might be problematic, whereas a 
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similar scenario taking place over the course of several millennia might not be 
problematic. Putting these observations together with our qualifed defense of the 
Restrictive View, it seems that in the long run, policy on human GE will need to take 
account of the rate of GE-mediated evolution of human beings  That is to say, even in 
the absence of deleterious effects from genetic alterations, preservation of human being­
ness could in itself serve as sufficient justification for limiting non-harmful human GE 
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We have just indicated the implications of human being-ness for ethics of human 
GE Does this view of human being-ness - of the central ethical importance of our moral 
responsiveness or "attitude" towards others - have implications for public policy in other 
spheres? 
Implications in Other Areas 
Abortion 
The most obvious policy area for which our notion of human being-ness has 
implications is abortion. To begin this discussion - which revisits many of the themes of 
Chapter 4 - we will consider a debate that took place more than thirty years ago between 
two of the early and leading commentators on bioethics - Nobel Prize-winning geneticist 
Joshua Lederberg and theologian Paul Ramsey. We will draw from two papers from 
Lederberg and one from Ramsey. Lederberg's earlier paper had to do with the direction 
of human evolution, or eugenics (1966), while the later paper dealt with contraception 
and abortion (1967). Ramsey's paper (1970) covered a range of topics, including human 
cloning, but the relevant segment for our purposes is his critique of the two Lederberg 
papers. 
Lederberg at this time felt that human genetic engineering - which he then called 
"genetic alchemy" or "algeny" - was not imminent and considered debates over it a 
distraction (1966, p  521) He once considered addressing a mid- l 960s audience about 
"molecular human biology" but decided against it, saying "it occurred to me that to dally 
on such question would be an amusing and engaging futuristic escapism" (1967, p. 25) 
As it turns out, the future was not so distant In any case, the topics he chose instead 
were contraception and abortion, which he felt were much more timely and important. 
Lederberg criticized the scientists and physicians of the 1940s and 1950s for not 
having the courage to advocate for contraception Their lack of leadership on that issue 
was partly responsible for the problem of world overpopulation, which was felt at that 
time to be approaching crisis proportions  This aura of crisis is communicated clearly by 
Lederberg "It is even possible that the world will not survive as a habitat of the human 
species simply because of our reticence, because of our pusillanimity, in coming to face 
(the issue of contraception]" (ibid , p. 25). Abortion in the 1960s was, he felt, the same 
kind of morally controversial issue that contraception was twenty or thirty years earlier. 
It was shameful that over one million women per year were seeking illegal back-alley 
abortions. 
Lederberg objected to the fetal right-to-life arguments of abortion opponents. In 
his view, the question, "When does life begin?" has no clear answer because biological 
165 
166 
life has existed on a continuum over evolutionary time. "[I]f life had a beginning at all, it 
was an event that occurred some 3 billion years ago," i.e., in the primordial soup. 
Lederberg pointed out that evolution of the human species and development of the 
human fetus and infant were analogous "During the evolution of the species there was 
no sudden emergence of human personality but the gradual accumulation of those genetic 
alterations controlling the development of the brain that in turn permit the development 
of humanity" (ibid , p  26) Similarly, the brain develops in the fetus and infant, and only 
at a certain point does the infant "achieve the full measure of humanity" (ibid., p. 26). 
When does the infant achieve "humanity"? 
An operationally useful point of divergence of the developing organism would be 
at approximately the first year of life, when the human infant continues his 
intellectual development, proceeds to the acquisition of language, and then 
participates in a meaningful, cognitive interaction with his mother and with the 
rest of society. At this point only does he enter into the cultural tradition that has 
been the special attribute of man by which he is set apart from the rest of the 
species 
What is striking here is the implication that our "humanity" depends entirely on 
our having attained certain neurological (and hence psychological) capacities. That is, 
Lederberg seems to subscribe to a completely unqualifed psychological view of 
personhood. Immediately, however, he recognizes a possible implication of this view 
He continues: 
. . I do not advocate a discussion of infanticide a special intervention in the 
period between the delivery of the inf�nt and the �ime at which he �c�uire_s 
language. We are all too emotionally mvolv�d with infant� t�a_t th1� 1s m_ 1�self 
enough to create an inevitable and a pragmatically useful d1v1dmg lme. (1b1d., pp. 
26-27) 
167 
As for abortion, Lederberg argued that it is morally permissible and ought to be legalized 
He gives two reasons for this view As noted above, the large number of back-alley 
abortions and the related high morbidity and mortality were a great concern. If it weren't 
for this "enormous inhumanity" traditional anti-abortion views and the associated 
"conceptions of the dignity of human life" could possibly be deferred to (ibid , p. 27). 
The second reason for favoring the legalization of abortion had to do with the fear that 
the human gene pool was gradually accumulating harmful mutations and would continue 
to do so unless society intervened in some way. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, this 
fear of the increasing "genetic load," as it was called, was taken very seriously at the 
time, and helped revive discussions of broad-based eugenics programs. Life-saving 
advances in medicine may have saved a lot of personal grief, but they also increase 
genetic load by ensuring that more people carrying deleterious genes survive to 
reproductive age and pass on those genes to future generations. Lederberg argued that 
the solution to genetic load was to rely on "differential fertility" - i e , the use of 
contraception and abortion combined with genetic testing and counseling "Far from 
limiting efforts to have children, the availability of voluntary abortion should go a long 
way to encourage the gamble in risky matings, by putting the stakes under more effective 
anticipation. Such a policy represents the only human reconciliation of the individual's 
rights of parenthood and social concern for the containment of genetic disease" (ibid , p. 
27). 
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Let us return, however, to Lederberg's comments regarding a psychological view 
of"humanity." In the earlier paper, there is more ambivalence on this subject (1966, p  
530) 
Humanistic culture rests on a definition of man which we already know to be 
biologically vulnerable. Nevertheless the goals of our culture rest on a credo of 
the sanctity of human individuality But how do we assay for man to demarcate 
him from his isolated or scrambled tissues and organs, on one side, from 
experimental karyotypic [i.e., genetic] hybrids on another. Pragmatically, the 
legal privileges of humanity will remain with objects that look enough like men to 
grip their consciences, and whose nurture does not cost too much. Rather than 
superficial appearance of face or chromosomes, a more rational criterion of 
human identity might be the potential for communication with the species, which 
is the foundation on which the unique glory of man is built 
But Lederberg disclaims this last assertion in a footnote "On further reflection I would 
attack any insistence on this suggestion (which I have made before) as another example 
of the intellectual arrogance that I decry a few sentences before - a human foible by no 
means egregious" (ibid , p 530). 
Ramsey ( 1970) takes Lederberg to task for his "muddled moral reasoning" 
regarding a criterion for humanity. Lederberg, in the just-quoted passage from the earlier 
paper, suggests that the ability to communicate with other humans would be a suitable 
criterion, and then immediately rejects his having made the suggestion as "intellectual 
arrogance." With this rejection, Ramsey says, all we are left with is a decision as to 
whether an offspring looks human. Thus, "mishaps do not constitute a moral problem" 
(ibid., p. 96) 
Lederberg stumbles into the same inconsistency in his later paper on 
contraception and abortion ( 1967). In that paper, as noted above, he says that the 
developing human being becomes morally significant at about age one, when it begins to 
engage in meaningful communication with other humans. Then he says he does not 
advocate infanticide because of our intense emotional involvement with infants Ramsey 
comments: "Lederberg has therefore provided himself with no intellectual foundation for 
the immediately following dictum 'To discuss the fetus during prenatal life as if he were 
a human being is merely to reflect the emotional involvement of that observer ' Surely 
he had just appealed to the same sort of emotional involvement with another life during 
that part of the continuum from birth to age one as the only ground for not practicing 
infanticide" (I 970, pp  97-98) 
So, if we aren't to rely on the degree of emotional involvement as a criterion for 
"humanity" or personhood, and we aren't to rely on ability to communicate within the 
species, what would Lederberg have us rely on? 
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Lederberg's protracted ambivalence on this point captures perfectly the feelings 
of moral ambivalence that have characterized our policy positions on human GE. On the 
one hand, there is the pull of the psychological view of personhood, which assumes that 
a) it is in virtue of being persons that we are morally important, and b) personhood is 
essentially psychological. On this view, fetuses are not included as part of humanity, and 
opinions to the contrary are the product of mere emotionalism  
On the other hand, there is an appeal to emotional attachments to justify our 
ethical prohibition against infanticide, a practice that - much to Lederberg's chagrin -
suggests itself given the elevation of the psychological view and the assumption that our 
emotional attachments to fetuses are morally irrelevant. And when the incompatibility of 
these competing ethical inclinations leaps into full view, demanding resolution, then any 
attempt to give criteria for "humanity" is dismissed as "intellectual arrogance." 
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Given the difficult intellectual terrain through which we have traveled in the 
preceding chapters, one cannot feel wholly unsympathetic to the latter assertion. 
Nevertheless, as the Lederberg-Ramsey debate so capably demonstrates, much of ethical 
significance hangs in the balance The fact that the ferocity of abortion politics has not 
abated over the course of the ensuing three decades is further testimony to the importance 
of these questions And to the extent that we find the notion of human being-ness 
plausible, the ambivalence captured by Lederberg's views may be alleviated, at least in 
part. 
In what ways does human being-ness help to resolve the moral ambivalence that 
we feel about abortion? On the view Cockburn and Diamond defend, emotions, attitudes, 
and values are of primary ethical importance. They are not disparaged as just so much 
static interference getting in the way of a clear signal - the facts of the matter - that 
would indicate the proper moral response. The fact that we instantaneously and viscerally 
respond to human fetuses and infants is the moral response. Thus, on this view, the 
charge that our attachment to fetuses and infants is "mere emotionalism" misses the 
point. They are human beings, and our "emotionalism" is a morally important 
recognition of our shared humanity. 
The psychological view of personhood, which serves us well in many cases, has 
its shortcomings, and it is those shortcomings upon which Lederberg stumbles. Attempts 
to give defining criteria for (morally significant) persons by looking to certain features of 
human beings inevitably seem inadequate As we noted in the previous chapter, such 
attempts have the result that "not all human beings will emerge as beings who are not to 
be killed" (Cockburn, 1990, p. 112-113) We now have a case in point- infants. 
On the psychological view, why is it morally wrong to painlessly kill infants 
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when their future prospects look bleak? Think of the circumstances in which some give 
serious consideration to abortion. Maybe the infant has Down syndrome. The range of 
disability in Down syndrome children is great. The degree of mental retardation in some 
cases is severe, but in other cases is comparatively mild  In some cases, there are 
extensive problems with internal organs, such as the heart, and in other cases not For 
parents considering abortion who would not abort in mild cases of Down syndrome, 
would it not make more sense to wait until the child is born so that a thorough assessment 
of the disability can be made? If the child is mildly disabled then its life is spared; and if 
it is severely disabled, then its life is terminated. In contrast, abortion looks like a poor 
option, for one takes the chance of terminating the life of a fetus with mild Down 
syndrome. It might be objected that we do not terminate the lives of even profoundly 
retarded infants because the level of psychological functioning is still high enough to 
qualify such infants as persons But, as discussed earlier, relying solely on psychological 
criteria leaves us in the apparently inconsistent position of killing higher animals and 
sparing infants even when the former possess greater psychological capacities than the 
latter either do or will in the future. 
Others might opt for abortion even in circumstances in which the future child is 
not expected to be disabled Consider a case in which the expectant mother is diagnosed 
with a terminal disease. The mother may consider the future prospects for her unborn 
child to be quite bleak. Perhaps other things make her expectation reasonable - the 
absence or limited availability of a father, the absence or unwillingness of siblings or 
others who might provide a loving home, and so on. For those who consider an abortion 
morally justifiable in this case, would it not also be morally justifiable for the mother to 
terminate the life of her newborn child if the mother's diagnosis came shortly after 
delivery? 
The suggestion that in cases such as these we might be justifed in killing infants 
strikes most of us as either sheer lunacy or simple barbarism. But the point here is not to 
call this into question The point is, if we accept the patent immorality of killing infants, 
why is it so difficult to give the reasons? 
On the human being-centered view, infants are just recognized as human beings 
The claim that one's status as a human being must be controversial unless the category 
human being can be reduced to certain defining features is rejected. As it was expressed 
above, our attitude towards the infant is "an attitude towards a soul;" we are not "of the 
opinion that he has a soul" (Wittgenstein, quoted in Cockburn, 1990, p. 6) When a 
newborn is in distress - for one of the many mysterious reasons that newborns become 
distressed - the effect that this can have on a roomful of adults is dramatic. Initially, 
there may be some sympathetic laughter and general clucking from the wise and 
experienced ones But as the episode goes on and one after another technique fails to 
comfort, the tension in the room becomes palpable. A great scurrying may ensue as all 
and sundry try their hand. Or alternatively, the child may be whisked into another room 
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by the stressed parents for some intensive intervention. The desire to console an 
inconsolable newborn can, like nothing else, arouse pity in us. We respond 
instantaneously to the cries, the flushed and contorted face And we do so even when we 
are convinced that the source of distress is nothing more than a temporary gastrointestinal 
imbalance. 
The human form, as has already been noted, is important here, especially the eyes 
and face. And just as we are moved by the sight of a newborn, its gestures and 
expressions, so are we moved by the sight of a fetus Of course, our opportunities for 
viewing fetuses are normally quite limited. But even the blurry image of the sonogram, 
in which the limbs and other physical features can be distinguished, carries with it a 
deeper significance than would an image of an internal organ or an embryo in utero. 
Among animal biologists, emb,yo refers to all stages from the single fertilized egg cell 
through about six to eight weeks gestational age, when recognizable features of the adult 
organism begin to appear, at which point fetus is used (Silver, 1997, p. 39)  On the 
psychological view, there is no ethical significance attached to the appearance of these 
physical features On the human being-centered view, these features are ethically 
significant, and thus the distinction between embryo and fetus is ethically important. 
Dworkin's insights into abortion and the nature of human "sacredness," though 
insightful, seemed to leave no room for the ethical significance of human form On 
Dworkin's view (see Chapter 4), there are two kinds of intrinsic human value at play in 
our reasoning about abortion. We called the two "natural sacredness" and "human 
sacredness " Natural sacredness is inherent in the biological creation. That is, the 
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embryo or fetus, in virtue of the biological creative investment embodied in them, 
possesses a non-incremental intrinsic value, or sacredness. Children and adults, in 
addition to natural sacredness, also possess "human sacredness" in virtue of the life 
commitments, projects, plans, and so forth, that are central to their lives as social 
creatures. What was not implied by Dworkin's theory of the natural sacredness of 
embryos and fetuses was that human fetuses were deserving of special ethical 
significance. If it is the "natural investment" - the creative act of biological development 
and its product - that grounds natural sacredness, then it seems we should have the same 
feelings of reverence and awe for the developing mouse or goat fetus as we have for the 
developing human fetus And while we may be struck by the magnificence of fetal 
development generally, there is a heightened responsiveness in the case of the human 
fetus. We are especially moved by the developing human form. 
None of this is to say, by ascribing human being-ness to fetuses, that this ought to 
be the overriding moral consideration in the abortion debate. How much weight it should 
carry is a subject for another day. What is being claimed here is that human being-ness 
is, as it was put earlier, "not nothing." Our (Wittgensteinian) attitude towards human 
fetuses is ethically significant, and therefore deserves to be taken seriously as one of 
several important considerations that have a legitimate place in our arguments about 
abortion. 
Thus far we have discussed the possible implications of our human being-
centered ethics for human genetic engineering and for abortion. The fnal area that might 
be influenced by human being-ness is the treatment of disabled persons 
Treatment of the disabled 
It has been noted several times that the psychological view seems to imply that at 
least some of the mentally disabled do not qualify as persons according to that view. 
Since it is in virtue of our personhood that we are morally important beings, it follows 
that the intellectually disabled are morally diminished as well 
175 
In contrast, the human being-centered view does not conceive of human beings as 
minds-plus-bodies It not only does not accept the skimming off of the mental or 
psychological as morally significant; by the same token it also does not accept the 
abandoning of the bodily as morally insignificant  The extended, tangible human being -
rather than mind and body - deserves a fundamental place in our ontology By rejecting 
the exclusively psychological criteria for personhood, the human being-centered view 
avoids any implication that the intellectually disabled might properly be classified as 
human "non-persons>' 
We have spoken quite a bit of the psychological view and its influence. But this 
is not to say that all or even most people adhere to an unqualified view of persons as 
morally important only in virtue of their psychological capacities Humanitarian 
impulses towards others - disabled and non-disabled, human and non-human - are well 
represented in society Thus, policies having to do with the treatment of, for example, the 
institutionalized mentally disabled can be expected to have appropriate protections for 
human rights. 
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On the other hand, the actual treatment of the institutionalized mentally disabled 
varies from place to place. In spite of the expression of a proper moral regard in policy 
statements, the implementation of policy may not faithfully reflect that moral regard. We 
are a society that, arguably, has become indifferent about caring for the mentally 
disabled. The policies of deinstitutionalization that were implemented by states 
beginning in the 1970s were often well intentioned. The idea was to put an end to the 
warehousing of the mentally ill; to provide care in the least restrictive setting; and to 
acknowledge their civil rights In implementation, however, thousands were released 
from institutions with nowhere to go. It is for this reason that so many of today's 
homeless are persons with mental disabilities 
What does this have to do with the human being-centered view? Although many 
causes may contribute to our sometimes negligent or indifferent treatment of the mentally 
disabled, the influence of the mind-body dichotomy in Western thought should not be 
dismissed out of hand. Perhaps we as a society would be more inclined to be responsive 
to persons with mental disabilities if the psychological view were not such a pervasive 
part of our way of thinking Perhaps an ethical view that emphasizes an "imaginative 
understanding" of others would serve us better. If we became more open to the idea that 
our instantaneous moral responsiveness towards other human beings was important, then 
our treatment of the mentally disabled - our implementation of our admirably worded 
policies - might be significantly improved And more generally, our openness to the 
human being-centered view might rejuvenate our ethics by adding breadth to our moral 
community and depth to our moral regard for those in it. 
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